Affected versions of this crate allowed the bytes { and \xa0 to appear
unquoted and unescaped in command arguments.
If the output of quote or join is passed to a shell, then what should be a
single command argument could be interpreted as multiple arguments.
This does not directly allow arbitrary command execution (you can't inject a
command substitution or similar). But depending on the command you're running,
being able to inject multiple arguments where only one is expected could lead
to undesired consequences, potentially including arbitrary command execution.
The flaw was corrected in version 1.2.1 by escaping additional characters.
Updating to 1.3.0 is recommended, but 1.2.1 offers a more minimal fix if
desired.
Workaround: Check for the bytes { and \xa0 in quote/join input or
output.
(Note: { is problematic because it is used for glob expansion. \xa0 is
problematic because it's treated as a word separator in specific
environments.)
Issue 2: Dangerous API w.r.t. nul bytes
Version 1.3.0 deprecates the quote and join APIs in favor of try_quote
and try_join, which behave the same except that they have Result return
type, returning Err if the input contains nul bytes.
Strings containing nul bytes generally cannot be used in Unix command arguments
or environment variables, and most shells cannot handle nul bytes even
internally. If you try to pass one anyway, then the results might be
security-sensitive in uncommon scenarios. More details here.
Due to the low severity, the behavior of the original quote and join APIs
has not changed; they continue to allow nuls.
Workaround: Manually check for nul bytes in quote/join input or output.
Issue 3: Lack of documentation for interactive shell risks
The quote family of functions does not and cannot escape control characters.
With non-interactive shells this is perfectly safe, as control characters have
no special effect. But if you writing directly to the standard input of an
interactive shell (or through a pty), then control characters can cause
misbehavior including arbitrary command injection.
This is essentially unfixable, and has not been patched. But as of version
1.3.0, documentation has been added.
Future versions of shlex may add API variants that avoid the issue at the
cost of reduced portability.
Release Notes
comex/rust-shlex (shlex)
### [`v1.3.0`](https://togithub.com/comex/rust-shlex/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#130)
- Full fix for the high-severity security vulnerability [RUSTSEC-2024-0006](https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0006.html) a.k.a. [GHSA-r7qv-8r2h-pg27](https://togithub.com/comex/rust-shlex/security/advisories/GHSA-r7qv-8r2h-pg27):
- Deprecates quote APIs in favor of `try_` equivalents that complain about nul bytes.
- Also adds a builder API, which allows re-enabling nul bytes without using the deprecated interface, and in the future can allow other things (as discussed in quoting_warning).
- Adds documentation about various security risks that remain, particularly with interactive shells.
- Adds explicit MSRV of 1.46.0.
### [`v1.2.1`](https://togithub.com/comex/rust-shlex/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#121)
- Partial fix for the high-severity security vulnerability [RUSTSEC-2024-0006](https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0006.html) a.k.a. [GHSA-r7qv-8r2h-pg27](https://togithub.com/comex/rust-shlex/security/advisories/GHSA-r7qv-8r2h-pg27) without bumping MSRV:
- The bytes `{` and `\xa0` are now escaped by quoting functions.
Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Enabled.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
[ ] If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box
This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate. View repository job log here.
This PR contains the following updates:
1.2.0->1.3.0GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
GHSA-r7qv-8r2h-pg27
Issue 1: Failure to quote characters
Affected versions of this crate allowed the bytes
{and\xa0to appear unquoted and unescaped in command arguments.If the output of
quoteorjoinis passed to a shell, then what should be a single command argument could be interpreted as multiple arguments.This does not directly allow arbitrary command execution (you can't inject a command substitution or similar). But depending on the command you're running, being able to inject multiple arguments where only one is expected could lead to undesired consequences, potentially including arbitrary command execution.
The flaw was corrected in version 1.2.1 by escaping additional characters. Updating to 1.3.0 is recommended, but 1.2.1 offers a more minimal fix if desired.
Workaround: Check for the bytes
{and\xa0inquote/joininput or output.(Note:
{is problematic because it is used for glob expansion.\xa0is problematic because it's treated as a word separator in specific environments.)Issue 2: Dangerous API w.r.t. nul bytes
Version 1.3.0 deprecates the
quoteandjoinAPIs in favor oftry_quoteandtry_join, which behave the same except that they haveResultreturn type, returningErrif the input contains nul bytes.Strings containing nul bytes generally cannot be used in Unix command arguments or environment variables, and most shells cannot handle nul bytes even internally. If you try to pass one anyway, then the results might be security-sensitive in uncommon scenarios. More details here.
Due to the low severity, the behavior of the original
quoteandjoinAPIs has not changed; they continue to allow nuls.Workaround: Manually check for nul bytes in
quote/joininput or output.Issue 3: Lack of documentation for interactive shell risks
The
quotefamily of functions does not and cannot escape control characters. With non-interactive shells this is perfectly safe, as control characters have no special effect. But if you writing directly to the standard input of an interactive shell (or through a pty), then control characters can cause misbehavior including arbitrary command injection.This is essentially unfixable, and has not been patched. But as of version 1.3.0, documentation has been added.
Future versions of
shlexmay add API variants that avoid the issue at the cost of reduced portability.Release Notes
comex/rust-shlex (shlex)
### [`v1.3.0`](https://togithub.com/comex/rust-shlex/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#130) - Full fix for the high-severity security vulnerability [RUSTSEC-2024-0006](https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0006.html) a.k.a. [GHSA-r7qv-8r2h-pg27](https://togithub.com/comex/rust-shlex/security/advisories/GHSA-r7qv-8r2h-pg27): - Deprecates quote APIs in favor of `try_` equivalents that complain about nul bytes. - Also adds a builder API, which allows re-enabling nul bytes without using the deprecated interface, and in the future can allow other things (as discussed in quoting_warning). - Adds documentation about various security risks that remain, particularly with interactive shells. - Adds explicit MSRV of 1.46.0. ### [`v1.2.1`](https://togithub.com/comex/rust-shlex/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#121) - Partial fix for the high-severity security vulnerability [RUSTSEC-2024-0006](https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0006.html) a.k.a. [GHSA-r7qv-8r2h-pg27](https://togithub.com/comex/rust-shlex/security/advisories/GHSA-r7qv-8r2h-pg27) without bumping MSRV: - The bytes `{` and `\xa0` are now escaped by quoting functions.Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Enabled.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate. View repository job log here.