AWS fix vulnerability if attacker gets control of backup role account

[candide-guevara]

Problem

• Metadata and storage infrastructure can be created by backup role account.
• Backup role account can delete/tamper with storage and metadata.

Goal

If an attacker gets control of backup role account, they should NOT be able to render the backup data unusable.

Solution

• Assert that infrastructure is created only by the root user.
  • Backup role should only be able to write.
• Use s3 object ownership, once data is written it cannot be modified by the backup role
• At the end of each successful backup make a backup of dynamodb that cannot be tampered with by the backup role.

[candide-guevara]

aws iam list-users

• btrfs_backup
• btrfs_canary
• btrfs_restore
• btrfs_experimental (for integration tests)
• btrfs_to_glacier_root (for cleaning and creating buckets)