BSIP83: Decouple BitAssets from Platform Governance Process

[jmjatlanta]

Update: The current text is being revised based on discussions with the community including the Committee, and will be updated in the future

[ryanRfox]

ACK

[bitcrab]

this is a complete joking, right?

[TechsUsInc]

In reference to voting; In my opinion this is also a perfect opportunity to include valuable BTS that is either locked up in Open Orders and/or staking and apply it towards voting with the hourly maintenance.

In reference to BP's; I suggest each BP submit substantial collateral on regular intervals which both helps the development of the network, and it forces them to be vested in the platform. Failure to produce satisfactory from the community results in forfeiture of vesting.

[thul3]

The most stupid idea i have read about giving power of price feeds to a small group.

"It is arguable who “owns” BTS"

Is it really ?Because i thought bitshares is being run like a business and for businesses and the current commercial law and business practise is cleary adding voting rights of bought stocks via margin to the debtor. Who is taking the risk to lose BTS?The debtor ?Or the simple holder ? Biitshares is borrowing me money but don't allow me to buy fully worth BTS, but just BTS without voting rights ?

If i buy with the my borrowed money EOS coins will my EOS coins also have no voting rights ?

Defenition of Collateral: Collateral is an asset that a lender accepts as security for a loan. If the borrower defaults on the loan payments, the lender can seize the collateral and resell it to recoup the losses.

So till the collateral is not being seized the ownership of that collateral is clearly owned by the debtor

[thul3]

"If given the choice, I don't believe that voting power correction for margin positions will ever make it."

"I believe it won't pass the voting, so why we waste time/efforts/funds including it in the BSIP? Having it in the BSIP means other features in the BSIP won't pass as well."

"That's the whole point. Including it in the BSIP forces the affected parties to compromise."

"Why to force?"

"because as you said...it would never get voted on its own."

At least people should know what it really is about

[bitProfessor]

1、I agree that witnesses are only responsible for production block and no longer responsible for feeding price. 2、i disagree giving power of price feeds to a small group.This is the stupidest thing.

[bitcrab]

it make sense to do the decouple, however we need be careful to select the new manager and price feeder, the new smartcoin manager should be similar to committee-account, a multisig account with members be voted by stakeholders, and the new price feeders should also be voted by stakeholders.

the adjustment of voting power should not be included in this BSIP.

and I suggest to add one more content - to pay salary to committee members as well as the new smartcoin manager.

[bitcrab]

after communicating with some people, I feel maybe BSIP management is the key problem? this BSIP comes out because BSIP76 comes out not perfectly following the core team process and make core team blamed, although it get enough support in voting?

but, even we do the decouple, are we sure that there will be no BSIP any more in smartcoin governance?

I don't think so. maybe we need to review the BSIP management process.

[btsfav]

I think it's a good idea to add specialized groups / break down the management. However, there will never be a "Maker" success, that train is long gone, so don't expect magic. Also, adding China to this BSIP makes it completely biased and worthless. Not the best move, I can not vote for it.

[pmconrad]

We have suggested the cn-vote account because it was our impression that cn-vote represents a large majority of the interests of debt holders. It seems this was a misjudgement on our part. We are of course open for other solutions. We are in no way connected with the cn-vote account, nor have we approached cn-vote wrt this proposal before we announced it yesterday.

Handing the BitAssets over to a normal account has the advantage that it is a comparatively simple change and could be executed quickly when approved. The same goes with assigning cn-vote as the sole price feeder - it is a simple first step, and afterwards the new BitAsset manager can assign whoever he wishes.

[sschiessl-bcp]

We have suggested the cn-vote account because it was our impression that cn-vote represents a large majority of the interests of debt holders. It seems this was a misjudgement on our part. We are of course open for other solutions. We are in no way connected with the cn-vote account, nor have we approached cn-vote wrt this proposal before we announced it yesterday.

Handing the BitAssets over to a normal account has the advantage that it is a comparatively simple change and could be executed quickly when approved. The same goes with assigning cn-vote as the sole price feeder - it is a simple first step, and afterwards the new BitAsset manager can assign whoever he wishes.

