Concern: Validators may be selling special treatment and bypassing Bruno burn

[NullQubit]

Take a look at this transaction: 0xc5fff8dfd621b964fabcd9e240d3a6d72927edb5f5195d9d41d6eb0a1859c92a

Things to note:

1. Gas price is 0
2. It is the sell transaction of a front-run operation, so it was prioritized even though gas price is 0.
3. Block was validated by MathWallet
4. There is a BNB transfer going to MathWallet validator (Possibly as payment for the special treatment).

There are many more of these transactions going on to the same contract address with the same behavior. At least 3 validators seem to be involved (MathWallet, TwStaking and NodeReal). The transactions are also not publicly visible from the transaction pool (Possibly they are submitted directly to the validators). Clearly, there is an agreement between the originator of the transactions and the validators and the goal is to perform front-running without risk.

MathWallet denied this, but we can all see what's going on.

Needless to say, because the gas price is 0, there is no burn (Introduced in Bruno upgrade). It's possible that this is another thing these validators are starting to explore to bypass the burn feature and maximize their profits.

Is this behavior allowed from validators? I don't believe that it's healthy for the network if validators do such things for profit. Validators are held to high standards and are supposed to be trustworthy.

For completion, here is also the buy transaction associated with the above sell transaction: 0x762e097ab15fbefeee0e91c6a444e492ec7e9e00c84cad2a4c4765e1f85efe47

[0xRango]

I guess mev-geth is forked for BSC. Never seen it before, is it happen after the transaction fee burn?

[serfiraz21]

Front runnings by validators with ZERO gas price! i see 3 validators(MathWallet, TwStaking ,NodeReal) That's awesome Great BSC!

[toriqahmads]

This more worthy than doing gas war. Waiting explanation.

But I don't see any fee transfered to the validators, it's transfered only on sell transaction. Interesting issue

[geekdadley]

I think these validators deserved being jailed forever.

[Lucienest]

Zero fee transaction is considered unhealthy and dangerous for the network. Whether it's for special treatment or malicious intention. The validators in question are responsible for such a shady execution behavior. Hence I believe their stakes should be slashed as per the BSC Consensus Agreement.

[caiiiyua]

Looks like at least those 3 validators are running MEV-GETH fork now, maybe use nodereal's directRoute will send bundles to those validators. 1/7 chance though

[realuncle]

I am a developer from Nodereal. As we strive to provide top quality infrastructure for BSC and more blockchain users, NodeReal are researching with some partners on some features that will benefit users with special requirements and help them to use ensure their transaction security and fairness, for example, the https://community.venus.io/t/venus-protocol-weekly-update-w40-2021-shortfall-recovery-report/1890, but not frontrun or MEV. Direct Route is such a product but still in Alpha stage. 0 gas price was a bug overlooked by the engineers, which doesn’t make sense in the economics as no validator will survive without rewarding their delegators and the network. Thank the community for the discovery. Stay tuned for the Direct Route public rollout.

[48ClubIan]

I am a developer from Nodereal. As we strive to provide top quality infrastructure for BSC and more blockchain users, NodeReal are researching with some partners on some features that will benefit users with special requirements and help them to use ensure their transaction security and fairness, for example, the https://community.venus.io/t/venus-protocol-weekly-update-w40-2021-shortfall-recovery-report/1890, but not frontrun or MEV. Direct Route is such a product but still in Alpha stage. 0 gas price was a bug overlooked by the engineers, which doesn’t make sense in the economics as no validator will survive without rewarding their delegators and the network. Thank the community for the discovery. Stay tuned for the Direct Route public rollout.

Dude we are not blind, 0 gas price comes with an internal transfer directly to your validator address. Of course not all txs go with 0 gas, there must be victim right? Delegators still get reward but validator gets extra benefit this way.

