Handle

gpersoon

Vulnerability details

Impact

The use of setYieldSource leaves the contract in a temporary inconsistent state because it changes the underlying yield source, but doesn't (yet) transfer the underlying balances, while the shares stay the same.

The function balanceOfToken will show the wrong results, because it is based on _sharesToToken, which uses yieldSource.balanceOfToken(address(this)), that isn't updated yet.

More importantly supplyTokenTo will give the wrong amount of shares back: First it supplies tokens to the yieldsource. Then is calls _mintShares, which calls _tokenToShares, which calculates the shares, using yieldSource.balanceOfToken(address(this)) This yieldSource.balanceOfToken(address(this)) only contains the just supplied tokens, but doesn't include the tokens from the previous YieldSource. So the wrong amount of shares is given back to the user; they will be given more shares than appropriate which means they can drain funds later on (once transferFunds has been done).

It is possible to make use of this problem in the following way:

monitor the blockchain until you see setYieldSource has been done
immediately call the function supplyTokenTo (which can be called because there is no access control on this function)

Proof of Concept

// https://github.com/pooltogether/swappable-yield-source/blob/main/contracts/SwappableYieldSource.sol function setYieldSource(IYieldSource _newYieldSource) external onlyOwnerOrAssetManager returns (bool) { _setYieldSource(_newYieldSource);

function _setYieldSource(IYieldSource _newYieldSource) internal { .. yieldSource = _newYieldSource;

function supplyTokenTo(uint256 amount, address to) external override nonReentrant { .. yieldSource.supplyTokenTo(amount, address(this)); _mintShares(amount, to); }

function _mintShares(uint256 mintAmount, address to) internal { uint256 shares = _tokenToShares(mintAmount); require(shares > 0, "SwappableYieldSource/shares-gt-zero"); _mint(to, shares); }

function _tokenToShares(uint256 tokens) internal returns (uint256) { uint256 shares; uint256 _totalSupply = totalSupply(); .. uint256 exchangeMantissa = FixedPoint.calculateMantissa(_totalSupply, yieldSource.balanceOfToken(address(this))); // based on incomplete yieldSource.balanceOfToken(address(this)) shares = FixedPoint.multiplyUintByMantissa(tokens, exchangeMantissa);

function balanceOfToken(address addr) external override returns (uint256) { return _sharesToToken(balanceOf(addr)); }

function _sharesToToken(uint256 shares) internal returns (uint256) { uint256 tokens; uint256 _totalSupply = totalSupply(); .. uint256 exchangeMantissa = FixedPoint.calculateMantissa(yieldSource.balanceOfToken(address(this)), _totalSupply); // based on incomplete yieldSource.balanceOfToken(address(this)) tokens = FixedPoint.multiplyUintByMantissa(shares, exchangeMantissa);

Tools Used

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Remove the function setYieldSource (e.g. only leave swapYieldSource) Or temporally disable actions like supplyTokenTo, redeemToken and balanceOfToken, after setYieldSource and until transferFunds has been done

code-423n4 / 2021-07-pooltogether-findings