For a more sophisticated solution, the committee-account could remain the owner, while being able to appoint a SmartCoin manager that is allowed to set certain parameters / options, couldn't? This way the community would still have the ultimate say, reducing the level of privatization.

[shulthz]

We have suggested the cn-vote account because it was our impression that cn-vote represents a large majority of the interests of debt holders. It seems this was a misjudgement on our part. We are of course open for other solutions. We are in no way connected with the cn-vote account, nor have we approached cn-vote wrt this proposal before we announced it yesterday.

Handing the BitAssets over to a normal account has the advantage that it is a comparatively simple change and could be executed quickly when approved. The same goes with assigning cn-vote as the sole price feeder - it is a simple first step, and afterwards the new BitAsset manager can assign whoever he wishes.

This bsip didn't clear something and not give a clear action/management of the programme. I didn't think this BSIP have a number first.

What it talk about is the asset of community, not belong to the cn-vote or someone. If the cn-vote didn't accept that, and what did you want to do, force the cn-vote or destroy these assets? We need to know what's your thought clearly for that.

and didn't you consider or clealy talk about the fault of sole price feeder?

This is shirking the responsibility to a third party.

[pmconrad]

What it talk about is the asset of community If the cn-vote didn't accept that,

I think it is clear that this proposal will not pass without the approval of the cn-vote and the majority of the community. Like I said, cn-vote may have been a poor choice due to a misjudgement on our side. We are open for other suggestions.

and didn't you consider or clealy talk about the fault of sole price feeder?

I don't understand the question, sorry.

[bangzi1001]

after communicating with some people, I feel maybe BSIP management is the key problem? this BSIP comes out because BSIP76 comes out not perfectly following the core team process and make core team blamed, although it get enough support in voting?

but, even we do the decouple, are we sure that there will be no BSIP any more in smartcoin governance?

I don't think so. maybe we need to review the BSIP management process.

BSIP76 is relevant to committee and witnessness but not relevant to core team. I suggest any changes on BitAsset parameter or price feed should post at committee's Github: https://github.com/bitshares/committee-tools/

[shulthz]

Like I said, cn-vote may have been a poor choice due to a misjudgement on our side.

Who is " our"?

and didn't you consider or clealy talk about the fault of sole price feeder?

I don't understand the question, sorry.

The question is very simple: The danger of the sole price feeder.

First i am very sorry for my terrible attitude, the information what i got from this BSIP is that: let we shirk the responsibility of bitasset to cn-vote quickly, and didn't give any soloution for cn-vote, and then we can joke the cn-vote and people will complain the cn-vote, it will not be our business anymore.

[pmconrad]

Who is " our"?

The authors of the BSIP.

The question is very simple: The danger of the sole price feeder.

The new manager can appoint more than one price feeder if he wants. The single feeder is only a simple solution until the new manager takes up his duties.

[shulthz]

Who is " our"?

The authors of the BSIP.

So the authors of the BSIP is not very rigorous, this should not happen. cn-vote only is a proxy like baozi or beos. Every proxy should not be a owner of bitasset.

The question is very simple: The danger of the sole price feeder.

The new manager can appoint more than one price feeder if he wants. The single feeder is only a simple solution until the new manager takes up his duties.

This is not the solution, just push the responsibility to the new manager and want the new manager to solve this problem. It is very irresponsible.

I can easily got the information from other program for the price feed: https://blog.makerdao.com/introducing-oracles-v2-and-defi-feeds/

[Agorise]

Relying on algos to humans is our preference.

We're also the largest holder of bitgold and bitsilver so of course we don't want our family's life savings to be put in jeopardy either, which it clearly is right now.

