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2 months ago :mag: Vulnerabilities of burntnetwork/xion:sha-a6db246
:package: Image Reference burntnetwork/xion:sha-a6db246
| digest | sha256:e6e21ea66170fbe0e71af64dc15ac4992c8e5e22dcbe9d2b3df6e156033def9a |
| vulnerabilities |      |
| size | 89 MB |
| packages | 283 |
:package: Base Image alpine:3.18
| also known as |
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| digest | sha256:b12c7d46bc14b4260b9e42714688e2dbf5dee973b291a4c12e0e1539404d9f1d |
| vulnerabilities |     |
pkg:golang/stdlib@1.21.10```dockerfile # Dockerfile (76:76) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/xiond /usr/bin/xiond ``` 
DescriptionThe various Is methods (IsPrivate, IsLoopback, etc) did not work as expected for IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, returning false for addresses which would return true in their traditional IPv4 forms. 
DescriptionThe net/http HTTP/1.1 client mishandled the case where a server responds to a request with an "Expect: 100-continue" header with a non-informational (200 or higher) status. This mishandling could leave a client connection in an invalid state, where the next request sent on the connection will fail. An attacker sending a request to a net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy proxy can exploit this mishandling to cause a denial of service by sending "Expect: 100-continue" requests which elicit a non-informational response from the backend. Each such request leaves the proxy with an invalid connection, and causes one subsequent request using that connection to fail. 
DescriptionThe archive/zip package's handling of certain types of invalid zip files differs from the behavior of most zip implementations. This misalignment could be exploited to create an zip file with contents that vary depending on the implementation reading the file. The archive/zip package now rejects files containing these errors. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/github.com/hashicorp/go-getter@1.7.1```dockerfile # Dockerfile (77:77) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/cosmovisor /usr/bin/cosmovisor ```  Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
DescriptionWhen go-getter is performing a Git operation, go-getter will try to clone the given repository. If a Git reference is not passed along with the Git url, go-getter will then try to check the remote repository’s HEAD reference of its default branch by passing arguments to the Git binary on the host it is executing on. An attacker may format a Git URL in order to inject additional Git arguments to the Git call. Consumers of the go-getter library should evaluate the risk associated with these issues in the context of their go-getter usage and upgrade go-getter to 1.7.4 or later.  Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')
DescriptionHashiCorp’s go-getter library can be coerced into executing Git update on an existing maliciously modified Git Configuration, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. When go-getter is performing a Git operation, go-getter will try to clone the given repository in a specified destination. Cloning initializes a git config to the provided destination and if the repository needs to get updated go-getter will pull the new changes . An attacker may alter the Git config after the cloning step to set an arbitrary Git configuration to achieve code execution. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/golang.org/x/net@0.12.0```dockerfile # Dockerfile (77:77) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/cosmovisor /usr/bin/cosmovisor ```  Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
DescriptionA malicious HTTP/2 client which rapidly creates requests and immediately resets them can cause excessive server resource consumption. While the total number of requests is bounded by the http2.Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting, resetting an in-progress request allows the attacker to create a new request while the existing one is still executing. With the fix applied, HTTP/2 servers now bound the number of simultaneously executing handler goroutines to the stream concurrency limit (MaxConcurrentStreams). New requests arriving when at the limit (which can only happen after the client has reset an existing, in-flight request) will be queued until a handler exits. If the request queue grows too large, the server will terminate the connection. This issue is also fixed in golang.org/x/net/http2 for users manually configuring HTTP/2. The default stream concurrency limit is 250 streams (requests) per HTTP/2 connection. This value may be adjusted using the golang.org/x/net/http2 package; see the Server.MaxConcurrentStreams setting and the ConfigureServer function.  Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
DescriptionText nodes not in the HTML namespace are incorrectly literally rendered, causing text which should be escaped to not be. This could lead to an XSS attack.  Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