[myuniswap2000]

bot:https://bscscan.com/tx/0x762e097ab15fbefeee0e91c6a444e492ec7e9e00c84cad2a4c4765e1f85efe47 Position 0 gas 0gwei user1:https://bscscan.com/tx/0xb14dceb29f5b400b98f330ecfbdc9e5fb5b46da5b1f91282e64365153a9a547f Position 1 gas 7gwei bot:https://bscscan.com/tx/0xc5fff8dfd621b964fabcd9e240d3a6d72927edb5f5195d9d41d6eb0a1859c92a Position 2 gas 0gwei user2:https://bscscan.com/tx/0xb53d369a55721e88693b12d8bcbccb553068e7299d8d88ac2927b9090647a1fe Position 3 gas 584.806682007 gwei

so why user1 is before user2?
You broke the rules, you hijack users. you made money for yourself~

[noXi89]

Venus NFTs: "The matches happen off chain to ensure real time capabilities and no fees are incurred for the player." https://community.venus.io/t/venus-protocol-weekly-update-w40-2021-shortfall-recovery-report/1890

Example: https://bscscan.com/tx/0x457d103487abf50ff1379549db6fc4bdc6f547ff7296aa7a884f26ebb811a8d5

This clearly is frontrunning by definition and you are risking a jail. @48ClubSirIan

[Lucienest]

I am a developer from Nodereal. As we strive to provide top quality infrastructure for BSC and more blockchain users, NodeReal are researching with some partners on some features that will benefit users with special requirements and help them to use ensure their transaction security and fairness, for example, the https://community.venus.io/t/venus-protocol-weekly-update-w40-2021-shortfall-recovery-report/1890, but not frontrun or MEV. Direct Route is such a product but still in Alpha stage. 0 gas price was a bug overlooked by the engineers, which doesn’t make sense in the economics as no validator will survive without rewarding their delegators and the network. Thank the community for the discovery. Stay tuned for the Direct Route public rollout.

I can say for sure it's a frontrunning. We are not blind, stop acting weird or justifying their action by any means. These validators must lose their delegation or we might have an unregulated chain where a validator won't have to care about the mechanisms or aggreements.

[fxfactorial]

@realuncle open to collaboration with your team or any other validator , DMs open Twitter.com/@edgararout

[Alexitdv]

https://bscscan.com/address/0xaa6b37630906e4d7ad8591a1e5124e69cf052677 20.000 + transactions with zero fees

[noXi89]

but not frontrun or MEV.

Are you sure? https://github.com/node-real/go-direct-route

NodeReal MEV is a permissionless, transparent service for efficient MEV extraction on EVM blockchains.

[psdlt]

People: praise blockchain for censorship and centralised governance resistance. Also people: asks for censorship and centralised governance when something that they don't like happens.

I mean... "frontrunning-as-a-service" is definitely not cool, but it is what it is... I'm honestly surprised this wasn't (im)ported from ETH sooner.

[serfiraz21]

I am a developer from Nodereal. As we strive to provide top quality infrastructure for BSC and more blockchain users, NodeReal are researching with some partners on some features that will benefit users with special requirements and help them to use ensure their transaction security and fairness, for example, the https://community.venus.io/t/venus-protocol-weekly-update-w40-2021-shortfall-recovery-report/1890, but not frontrun or MEV. Direct Route is such a product but still in Alpha stage. 0 gas price was a bug overlooked by the engineers, which doesn’t make sense in the economics as no validator will survive without rewarding their delegators and the network. Thank the community for the discovery. Stay tuned for the Direct Route public rollout.

You say not frontrun or MEV. But this is exactly "SANDWICH ATTACK" with zero fee. thats unacceptable for the trusty of network.

my advice is that other validators should check the gasPrice order of the block

[Lucienest]

People: praise blockchain for censorship and centralised governance resistance. Also people: asks for censorship and centralised governance when something that they don't like happens.

I mean... "frontrunning-as-a-service" is definitely not cool, but it is what it is... I'm honestly surprised this wasn't (im)ported from ETH sooner.

Have u even read the BSC's slashing mechanism? BSC has the authority to punish the malicious validators.

[chiuzon]

People: praise blockchain for censorship and centralised governance resistance. Also people: asks for censorship and centralised governance when something that they don't like happens. I mean... "frontrunning-as-a-service" is definitely not cool, but it is what it is... I'm honestly surprised this wasn't (im)ported from ETH sooner.

Have u even read the BSC's slashing mechanism? BSC has the authority to punish the malicious validators.

Why no punishment then ? They look quite fine.

[0xclaudeshannon]

Also looking to collaborate with validators. I have infrastructure ready for you to start getting a cut of arbs on BSC. dms open @0xclaudeshannon

[48ClubIan]

@noXi89 Why do you cue me ? ? ?

[48ClubIan]

People: praise blockchain for censorship and centralised governance resistance. Also people: asks for censorship and centralised governance when something that they don't like happens.

I mean... "frontrunning-as-a-service" is definitely not cool, but it is what it is... I'm honestly surprised this wasn't (im)ported from ETH sooner.

