bitshares / bsips

BitShares Improvement Proposals and Protocols. These technical documents describe the process of updating and improving the BitShares blockchain and technical ecosystem.
https://bitshares.github.io
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NEW BSIP: Redefine and clear the scope of Committee #282

Open shulthz opened 4 years ago

shulthz commented 4 years ago

I think:

"Committee" just is adviser,not "council" , "commission" and "Board".

"Committee" only needs to follow the decision of the holders of BTS and give the advice to the holders of BTS, can't replace the holders of BTS to make decison.

Every onchain governace must vote through the holders of BTS, not the Committee.

We build the WPS system, everything can be solved through WPS system,didn‘t need the Committee replacing the holders of BTS to make decison.

We must remember the bottom line, the holders of BTS have all the power, only they can make decisions, not the "Committee".

If the committee have the power to make decisons,then we build a Nazi agent for the holders of BTS.

If the committees have any advice for community, they can make a issue in BSIP or BAIP, after fully discussed and reasonable process in BSIP and BAIP, the committees can make a WP through the committee account, after voting by the holders of BTS, then the committee can follow the decision of holders of BTS.

Any WP can't cede power from BTS holders to committee.


Need to design a threshold which only 1/3 committees can be replaced in every 3 days!

Need to design a threshold which only 1/3 witnesses can be replaced in every 3 days!


For the onchain governace vote like BSIP/BAIP:

I suggest:

  1. Every worker fund should come from the WPS pool(donation exception);

  2. A BSIP worker should get continuous seven days pay from the reserver pool; If there have a YES/NO BSIP worker proposal, which got more votes and keep the higher vote than another in continuous seven days, and it shoud get continuous pay from the reserver pool in the competition process of keeping the higher vote than another in continuous seven days;

  3. This day pay must be fully worker pay.

  4. We must set a Threshold to make sure the vote can't be cheated and ensure the turnout

The Threshold must >=3/8 (the worker which have the hightest votes+the wittness which have the hightest votes) Example: The hightest worker votes is 675557848, the hightest wittness vote is 941299444 So the Threshold=3/8 1616857292=606,321,484.5

SO, a BSIP/BAIP want to be approved, must meet 2,3,4.

  1. This voting threshold mechanism should be voted by the holders of BTS,and get continuous 30 days pay from the reserver pool, then we can consider the voting threshold mechanism approved.
sschiessl-bcp commented 4 years ago

Ultimately, committee can't be forced to do anything. Any instruction -- with or without a BSIP/BAIP/Whatever -- towards committee is more of a recommendation. And if it is voted active, it is proof of what the voting power holders want.

If a committee member does not adhere to it, or does something else, the voting power holders do have the instant and ultimate vote-of-no-confidence by voting them out and replacing them with someone more suitable.

In that sense I need to disagree with that statement:

"Every onchain governace must vote through the holders of BTS, not the Committee."

The voting of committee follows something like an indirect plutocracy, and committee members should act in best interest of voting power holders. Still, the voting power holders do not have direct control over committee, they merely did a vote of confidence.

This statement does not reflect a personal opinion in either direction, just my view on committee.

abitmore commented 4 years ago

The on-chain governance structure (written in code) is as simple as that, if a voter disagrees with a decision that a committee member made, the voter doesn't vote for the committee member and/or votes for other committee members.

Other rules are all not written in code.

If to make a BSIP to change rules, please focus on the in-code part but not the non-code part.

shulthz commented 4 years ago

The on-chain governance structure (written in code) is as simple as that, if a voter disagrees with a decision that a committee member made, the voter doesn't vote for the committee member and/or votes for other committee members.

Thing is not like what you think is so simple, we must get the lessons from the real world, not if if a voter disagrees with a decision that a committee member made, the voter doesn't vote for the committee member and/or votes for other committee members.

If things was so simple, the real world will become so easily, and didn't need so many laws, and didn't need the “Division of Power”,EOS didn‘t need the Constitution.

You can't make sure the turnout, so you can't make sure the committee. When we give the power to committee, just like we give the knife to them, when they stabbed us, you tell me to chose another one who will not stab the cummunity?

Decision MUST be made by the BTS holders, can't be made by the committee, this is the the bottom line.

shulthz commented 4 years ago

Ultimately, committee can't be forced to do anything. Any instruction -- with or without a BSIP/BAIP/Whatever -- towards committee is more of a recommendation. And if it is voted active, it is proof of what the voting power holders want.

If a committee member does not adhere to it, or does something else, the voting power holders do have the instant and ultimate vote-of-no-confidence by voting them out and replacing them with someone more suitable.

In that sense I need to disagree with that statement:

"Every onchain governace must vote through the holders of BTS, not the Committee."

The voting of committee follows something like an indirect plutocracy, and committee members should act in best interest of voting power holders. Still, the voting power holders do not have direct control over committee, they merely did a vote of confidence.

This statement does not reflect a personal opinion in either direction, just my view on committee.

Yes, it is proof of what the voting power holders want,

just like: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

If we didn't have this, things become embarrassed, the committee will follow what? and the committee can do something without the approve of community, as we didn't have enough turnout, if the committee members should act in best interest of voting power holders, we can do this through vote directly, why we need committee?

sschiessl-bcp commented 4 years ago

The on-chain governance structure (written in code) is as simple as that, if a voter disagrees with a decision that a committee member made, the voter doesn't vote for the committee member and/or votes for other committee members.

Thing is not like what you think is so simple, we must get the lessons from the real world, not if if a voter disagrees with a decision that a committee member made, the voter doesn't vote for the committee member and/or votes for other committee members.

If things was so simple, the real world will become so easily.

You can't make sure the turnout, so you can't make sure the committee. When we give the power to committee, just like we give the knife to them, when they stabbed us, you tell me to chose another one who will not stab the cummunity?

Decision MUST be made by the BTS holders, can't be made by the committee, this is the the bottom line.

What you are looking for is the review_period of all committee proposals. The review_period allows the voters to adjust their committee votes and even replace members BEFORE an action is executed. So maybe you want to discuss extending the review_period?

In your metaphor: The review period holds the time while they try to stab you, and allows you to replace the person that holds the knife. If you (the voters) now choose a person that does not want to stab you anymore, you are saved :)

shulthz commented 4 years ago

What you are looking for is the review_period of all committee proposals. The review_period allows the voters to adjust their committee votes and even replace members BEFORE an action is executed. So maybe you want to discuss extending the review_period?

This is not only the review_period, but also a guideline, let the committee know what they should do and what they shouldn't do.

With this , we can find out easily who is capturing the power from the community, even the committee is the representative of the big voting power holders.

POW must have > 50% hash to decide, but we only need 6.7/29.5=23%...

and we must clear know, why the committee want the power?