DescriptionAn attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.  Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Description## HTTP/2 Rapid reset attack The HTTP/2 protocol allows clients to indicate to the server that a previous stream should be canceled by sending a RST_STREAM frame. The protocol does not require the client and server to coordinate the cancellation in any way, the client may do it unilaterally. The client may also assume that the cancellation will take effect immediately when the server receives the RST_STREAM frame, before any other data from that TCP connection is processed. Abuse of this feature is called a Rapid Reset attack because it relies on the ability for an endpoint to send a RST_STREAM frame immediately after sending a request frame, which makes the other endpoint start working and then rapidly resets the request. The request is canceled, but leaves the HTTP/2 connection open. The HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack built on this capability is simple: The client opens a large number of streams at once as in the standard HTTP/2 attack, but rather than waiting for a response to each request stream from the server or proxy, the client cancels each request immediately. The ability to reset streams immediately allows each connection to have an indefinite number of requests in flight. By explicitly canceling the requests, the attacker never exceeds the limit on the number of concurrent open streams. The number of in-flight requests is no longer dependent on the round-trip time (RTT), but only on the available network bandwidth. In a typical HTTP/2 server implementation, the server will still have to do significant amounts of work for canceled requests, such as allocating new stream data structures, parsing the query and doing header decompression, and mapping the URL to a resource. For reverse proxy implementations, the request may be proxied to the backend server before the RST_STREAM frame is processed. The client on the other hand paid almost no costs for sending the requests. This creates an exploitable cost asymmetry between the server and the client. Multiple software artifacts implementing HTTP/2 are affected. This advisory was originally ingested from the `swift-nio-http2` repo advisory and their original conent follows. ## swift-nio-http2 specific advisory swift-nio-http2 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service vulnerability in which a malicious client can create and then reset a large number of HTTP/2 streams in a short period of time. This causes swift-nio-http2 to commit to a large amount of expensive work which it then throws away, including creating entirely new `Channel`s to serve the traffic. This can easily overwhelm an `EventLoop` and prevent it from making forward progress. swift-nio-http2 1.28 contains a remediation for this issue that applies reset counter using a sliding window. This constrains the number of stream resets that may occur in a given window of time. Clients violating this limit will have their connections torn down. This allows clients to continue to cancel streams for legitimate reasons, while constraining malicious actors. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/google.golang.org/grpc@1.56.2```dockerfile # Dockerfile (77:77) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/cosmovisor /usr/bin/cosmovisor ``` 
Description### Impact In affected releases of gRPC-Go, it is possible for an attacker to send HTTP/2 requests, cancel them, and send subsequent requests, which is valid by the HTTP/2 protocol, but would cause the gRPC-Go server to launch more concurrent method handlers than the configured maximum stream limit. ### Patches This vulnerability was addressed by #6703 and has been included in patch releases: 1.56.3, 1.57.1, 1.58.3. It is also included in the latest release, 1.59.0. Along with applying the patch, users should also ensure they are using the `grpc.MaxConcurrentStreams` server option to apply a limit to the server's resources used for any single connection. ### Workarounds None. ### References #6703 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Description## HTTP/2 Rapid reset attack The HTTP/2 protocol allows clients to indicate to the server that a previous stream should be canceled by sending a RST_STREAM frame. The protocol does not require the client and server to coordinate the cancellation in any way, the client may do it unilaterally. The client may also assume that the cancellation will take effect immediately when the server receives the RST_STREAM frame, before any other data from that TCP connection is processed. Abuse of this feature is called a Rapid Reset attack because it relies on the ability for an endpoint to send a RST_STREAM frame immediately after sending a request frame, which makes the other endpoint start working and then rapidly resets the request. The request is canceled, but leaves the HTTP/2 connection open. The HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack built on this capability is simple: The client opens a large number of streams at once as in the standard HTTP/2 attack, but rather than waiting for a response to each request stream from the server or proxy, the client cancels each request immediately. The ability to reset streams immediately allows each connection to have an indefinite number of requests in flight. By explicitly canceling the requests, the attacker never exceeds the limit on the number of concurrent open streams. The number of in-flight requests is no longer dependent on the round-trip time (RTT), but only on the available network bandwidth. In a typical HTTP/2 server implementation, the server will still have to