Didn't you realize MEV means off-chain behaviors involved? It's nothing but non-blockchain.

[realuncle]

I am a developer from Nodereal. As we strive to provide top quality infrastructure for BSC and more blockchain users, NodeReal are researching with some partners on some features that will benefit users with special requirements and help them to use ensure their transaction security and fairness, for example, the https://community.venus.io/t/venus-protocol-weekly-update-w40-2021-shortfall-recovery-report/1890, but not frontrun or MEV. Direct Route is such a product but still in Alpha stage. 0 gas price was a bug overlooked by the engineers, which doesn’t make sense in the economics as no validator will survive without rewarding their delegators and the network. Thank the community for the discovery. Stay tuned for the Direct Route public rollout.

You say not frontrun or MEV. But this is exactly "SANDWICH ATTACK" with zero fee. thats unacceptable for the trusty of network.

my advice is that other validators should check the gasPrice order of the block

SANDWICH ATTACK is definitely not our purpose, we will refine the service soon and avoid abusing.

[Lucienest]

People: praise blockchain for censorship and centralised governance resistance. Also people: asks for censorship and centralised governance when something that they don't like happens. I mean... "frontrunning-as-a-service" is definitely not cool, but it is what it is... I'm honestly surprised this wasn't (im)ported from ETH sooner.

Have u even read the BSC's slashing mechanism? BSC has the authority to punish the malicious validators.

Why no punishment then ? They look quite fine.

Not all abusive behaviors gets automatically fined. They don't look fine at all.

[gomes7997]

Binance could easily stop validators from doing this. I wonder what regulators will think about a centralized block chain that allows frontrunning.

[niftyorca]

Can BSC be more centralized than what it already is? Is this something we want?

The thing is, validators will ALWAYS have the ability to do MEV themselves, regardless of what rules you put in place. This is the nature of all EVM chains. Specifically:

• TxPool status is ephemeral, and there is no consensus on what txs are in the TxPool at any point in time, let alone what txs to include or exclude.
• There is NO rule regarding the ordering of txs within a block, and this is completely up to the miner. Parity has multiple options for this for example, and ordering by gas is the default. But if you look at Ethereum about ~40% of blocks don't follow this default setting.
• There is NO rule regarding the acceptable gas price to include in a block prior to EIP1559. A minimum block gas is enforced in EIP1559. I would love to see BSC implement this upgrade though.

It is important to understand that validators will ALWAYS have the ability to do MEV/frontrunning/sandwich. They can in any case censor transactions and put arbitrary gas prices on their own txs as this is paid to themselves anyway. An observer will have no way of detecting this. Flashbots make these tools equally available to all participants in a fair way, and is good for the ecosystem.

[cwazy2020]

Are validators even allowed to run non-standard forks of BSC Geth? My understanding was that this was a slashable offense, regardless of what they are doing with it.

None of this behavior is healthy for the ecosystem. As we have seen with Flashbots on ETH, the inevitable result is effectively all MEV going straight into the pockets of validators. The difference here is that most validators appear to be run by Binance itself, so people will see it as nothing more than a predatory Binance cash grab. Existing users will pull their money and new users will steer clear of BSC.

If they aren’t slashed immediately, and this behavior isn’t explicitly banned, BSC isn’t going to have a future. BNB values will collapse. Nobody wants to throw their money into a black hole that leads straight into CZ’s pocket.

[safuspace]

In a decentralized system, this is an abuse of power. The system ceases to be peer-to-peer in logic, since not all are equal to each other.

[cwazy2020]

In a decentralized system, this is an abuse of power. The system ceases to be peer-to-peer in logic, since not all are equal to each other.

That would be true, if BSC were truly decentralized. It isn't; most of the validators are controlled by Binance, and they are all chosen by Binance. That is the difference between ETH and BSC. That makes this behavior extremely problematic; effectively what this means is that Binance is now going to take all MEV on BSC, and will actively sandwich every trade that they can.

"Come to my house, I'm going to mug you". That's basically the value proposition for BSC if this is allowed to continue. How many people will participate in that?

[ghost]

Is BSC a chain with governance?

We know front-run is evil, it harms real users and it is a crime in traditional stock markets.

We know there are three validators who did helped front-run. We should not make judgement by guessing their intention or their words, but by what they have done and the evidence on chain.

We know Binance can at least kick out the three validators, who have lost the trust of the community.

