docs/lecture_02/the_problem_of_action_and_habitual/

[utterances-bot]

The Problem of Action meets Habitual Processes - Philosophical Issues in Behavioural Science: From Individual to Collaborative Action

A course at the University of Warwick about philosophical issues in behavioural science.

http://philosophical-behavioral-science-docs.butterfill.com/docs/lecture_02/the_problem_of_action_and_habitual/

[janbalcerowski]

Was not Davidson in his Essay Agency concerned with Agency and therefore Intentional Action that is expression of Agency rather than action per se? I have a feeling that the "Standard Solution" has been taken out of context of previous work both by Davidson and Anscombe and is being refuted in the lectures with claims, that could be easily accommodated in the wider theory of those philosophers. However I am likely to be wrong.

[JosiahJ11]

To consider humans to be conflicted beings with conflicting desires seems to be a universally-held belief [reference]. When our intentions are in constant competition and counter each other, can it not always be assumed that there will be some intention that might relate to an action? Would having an intention that seems to be more 'explicit' (in reference to a potential action) matter? Might any attempt to explain why one has no intention of eating popcorn in a cinema be simply excusing a lack of self-control?

[username27432]

According to the glossary definition, an action is instrumental if "it happens in order to bring about an outcome". Could we argue that at least certain (if not all) thoughts are instrumental actions as well? Could we then, in a similar way, have thoughts that are caused by goal-directed processes and habitual processes?

[ryanlynchy]

When I 'do' an action such as a shift of attention, it seems utterly mysterious to me how I am able to generate that movement. The mechanism of 'attentional control' seems to be hidden from my introspective awareness, all I can really say is that I am witness to 'certain attentional processes' occurring in my experience. If we cannot fully introspect on how we do the things we do, what does this mean for the apparent distinction between things that happen to us and things that we do?