do significant amounts of work for canceled requests, such as allocating new stream data structures, parsing the query and doing header decompression, and mapping the URL to a resource. For reverse proxy implementations, the request may be proxied to the backend server before the RST_STREAM frame is processed. The client on the other hand paid almost no costs for sending the requests. This creates an exploitable cost asymmetry between the server and the client. Multiple software artifacts implementing HTTP/2 are affected. This advisory was originally ingested from the `swift-nio-http2` repo advisory and their original conent follows. ## swift-nio-http2 specific advisory swift-nio-http2 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service vulnerability in which a malicious client can create and then reset a large number of HTTP/2 streams in a short period of time. This causes swift-nio-http2 to commit to a large amount of expensive work which it then throws away, including creating entirely new `Channel`s to serve the traffic. This can easily overwhelm an `EventLoop` and prevent it from making forward progress. swift-nio-http2 1.28 contains a remediation for this issue that applies reset counter using a sliding window. This constrains the number of stream resets that may occur in a given window of time. Clients violating this limit will have their connections torn down. This allows clients to continue to cancel streams for legitimate reasons, while constraining malicious actors.  OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
Description### Impact In affected releases of gRPC-Go, it is possible for an attacker to send HTTP/2 requests, cancel them, and send subsequent requests, which is valid by the HTTP/2 protocol, but would cause the gRPC-Go server to launch more concurrent method handlers than the configured maximum stream limit. ### Patches This vulnerability was addressed by #6703 and has been included in patch releases: 1.56.3, 1.57.1, 1.58.3. It is also included in the latest release, 1.59.0. Along with applying the patch, users should also ensure they are using the `grpc.MaxConcurrentStreams` server option to apply a limit to the server's resources used for any single connection. ### Workarounds None. ### References #6703 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/github.com/cosmwasm/wasmd@0.45.0```dockerfile # Dockerfile (76:76) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/xiond /usr/bin/xiond ```  Stack-based Buffer Overflow
Description**Component:** wasmd **Criticality:** High ([ACMv1](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md): I:Critical; L:Likely) **Patched versions:** wasmd 0.53.0, 0.46.0 See [CWA-2024-005](https://github.com/CosmWasm/advisories/blob/main/CWAs/CWA-2024-005.md) for more details.  Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Description**Component:** wasmd **Criticality:** Low ([ACMv1](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md): I:Moderate; L:Unlikely) **Patched versions:** wasmd 0.52.0 In multiple wasmd message types it was possible to add a large number of addresses which might lead to unexpected resource consumption in ValidateBasic. See [CWA-2024-003](https://github.com/CosmWasm/advisories/blob/main/CWAs/CWA-2024-003.md) for more details. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/github.com/hashicorp/go-getter@1.7.4```dockerfile # Dockerfile (76:76) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/xiond /usr/bin/xiond ``` Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')
DescriptionHashiCorp’s go-getter library can be coerced into executing Git update on an existing maliciously modified Git Configuration, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution. When go-getter is performing a Git operation, go-getter will try to clone the given repository in a specified destination. Cloning initializes a git config to the provided destination and if the repository needs to get updated go-getter will pull the new changes . An attacker may alter the Git config after the cloning step to set an arbitrary Git configuration to achieve code execution. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk@0.46.0-beta2.0.20230614103911-b3da8bb4e801```dockerfile # Dockerfile (77:77) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/cosmovisor /usr/bin/cosmovisor ```  Improper Input Validation
Description## ASA-2024-003: Missing `BlockedAddressed` Validation in Vesting Module **Component**: Cosmos SDK **Criticality**: Low **Affected Versions**: Cosmos SDK versions <= 0.50.3; <= 0.47.8 **Affected Users**: Chain developers, Validator and Node operators **Impact**: Denial of Service ## Description A vulnerability was identified in the `x/auth/vesting` module, which can allow a user to create a periodic vesting account on a blocked address, for example a non-initialized module account. Additional validation was added to prevent creation of a periodic vesting account in this scenario. If this case is triggered, there is the potential for a chain halt if the uninitialized account in question is called by `GetModuleAccount` in `Begin`/`EndBlock` of a module. This combination of an uninitialized blocked module account is not common. ## Next Steps for Impacted Parties If your chain has uninitialized blocked module accounts, it is recommended to proactively initialize them, as they are often initialized