Let's see what Binance will do.

[niftyorca]

That would be true, if BSC were truly decentralized. It isn't; most of the validators are controlled by Binance, and they are all chosen by Binance. That is the difference between ETH and BSC. That makes this behavior extremely problematic; effectively what this means is that Binance is now going to take all MEV on BSC, and will actively sandwich every trade that they can.

"Come to my house, I'm going to mug you". That's basically the value proposition for BSC if this is allowed to continue. How many people will participate in that?

It is technically impossible to identify such MEV behaviour on any EVM-like chain, ETH or BSC. This time they were discovered only because they did a bad job. If done properly it would be completely indistinguishable from a normal block. If left in the hands of Binance they can totally extract all the MEV without us ever finding out about it.

Flashbot's logic at its core is that, if we cannot discover and ban such behaviour, it's better to make these tools publicly available so that everyone could at least benefit from it equally. Additionally, these tools can be used both ways, and are frequently used as a protection against frontrunning.

Instead of banning/slashing those validators, I would advocate for those tools to be made more generally available. This is the only sustainable way forward for the benefit of the community.

[1] https://explore.flashbots.net/ [2] https://www.edennetwork.io/

[cwazy2020]

That would be true, if BSC were truly decentralized. It isn't; most of the validators are controlled by Binance, and they are all chosen by Binance. That is the difference between ETH and BSC. That makes this behavior extremely problematic; effectively what this means is that Binance is now going to take all MEV on BSC, and will actively sandwich every trade that they can. "Come to my house, I'm going to mug you". That's basically the value proposition for BSC if this is allowed to continue. How many people will participate in that?

It is technically impossible to identify such MEV behaviour on any EVM-like chain, ETH or BSC. This time they were discovered only because they did a bad job. If done properly it would be completely indistinguishable from a normal block. If left in the hands of Binance they can totally extract all the MEV without us ever finding out about it.

Flashbot's logic at its core is that, if we cannot discover and ban such behaviour, it's better to make these tools publicly available so that everyone could at least benefit from it equally. Additionally, these tools can be used both ways, and are frequently used as a protection against frontrunning.

Instead of banning/slashing those validators, I would advocate for those tools to be made more generally available. This is the only sustainable way forward for the benefit of the community.

[1] https://explore.flashbots.net/ [2] https://www.edennetwork.io/

Flashbots was the worst thing to happen to ETH and MEV. It's a race to the bottom. I read somewhere that Flashbots searchers now keep ~7% of profits on average, with the rest going to miners. The same would happen on BSC, but instead of going to a large set of miners, it will all pretty much go to Binance (assuming the rumors are true that they control most of the validators).

That's a real problem in my view. Flashbots has ruined the MEV landscape on ETH for everyone but miners, and now we are going to do that here? Why would you encourage that?

[niftyorca]

Flashbots was the worst thing to happen to ETH and MEV. It's a race to the bottom. I read somewhere that Flashbots searchers now keep ~7% of profits on average, with the rest going to miners. The same would happen on BSC, but instead of going to a large set of miners, it will all pretty much go to Binance (assuming the rumors are true that they control most of the validators).

That's a real problem in my view. Flashbots has ruined the MEV landscape on ETH for everyone but miners, and now we are going to do that here? Why would you encourage that?

I would encourage it because it's unavoidable. In BSC it's less of a problem compared to ETH, because validators will be in a race to redistribute the MEV profits back to stakers by providing higher staking rewards, and validators who can do this more efficiently will attract more staked BNB. And the most efficient way is to provide an open system via Flashbots where all players can participate. As a result the network will be healthier because all parties participate equally in extracting the MEV, and the value extracted in MEV will be redistributed back to the community.

[cwazy2020]

Flashbots was the worst thing to happen to ETH and MEV. It's a race to the bottom. I read somewhere that Flashbots searchers now keep ~7% of profits on average, with the rest going to miners. The same would happen on BSC, but instead of going to a large set of miners, it will all pretty much go to Binance (assuming the rumors are true that they control most of the validators). That's a real problem in my view. Flashbots has ruined the MEV landscape on ETH for everyone but miners, and now we are going to do that here? Why would you encourage that?

I would encourage it because it's unavoidable. In BSC it's less of a problem compared to ETH, because validators will be in a race to redistribute the MEV profits back to stakers by providing higher staking rewards, and validators who can do this more efficiently will attract more staked BNB. And the most efficient way is to provide an open system via Flashbots where all players can participate. As a result the network will be healthier because all parties participate equally in extracting the MEV, and the value extracted in MEV will be redistributed back to the community.