If bitassets (mpa's) are to be taken out of the control of the chain itself, a couple thoughts:

1. Think of each mpa as a product that a business is selling. Competition is good.
2. Each business that feeds an mpa competes to have people use their mpa. Fees, spreads and other things could be used to throw a few sats at the people who host the feed for that mpa too, and let those businesses decide what kind of fees they want to charge.
3. NOT a fan at all of salaries as bitcrab mentioned above. Salaries most of the time, over time, will breed apathy, laziness and an un-competitive attitude towards the product or service that you business sells. Think more in terms of co-ops. The more successful your business is, the more fees/income will be generated, and hence distributed to the feed producers/publishers.
4. Create more competing mpa's and have those businesses feeds/pegs/accuracy/use compete with one another. bitWheat, bitCattle, bitCorn, bitPlatinum

If for example Bitshares has 20 mpa's, then Bitshares is also large enough now to have 20 competing committees who run those 20 products. Competition breeds innovation, efficiency and many times, success.

Oh, and reducing the world's "whale problem" a bit is probably also of benefit.

[TechsUsInc]

How does the terminology of this BSIP not infer a replace-as-fee or extended block header hard fork?

[froooze]

1. Think of each mpa as a product that a business is selling. Competition is good.

YES

I see the need for a new group/token called price-feeder, which is independent from witnesses. Asset owner needs to buy price-feed-tokens and creates a whitelist for potential price-feeder.
Price-feeder are selected and paid by asset owner to provide price feeds.

[MichelSantos]

The current text is being revised based on discussions with the community including the Committee, and will be updated in the future

[pmconrad]

After much discussion we have made two significant amendments to the proposal:

1. The voting weight change has been removed.
2. We have replaced the suggestion to appoint "cn-vote" as the bitasset manager with a voting mechanism. The committee will retain full control over the manager account, but can hand over day-to-day operations to a different entity.

[shulthz]

Some bitasset didn't have the threshold price, what will happen to them?

[pmconrad]

What's that mean? "interested parties""?

Whoever is interested in voting on this. And still has the voting tokens, obviously.

Some bitasset didn't have the threshold price, what will happen to them?

This BSIP applies to all committee-owned bitassets, regardless of threshold price.

[shulthz]

What's that mean? "interested parties""?

Whoever is interested in voting on this. And still has the voting tokens, obviously.

This should be the stakeholder of BTS, not the "interested parties", please make the words more accurate.

Some bitasset didn't have the threshold price, what will happen to them?

This BSIP applies to all committee-owned bitassets, regardless of threshold price.

It's very dangerous like what @abitmore said.

Need more serious and specific action.

[MichelSantos]

I, as an author, support this proposal

[MichelSantos]

Creation of BITASSET.MANAGER asset

If this creation is necessary? please explain.

This is the new voting token for the new BitAsset manager.

"The initial distribution will be made equal to the current BTS distribution." "Subsequently, tokens of this new asset can be freely transferred or traded."

[shulthz]

Creation of BITASSET.MANAGER asset

If this creation is necessary? please explain.

This is the new voting token for the new BitAsset manager.

What's that mean of “new voting token”？

[shulthz]

I don't think the “Creation of BITASSET.MANAGER asset” is necessary.

This will also push the bitasset to be a third party, it's no different with before words.

What's the right method is which the stakeholder of BTS vote the price feeder and committee of bitasset.

[pmconrad]

This will also push the bitasset to be a third party, it's no different with before words. What's the right method is which the stakeholder of BTS vote the price feeder and committee of bitasset.

As the title of the BSIP implies, this is exactly the point. We suggest to decouple the bitAssets from the platform. Initially, the BITASSET.MANAGER distribution will match BTS distribution. This can and will change, when the new asset starts being traded independently from BTS. "interested parties" can buy more of these tokens, and those who aren't interested can sell them.

This should be the stakeholder of BTS, not the "interested parties"

You are of course entitled to have a different opinion, but in the opinion of the authors what should happen is what this BSIP proposes.

[thul3]

""interested parties" can buy more of these tokens, and those who aren't interested can sell them."

Is this a joke ?

[thul3]

or the second trojan horse from dev team trying to create a possibility to give control over bitassets to private group ?