during a chain migration or during init genesis. If you are a chain developer on an affected version of the Cosmos SDK, it is advised to update to the latest available version of the Cosmos SDK for your project. Once a patched version is available, it is recommended that network operators upgrade. A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the Cosmos-SDK [repository](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/security/advisories). For more information about Cosmos SDK, see https://docs.cosmos.network/. This issue was found by [Dongsam](https://github.com/dongsam) who reported it to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on January 30, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos. ## Addendum A variant trigger of this issue via the `x/authz` and `x/feegrant` modules was discovered by [Richie](https://github.com/sushiwushi) who reported it to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on April 6th, 2024, and was subsequently fixed by the Cosmos SDK team on April 21st, 2024. The guidance for mitigating this additional variant is the same as the parent advisory, so it is suggested that all chains proactively initialize module accounts if they have not already done so.  Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input
Description## ASA-2024-002: Default `PrepareProposalHandler` may produce invalid proposals when used with default `SenderNonceMempool` **Component**: Cosmos SDK **Criticality**: Medium **Affected** Versions: Cosmos SDK versions <= 0.50.3; <= 0.47.8 **Affected** Users: Chain developers, Validator and Node operators **Impact**: Denial of Service ## Summary When using the default `PrepareProposalHandler` and the default `SenderNonceMempool`, an issue was identified which may allow invalid blocks to be proposed when a single sender includes multiple transactions with non-sequential sequence numbers in certain conditions. If this state is reached, it can lead to a reduction in block production for a network. ## Next Steps for Impacted Parties If you are a chain developer on an affected version of the Cosmos SDK, it is advised to update to the latest available version of the Cosmos SDK for your project. Once a patched version is available, it is recommended that network operators upgrade. A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the Cosmos-SDK [repository](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/security/advisories). For more information about Cosmos SDK, see https://docs.cosmos.network/. This issue was found by [KonradStaniec](https://github.com/KonradStaniec), [gitferry](https://github.com/gitferry), [SebastianElvis](https://github.com/SebastianElvis), and [vitsalis](https://github.com/vitsalis) who reported it to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on January 16, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos. 
Description**Component**: Cosmovisor **Criticality**: Medium **Affected Versions**: Cosmovisor < v1.0.0 (distributed with Cosmos-SDK < 0.46) **Affected Users**: Validators and Node operators utilizing unsupported versions of Cosmovisor **Impact**: DOS, potential RCE on node depending on configuration An issue has been identified on unsupported versions of Cosmovisor which may result in a Denial of Service or Remote Code Execution path depending on configuration for a node or validator using the vulnerable version to manage their node. If a validator is utilizing an affected version of Cosmovisor with `DAEMON_ALLOW_DOWNLOAD_BINARIES` set to true, a non-default configuration, it may be possible for an attacker to trigger a Remote Code Execution path as well on the host. In this configuration it is recommended to immediately stop use of the `DAEMON_ALLOW_DOWNLOAD_BINARIES` feature, and then proceed with an upgrade of Cosmovisor. It is recommended that all validators utilizing unsupported versions of Cosmovisor to upgrade to the latest supported versions immediately. If you are utilizing a forked version of Cosmos-SDK, it is recommended to stop use of Cosmovisor until it is possible to update to a supported version of Cosmovisor, whether through your project’s fork, or directly compiled from the Cosmos-SDK. At the time of this advisory, the latest version of Cosmovisor is v1.5.0. Additionally, the Amulet team recommends that developers building chains powered by Cosmos-SDK share this advisory with validators and node operators to ensure this information is available to all impacted parties within their ecosystems. For more information about Cosmovisor, see https://docs.cosmos.network/main/tooling/cosmovisor This issue was discovered by [Maxwell Dulin](https://maxwelldulin.com) and Nathan Kirkland, who reported it to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see [https://hackerone.com/cosmos](https://hackerone.com/cosmos). ## How to tell if I am affected? Running the following command will output whether your cosmovisor version is vulnerable to this issue or not. Vulnerable to this issue: ``` strings ./cosmovisor | grep -q "NEEDED at" && echo "vulnerable" || echo "NOT vulnerable" vulnerable ``` NOT vulnerable to this issue: ``` strings ./cosmovisor_new | grep -q "NEEDED at" && echo "vulnerable" || echo "NOT vulnerable" NOT vulnerable ``` ***** A Note from Amulet on the Security Advisory Process In the interest of timely resolution of this issue for validators and node operators, the Amulet team has chosen to use existing processes and resources for distributing security advisories within the Cosmos and Interchain Ecosystems. Stay tuned as we implement an improved, more robust security advisory distribution system that will provide equitable access to information about security issues in the Interchain Stack.  Incomplete Internal State Distinction