Zero players can participate, because searchers get such a low percentage of the MEV that it isn't even worth running the infrastructure necessary to be a searcher. Also, most validators are run by Binance, so there won't be any redistribution of anything, except to CZ.

[DeepBorys]

Flashbots are a huge drain on retail traders, because they get exploited to the maximum every single time. If someone forgets to set AmountOutMinimum he will be sandwiched and taken for 95% of the investment with the use of flashbots, but if thats not allowed all the front running bots will be scared to raise the price to much and the retail trader will only lose a couple percent.

So its not only a zero sum game redistribution from searchers to miners but a massive effective trading fee increase and a drain on the least sophisticated market participants.

[psdlt]

@DeepBorys

front running bots will be scared to raise the price to much

if retail trader sets slippage too high, front running bots will calculate exactly how much they can push the price without reverting victim’s tx and retail trader will lose same amount as if it was done with flashbots. your argument is invalid.

[soyasoya5]

Flashbots was the worst thing to happen to ETH and MEV. It's a race to the bottom. I read somewhere that Flashbots searchers now keep ~7% of profits on average, with the rest going to miners. The same would happen on BSC, but instead of going to a large set of miners, it will all pretty much go to Binance (assuming the rumors are true that they control most of the validators). That's a real problem in my view. Flashbots has ruined the MEV landscape on ETH for everyone but miners, and now we are going to do that here? Why would you encourage that?

I would encourage it because it's unavoidable. In BSC it's less of a problem compared to ETH, because validators will be in a race to redistribute the MEV profits back to stakers by providing higher staking rewards, and validators who can do this more efficiently will attract more staked BNB. And the most efficient way is to provide an open system via Flashbots where all players can participate. As a result the network will be healthier because all parties participate equally in extracting the MEV, and the value extracted in MEV will be redistributed back to the community.

Zero players can participate, because searchers get such a low percentage of the MEV that it isn't even worth running the infrastructure necessary to be a searcher. Also, most validators are run by Binance, so there won't be any redistribution of anything, except to CZ.

I'm afraid I would have to agree with @niftyorca here. We already know tx reordering is happening as evidenced in this thread. It becomes a question of which do you prefer more, a more open, transparent MEV extraction system or a closed one?

As seen on ETH, we have evidence of mining pools running their own searchers to extract MEV and have done so in an unfair manner in the past. Their BSC equivalents (Validators) are in a position to do the same to extract all MEV by themselves. What happens once validators become sophisticated enough to capture >99% of MEV in the chain?

What if validators already are reordering transactions, but in a manner less brazen than 0 gas txs? What if they have exclusive backroom deals with top searchers (e.g see what @fxfactorial is trying to do )? In these situations, no one would be able to compete unless you have a better deal that can make the validators more money.

While you may not agree with Flashbots style of transparent, democratized MEV extraction solution, it certainly has shown us how the game could be without it. Perhaps if you have a better idea you can pitch it to us?

[cwazy2020]

@DeepBorys

front running bots will be scared to raise the price to much

if retail trader sets slippage too high, front running bots will calculate exactly how much they can push the price without reverting victim’s tx and retail trader will lose same amount as if it was done with flashbots. your argument is invalid.

You’re wrong. The issue with Flashbots is that it removes the risk of loss in the event that the victim tx reverts, along with the risk of the sandwich buy tx being backrun. Malicious actors can act with impunity and extract maximum value from every sandwich because they have none of the risks that they would have on a non-Flashbots tx.

[psdlt]

@cwazy2020 original argument was about retail traders losing money, not about which method is a more effective way if extracting maximum value. Yes, with flashbots there less (none) risks. But from the perspective of retail trader - they will still lose money. Even without flashbots/malicious validators, sandwiching will still happen and the least sophisticated market participant will lose money (this, unfortunatelly, is true is any market, crypto or otherwise).

[cwazy2020]

Flashbots was the worst thing to happen to ETH and MEV. It's a race to the bottom. I read somewhere that Flashbots searchers now keep ~7% of profits on average, with the rest going to miners. The same would happen on BSC, but instead of going to a large set of miners, it will all pretty much go to Binance (assuming the rumors are true that they control most of the validators). That's a real problem in my view. Flashbots has ruined the MEV landscape on ETH for everyone but miners, and now we are going to do that here? Why would you encourage that?

