search

cardano-foundation / CIPs

Cardano Improvement Proposals (CIPs)
https://cips.cardano.org/
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
516 stars 319 forks source link

Limit voting power of all SPO's to linear function of pledge #403

Open Kronoshus opened 1 year ago

Kronoshus commented 1 year ago 
    > Applying this lesson to social decentralization and governance it would be wise to limit the voting power of all SPO's to some leverage limit multiple of the SPO's pledge: L. This has a profound effect: there is an added social/governance motivation for pledge. Groups like Binance and Coinbase which do not pledge any ADA would have no voting power.

I think this is a very valid point, thank you @michael-liesenfelt . How do we reconcile this, however, with the fact that SPOs that do not wish for a hard fork can always just not upgrade their software? If they do that, as a collective, then the 'no' vote is basically determined by the longest chain, which ignores pledge.

Originally posted by @JaredCorduan in https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/issues/380#issuecomment-1329616811

Kronoshus commented 1 year ago

Need to allow for the continual fragmentation of groups. Within SPO's you need to have a mechanism that allows them to split from the main vote and give their vote elsewhere. This is assuming you have a yes or no proposal system rather than one that allows fragmentation of yes or no options.

Ryun1 commented 1 year ago

What would be the possible negative impact(s) of not limiting SPOs voting power?

JaredCorduan commented 1 year ago

The issue is that an SPO who has control of a lot of ADA, but doesn't really own it (as evidenced by a low pledge, such as the situation with an exchange) doesn't really have the same kind of skin in the game and has delegators who may be completely oblivious to the voting rights that they are giving away.