Description## ASA-2024-005: Potential slashing evasion during re-delegation **Component**: Cosmos SDK **Criticality**: Low **Affected Versions**: Cosmos SDK versions <= 0.50.4; <= 0.47.9 **Affected Users**: Chain developers, Validator and Node operators **Impact**: Slashing Evasion ## Summary An issue was identified in the slashing mechanism that may allow for the evasion of slashing penalties during a slashing event. If a delegation contributed to byzantine behavior of a validator, and the validator has not yet been slashed, it may be possible for that delegation to evade a pending slashing penalty through re-delegation behavior. Additional validation logic was added to restrict this behavior. ## Next Steps for Impacted Parties If you are a chain developer on an affected version of the Cosmos SDK, it is advised to update to the latest available version of the Cosmos SDK for your project. Once a patched version is available, it is recommended that network operators upgrade. A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the Cosmos-SDK [repository](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-86h5-xcpx-cfqc). For more information about Cosmos SDK, see https://docs.cosmos.network/. This issue was found by cat shark (Khanh) who reported it to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on December 6, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.  OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
Description## ASA-2024-003: Missing `BlockedAddressed` Validation in Vesting Module **Component**: Cosmos SDK **Criticality**: Low **Affected Versions**: Cosmos SDK versions <= 0.50.3; <= 0.47.8 **Affected Users**: Chain developers, Validator and Node operators **Impact**: Denial of Service ## Description A vulnerability was identified in the `x/auth/vesting` module, which can allow a user to create a periodic vesting account on a blocked address, for example a non-initialized module account. Additional validation was added to prevent creation of a periodic vesting account in this scenario. If this case is triggered, there is the potential for a chain halt if the uninitialized account in question is called by `GetModuleAccount` in `Begin`/`EndBlock` of a module. This combination of an uninitialized blocked module account is not common. ## Next Steps for Impacted Parties If your chain has uninitialized blocked module accounts, it is recommended to proactively initialize them, as they are often initialized during a chain migration or during init genesis. If you are a chain developer on an affected version of the Cosmos SDK, it is advised to update to the latest available version of the Cosmos SDK for your project. Once a patched version is available, it is recommended that network operators upgrade. A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the Cosmos-SDK [repository](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/security/advisories). For more information about Cosmos SDK, see https://docs.cosmos.network/. This issue was found by [Dongsam](https://github.com/dongsam) who reported it to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on January 30, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.  OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
Description## ASA-2024-002: Default `PrepareProposalHandler` may produce invalid proposals when used with default `SenderNonceMempool` **Component**: Cosmos SDK **Criticality**: Medium **Affected** Versions: Cosmos SDK versions <= 0.50.3; <= 0.47.8 **Affected** Users: Chain developers, Validator and Node operators **Impact**: Denial of Service ## Summary When using the default `PrepareProposalHandler` and the default `SenderNonceMempool`, an issue was identified which may allow invalid blocks to be proposed when a single sender includes multiple transactions with non-sequential sequence numbers in certain conditions. If this state is reached, it can lead to a reduction in block production for a network. ## Next Steps for Impacted Parties If you are a chain developer on an affected version of the Cosmos SDK, it is advised to update to the latest available version of the Cosmos SDK for your project. Once a patched version is available, it is recommended that network operators upgrade. A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the Cosmos-SDK [repository](https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/security/advisories). For more information about Cosmos SDK, see https://docs.cosmos.network/. This issue was found by [KonradStaniec](https://github.com/KonradStaniec), [gitferry](https://github.com/gitferry), [SebastianElvis](https://github.com/SebastianElvis), and [vitsalis](https://github.com/vitsalis) who reported it to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on January 16, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.  OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
DescriptionImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') in github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk. 