I would encourage it because it's unavoidable. In BSC it's less of a problem compared to ETH, because validators will be in a race to redistribute the MEV profits back to stakers by providing higher staking rewards, and validators who can do this more efficiently will attract more staked BNB. And the most efficient way is to provide an open system via Flashbots where all players can participate. As a result the network will be healthier because all parties participate equally in extracting the MEV, and the value extracted in MEV will be redistributed back to the community.

Zero players can participate, because searchers get such a low percentage of the MEV that it isn't even worth running the infrastructure necessary to be a searcher. Also, most validators are run by Binance, so there won't be any redistribution of anything, except to CZ.

I'm afraid I would have to agree with @niftyorca here. We already know tx reordering is happening as evidenced in this thread. It becomes a question of which do you prefer more, a more open, transparent MEV extraction system or a closed one?

As seen on ETH, we have evidence of mining pools running their own searchers to extract MEV and have done so in an unfair manner in the past. Their BSC equivalents (Validators) are in a position to do the same to extract all MEV by themselves. What happens once validators become sophisticated enough to capture >99% of MEV in the chain?

What if validators already are reordering transactions, but in a manner less brazen than 0 gas txs? What if they have exclusive backroom deals with top searchers (e.g see what @fxfactorial is trying to do )? In these situations, no one would be able to compete unless you have a better deal that can make the validators more money.

While you may not agree with Flashbots style of transparent, democratized MEV extraction solution, it certainly has shown us how the game could be without it. Perhaps if you have a better idea you can pitch it to us?

The one advantage to having a semi-centralized chain with massive staking required is that rules can be enforced under threat of serious financial consequences. No such threat is possible on ETH.

If Binance had any ethics, or even an interest in self preservation, they’d explicitly ban “unconventional ordering” on BSC. They obviously aren’t going to do that, but I think if things quickly devolve into a flashbots-style race to the bottom where every retail trade is taxed to the absolute maximum and virtually all profits wind up in the hands of validators, BSC will very quickly become a ghost town. Retail traders will leave or not come as that reputation spreads, and everyone currently extracting MEV will stop operating nodes and bots.

[cwazy2020]

@cwazy2020 original argument was about retail traders losing money, not about which method is a more effective way if extracting maximum value. Yes, with flashbots there less (none) risks. But from the perspective of retail trader - they will still lose money. Even without flashbots/malicious validators, sandwiching will still happen and the least sophisticated market participant will lose money (this, unfortunatelly, is true is any market, crypto or otherwise).

But my point (and I believe the other poster’s point as well) is that non-Flashbot sandwiches cost retail traders significantly less money, because of the capital risk of pushing pool prices to maximize profit where transactional uncertainty exists.

[DeepBorys]

@cwazy2020 original argument was about retail traders losing money, not about which method is a more effective way if extracting maximum value. Yes, with flashbots there less (none) risks. But from the perspective of retail trader - they will still lose money. Even without flashbots/malicious validators, sandwiching will still happen and the least sophisticated market participant will lose money (this, unfortunatelly, is true is any market, crypto or otherwise).

But my point (and I believe the other poster’s point as well) is that non-Flashbot sandwiches cost retail traders significantly less money, because of the capital risk of pushing pool prices to maximize profit where transactional uncertainty exists.

Yes, that was my point, you just said it better.

Whenever I lost money trading to "classic" bots I was like yeah tough luck, have to pick better slippage, write better code etc.

The first few times I lost to unconventional ordering I was wondering are the miners colluding against me, is the system rigged, what else is going on. Then I learned about flashbots, and sure its democratic, its kind of fair that anyone can participate but the perception of someone unfamiliar will be super negative and they might just move to another chain, and there are plenty of them nowadays.

[DryDragon10]

Can someone just send this to CZ? I'm sure he won't be happy to see this kind of behaviour

[soyasoya5]

Yes, that was my point, you just said it better.

Whenever I lost money trading to "classic" bots I was like yeah tough luck, have to pick better slippage, write better code etc.

The first few times I lost to unconventional ordering I was wondering are the miners colluding against me, is the system rigged, what else is going on. Then I learned about flashbots, and sure its democratic, its kind of fair that anyone can participate but the perception of someone unfamiliar will be super negative and they might just move to another chain, and there are plenty of them nowadays.