[thul3]

Update: The current text is being revised based on discussions with the community including the Committee, and will be updated in the future

" As the title of the BSIP implies, this is exactly the point. We suggest to decouple the bitAssets from the platform. Initially, the BITASSET.MANAGER distribution will match BTS distribution. This can and will change, when the new asset starts being traded independently from BTS. "interested parties" can buy more of these tokens, and those who aren't interested can sell them."

COMMITTEE said cleary that it do not want to give away bitassets management to third parties.

[pmconrad]

COMMITTEE said cleary that it do not want to give away bitassets management to third parties.

This is reflected in the current text. The committee account will be the owner of the new manager account, which gives them full control.

second trojan horse from dev team trying to create a possibility to give control over bitassets to private group

It's not a joke, and not a trojan either. It is our opinion that BitAsset governance should be decoupled from platform governance. The title clearly says so.

It is also our opinion that currently BitAssets are effectively controlled by a small group of debt holders. The fact that witnesses have been coerced into providing a fake price feed clearly proves this. This BSIP attempts to clean up the current governance mess by creating a clear separation of duties.

[shulthz]

It is also our opinion that currently BitAssets are effectively controlled by a small group of debt holders. The fact that witnesses have been coerced into providing a fake price feed clearly proves this.

This is not the fact, BSIP76 is voted in by the stakeholder of bts, if someone disagree it, he needs to bid for votes, this is very fair for everyone. No body can coerce witnesses, but the witnesses need to follow the vote. And don't call "fake price feed", if the authors always have this thought in the price feed, this will can't make this BSIP better, and this BSIP will can't make somthing better.

This BSIP attempts to clean up the current governance mess by creating a clear separation of duties.

Whether you admit it or not, the debt holders has a big Voting weights in the governance now. The debt holder is tightly connected with the community and a part of community, not "interested parties" or "private group", they are inalienable part to the platform and community. If the authors have the hostile attitude to the debt holder, can't make thing better.

[pmconrad]

No body can coerce witnesses, but the witnesses need to follow the vote.

Fact is that witnesses were voted out for not providing a fake feed even before the vote was active.

And don't call "fake price feed",

It is my personal opinion that the feed is fake.

But let's agree that we disagree on some points and focus the BSIP contents. The wording in the BSIP is sufficiently neutral in that regard IMO.

[shulthz]

Fact is that witnesses were voted out for not providing a fake feed even before the vote was active.

This is a preconceived idea, every wittness will vote out for something, it was decided by the stakeholder, and the stakeholder can't forecast the behavior of the wittness which will be actived.

[abitmore]

Transferring voting rights from BTS to another token is not acceptable and should never be an option. PR reverted.

[pmconrad]

That is not for you to decide single-handedly!

[sschiessl-bcp]

Transferring voting rights from BTS to another token is not acceptable and should never be an option. PR reverted.

BTS holders may decide it, unlikely but who knows. Given the controversy this bsip might still have been merged prematurely.

What process do we have for conflicts like this? Discuss and iterate.

[jmjatlanta]

Evidently, the current process is if Abit likes it, he pushes it through without discussion. If he doesn't like it, he reverts it even if there was thorough discussion. I think the process needs improvement.

See https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/pull/249

[thul3]

Who liked it outside of the core team ?

Am asking cause i didn't saw the committee supporting it or any proxy.

[pmconrad]

Who liked it outside of the core team ?

That is beside the point. No single member has a veto right to anything.

[thul3]

Would be nice if core could also focus on non LTM refferals to get bitshares real growth instead discussing on something which clearly has no chance to pass.

I asked core to have a look at it how it can be done since i'm not a tech guy and i guess this is currently the most important part for bitshares to get growth.Would be nice to see Core focusing on that the same way as you focus on this one.

[shulthz]

Transferring voting rights from BTS to another token is not acceptable and should never be an option. We shouldn't approved any PR which clearly has no chance to pass, this is a waste of time and money.

What we are talking about is the base of BTS, this PR shouldn't be approved if we have any key disagreement on it.

[MichelSantos]

@shulthz I was unaware that anything could be considered "unacceptable" given the BSIPs that have have been presented to voters during the past year