DescriptionThe cosmos-sdk module is affected by the vulnerability codenamed "Barberry". | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/github.com/dvsekhvalnov/jose2go@1.5.0```dockerfile # Dockerfile (77:77) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/cosmovisor /usr/bin/cosmovisor ```  Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
DescriptionAn attacker controlled input of a PBES2 encrypted JWE blob can have a very large p2c value that, when decrypted, produces a denial-of-service. 
DescriptionThe jose2go component before 1.6.0 for Go allows attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a large p2c (aka PBES2 Count) value.  OWASP Top Ten 2017 Category A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
DescriptionAn attacker controlled input of a PBES2 encrypted JWE blob can have a very large p2c value that, when decrypted, produces a denial-of-service. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/github.com/cometbft/cometbft@0.37.4```dockerfile # Dockerfile (76:76) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/xiond /usr/bin/xiond ```  Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere
Description**Name**: ASA-2024-008: Instability during blocksync when syncing from malicious peer **Component**: CometBFT **Criticality**: Medium ([ACMv1](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md): I:Moderate; L: Possible) **Affected versions**: < v0.38.7 # Summary An issue was identified for nodes syncing on an existing network during blocksync in which a malicious peer could cause the syncing peer to panic, enter into a catastrophic invalid syncing state or get stuck in blocksync mode, never switching to consensus. It is recommended for all clients to adopt this patch so that blocksync functions as expected and is tolerant of malicious peers presenting invalid data in this situation. Nodes that are vulnerable to this state may experience a Denial of Service condition in which syncing will not work as expected when joining a network as a client. # Recognition This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on 5/01/24 by unknown_feature. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos. If you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io). For more information about CometBFT, please see https://docs.cometbft.com/. For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security. 
Description## Amulet Security Advisory for CometBFT: ASA-2023-002 **Component**: CometBFT **Criticality:** Low **Affected versions:** All **Affected users:** Validators, Chain Builders + Maintainers # Summary A default configuration in CometBFT has been found to be large for common use cases, and may affect block times and consensus participation when fully utilized by chain participants. It is advised that chains consider their specific needs for their use case when setting the `BlockParams.MaxBytes` consensus parameter. Chains are encouraged to evaluate the impact of having proposed blocks with the maximum allowed block size, especially on bandwidth usage and block latency. Additionally, the `timeout_propose` parameter should be computed using the maximum allowed block size as a reference. This issue does not represent an actively exploitable vulnerability that would result in a direct loss of funds, however it may have a slight impact on block latency depending on a network’s topography. When setting a large `BlockParams.MaxBytes`, there are two main implications: * Increased bandwidth to propagate a block * Increased latency to propagate a block When combined, this may result in less round participation, and in some cases additional rounds may be required to meet the consensus threshold, which could lead to timeouts depending on the topography of a network and environmental factors. These factors can include the number of validators on a network, geographic distribution, network connectivity (including latency, bandwidth, and reachability), the functionality of the modules implementing the logic for a transaction in your chain, etc. The cost to propagate a 21MB block, the default value for `BlockParams.MaxBytes`, will be far higher than the cost of propagating a smaller 1MB block. CometBFT recommends tuning this parameter to a smaller limit if full initial-round participation is an important quality for your chain. # Considerations CometBFT is designed to be configurable by chains, and implements many different configuration variables and parameters to allow chain developers, validators, node operators, and chain participants to customize it best to their use case. A high-performing validator may find it necessary to experiment with tuning local configuration, optimizing network and compute resources, and implementing controls to inhibit spam. # Next Steps for Chains and Validators To increase awareness