Sorry but I don't see the logic in this perspective. If traders are afraid of being given the short end of the stick, just set 0% slippage? What kind of trading system revolves around hoping you get a good trade execution? In your example, do you set a 5% slippage in your code and proceed as if its 0 or 2%? Where's the logic in this?

Whats the difference between getting bad trade execution from "classic" bots and getting sandwiched? These arguments against Flashbots doesnt seem valid to me seeing how you wouldn't know if miners are sandwiching your trades anyways.

Furthermore, Ethereum doesnt seem to be doing too bad even with Flashbots? I personally haven't seen anyone swearing off Ethereum because of getting sandwiched lol. This just seems to me as an effort to keep competition out in a FCFS chain.

If you really cared about bad price execution, just set your slippage as low as possible? Gas fees arent even expensive on BSC anyways.

[BoogerWooger]

I don't understand why all are so angry about MEV of validators? Such a behaviour is totally predicatble, teams increase their profit because they can. Protocol doesn't deny such activities. If you want to live with "rules for good people" - go to traditional finances. They do the same things, but under the hood. But if you respect "code is the law" - it's' better to think about good tx ordering markets and solutions, like flashbots do...

[serfiraz21]

I don't understand why all are so angry about MEV of validators? Such a behaviour is totally predicatble, teams increase their profit because they can. Protocol doesn't deny such activities. If you want to live with "rules for good people" - go to traditional finances. They do the same things, but under the hood. But if you respect "code is the law" - it's' better to think about good tx ordering markets and solutions, like flashbots do...

Yes code is the law. but this is not mean validators can do what they want to do. if you say yes they can do what they want to do then yes the traditional finances under governments is better than this. The PoS consensus idea is not this. this situation is gonna make BSC network more and more centralize and controling under just 21 validator. Validators already earn rewards tx fees per block. That is already good profit for them. One validator earn network fee per 21 block ( this mean earned fee per 63sec)

[ghost]

I don't understand why all are so angry about MEV of validators? Such a behaviour is totally predicatble, teams increase their profit because they can. Protocol doesn't deny such activities. If you want to live with "rules for good people" - go to traditional finances. They do the same things, but under the hood. But if you respect "code is the law" - it's' better to think about good tx ordering markets and solutions, like flashbots do...

Code is law and validators can make a multi-sig to freeze or grab all your assets. You don't understand PoS. We cannot stop this easily doesn't mean what they are doing are legal and should be encouraged.

[niftyorca]

Code is law and validators can make a multi-sig to freeze or grab all your assets. You don't understand PoS. We cannot stop this easily doesn't mean what they are doing are legal and should be encouraged.

We cannot stop MEV easily != We cannot stop MEV at all. And the latter is true.

[ghost]

Code is law and validators can make a multi-sig to freeze or grab all your assets. You don't understand PoS. We cannot stop this easily doesn't mean what they are doing are legal and should be encouraged.

We cannot stop MEV easily != We cannot stop MEV at all. And the latter is true.

We cannot stop all the crimes around the world. So we make something like Flashbot to bring more fair to the criminals and let them make more crimes with better tools and without risks?

Flashbot may be more fair to arbitrators or front-runners. But it also makes things worse for normal traders. You have to admit that flashbot makes front-run risk-less. Before flashbot, not all front-runners have the relationship with all the validators. One front-runner cheating with validator A may have risks of losing money when other validators packing his tx. With flashbot, all the front-runners will do their sandwich whenever the fron-run-tx has 0.000000000000000001 net profit.

I'm not saying flashbot is useless. It's just I don't think it's the right way to solve the problem.

Decentralization != no governance. Especially for a PoS chain. Decentralization != criminals can do illegal things. I hope in the future when blockchain is accepted by more and more countries, criminals like front-runners deserve to be punished by laws. I know there is a long way to go.

Front-run is evil and immoral. I cannot persuade myself that I have to bow to the forces of evil just because I cannot stop it by code.

[niftyorca]

Before flashbot, not all front-runners have the relationship with all the validators. One front-runner cheating with validator A may have risks of losing money when other validators packing his tx.

It only shows that you're completely uninformed about frontrunning and MEV. Please get your basic facts straight before stating your opinion.

[psdlt]

FYI & FWIW NodeReal has changed their implementation (or at least their API docs now says) to "Note that only one tx sender is allowed with one bundle". This doesn't solve frontrunning issue, but if they really did implemented such "only one sender per bundle" mechanism, this will solve backrunning and sandwiching. I guess... yay? 🙂