of the potential impacts of this default parameter, the CometBFT team has updated the documentation (https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/pull/1405, [v0.34.x](https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.34/spec/abci/apps#blockparamsmaxbytes), [v0.37.x](https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.37/spec/abci/abci++_app_requirements#blockparamsmaxbytes), [v0.38.x](https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.38/spec/abci/abci++_app_requirements#blockparamsmaxbytes)) for builders and maintainers of chain applications. Additionally, it is recommended that: * Chain ecosystems and their maintainers set a `BlockParams.MaxBytes` configuration appropriate for their use case at the application level; in some cases, fine-tuning `BlockParams` may require a network upgrade. * Chain ecosystems and their maintainers evaluate how gas is used and required on their chain, including gas and fee parameters, no-fee or fee-exempt message policies, and ensure that any custom modules integrate with the gas and fee frameworks. This is especially important for chains that may have implemented custom modules or functionality to allow IBC messages to bypass fees. * Chain ecosystems and their maintainers audit all of their currently-set parameters and configurations to ensure that they are appropriate for their use case. * All validators develop and implement anti-spam measures on their nodes. Amulet encourages validators to form working groups to collaborate on spam prevention and on tooling that can be implemented by node operators across the Interchain. * All validators consider developing and implementing tooling that would allow them to sample incoming transactions to enable them to fine-tune the level of service they would like to provide to be resilient in slowdown scenarios. Amulet also encourages validators to collaborate on tooling that can be implemented by node operators across the Interchain. The CometBFT team has also revisited all the checks performed by the consensus protocol regarding proposed blocks. This investigation has confirmed that proposed blocks with size exceeding the `BlockParams.MaxBytes` limit established by the application are not accepted by nodes. The team notwithstanding has decided to introduce additional sanity checks for the size of proposed blocks (https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/pull/1408), allowing for an early identification and rejection of invalid or oversized blocks. These code changes will be included in the _next_ release of each branch of CometBFT. As more chains adopt the Interchain Stack for new and cutting-edge use cases, the CometBFT team recommends that all chains regularly evaluate their parameters and configurations to ensure they meet the needs of their ecosystem as their networks mature. For more information about CometBFT, see [https://docs.cometbft.com](https://docs.cometbft.com/). This issue was reported via the vulnerability disclosure channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io) on Friday, September 23, 2023. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see [https://hackerone.com/cosmos](https://hackerone.com/cosmos). ***** Note from Amulet on the Security Advisory Process: In the interest of timely resolution of this issue for validators and node operators, the Amulet team has chosen to use existing processes and resources for distributing security advisories within the Cosmos and Interchain Ecosystems. Stay tuned as we implement an improved, more robust security advisory distribution system that will provide equitable access to information about security issues in the Interchain Stack. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/golang.org/x/crypto@0.11.0```dockerfile # Dockerfile (77:77) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/cosmovisor /usr/bin/cosmovisor ```  Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Description### Summary Terrapin is a prefix truncation attack targeting the SSH protocol. More precisely, Terrapin breaks the integrity of SSH's secure channel. By carefully adjusting the sequence numbers during the handshake, an attacker can remove an arbitrary amount of messages sent by the client or server at the beginning of the secure channel without the client or server noticing it. ### Mitigations To mitigate this protocol vulnerability, OpenSSH suggested a so-called "strict kex" which alters the SSH handshake to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle attacker cannot introduce unauthenticated messages as well as convey sequence number manipulation across handshakes. **Warning: To take effect, both the client and server must support this countermeasure.** As a stop-gap measure, peers may also (temporarily) disable the affected algorithms and use unaffected alternatives like AES-GCM instead until patches are available. ### Details The SSH specifications of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com MACs) are vulnerable against an arbitrary prefix truncation attack (a.k.a. Terrapin attack). This allows for an extension negotiation downgrade by stripping the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO sent after the first message after SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, downgrading security, and disabling attack countermeasures in some versions of OpenSSH. When targeting Encrypt-then-MAC, this attack requires the use of a CBC cipher to be practically exploitable due to the internal workings of the cipher mode. Additionally, this novel attack technique can be used to exploit previously unexploitable implementation flaws in a Man-in-the-Middle scenario. The attack works by an attacker injecting an arbitrary number of SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages during the initial key exchange and consequently removing the same number of messages just after the initial key exchange has concluded. This is possible due to missing authentication of the excess SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages and the fact that the implicit sequence numbers used within the SSH protocol are only checked after the initial key exchange. In the case of ChaCha20-Poly1305, the attack is guaranteed to work on every connection as this cipher does not maintain an internal state other than the message's sequence number. In the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, practical exploitation requires the use of a CBC cipher; while theoretical integrity is broken for all ciphers when using this mode, message processing will fail at the application layer for CTR and stream ciphers. For more details see [https://terrapin-attack.com](https://terrapin-attack.com). ### Impact This attack targets the specification of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com) and Encrypt-then-MAC (*-etm@openssh.com), which are widely adopted by well-known SSH implementations and can be considered de-facto standard. These algorithms can be practically exploited; however, in the case of Encrypt-Then-MAC, we additionally require the use of a CBC cipher. As a consequence, this attack works against all well-behaving SSH implementations supporting either of those algorithms and can be used to downgrade (but not fully strip) connection security in case SSH extension negotiation (RFC8308) is supported. The attack may also enable attackers to exploit certain implementation flaws in a man-in-the-middle (MitM) scenario. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/google.golang.org/protobuf@1.31.0```dockerfile # Dockerfile (77:77) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/cosmovisor /usr/bin/cosmovisor ```  Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
DescriptionThe protojson.Unmarshal function can enter an infinite loop when unmarshaling certain forms of invalid JSON. This condition can occur when unmarshaling into a message which contains a google.protobuf.Any value, or when the UnmarshalOptions.DiscardUnknown option is set. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/google.golang.org/protobuf@1.32.0```dockerfile # Dockerfile (76:76) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/xiond /usr/bin/xiond ``` Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
DescriptionThe protojson.Unmarshal function can enter an infinite loop when unmarshaling certain forms of invalid JSON. This condition can occur when unmarshaling into a message which contains a google.protobuf.Any value, or when the UnmarshalOptions.DiscardUnknown option is set. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
pkg:golang/github.com/cosmwasm/wasmvm@1.5.2```dockerfile # Dockerfile (76:76) COPY --from=builder /go/bin/xiond /usr/bin/xiond ```  Improper Restriction of Power Consumption
Description**Component:** wasmvm **Criticality:** Medium ([ACMv1](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md): I:Moderate; L:Likely) **Patched versions:** wasmvm 1.5.4, 2.0.3, 2.1.2 Some Wasm operations take significantly more gas than our benchmarks indicated. This can lead to missing the [gas target](https://github.com/CosmWasm/cosmwasm/blob/e50490c4199a234200a497219b27f071c3409f58/docs/GAS.md#cosmwasm-gas-pricing) we defined by a factor of ~10x. This means a malicious contract could take 10 times as much time to execute as expected, which can be used to temporarily DoS a chain. See [CWA-2024-004](https://github.com/CosmWasm/advisories/blob/main/CWAs/CWA-2024-004.md) for more details. |
stdlib 
google.golang.org/grpc 
github.com/cosmwasm/wasmd 
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk 
golangci-lint:gosec suddenly started flagging these conversion errors