Handle

ScopeLift

Vulnerability details

Impact

Governor can drain incentive balance via arbitraryCall

Proof of Concept

The Stream contract offers createIncentive https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/main/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L500 and claimIncentive https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/main/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L516 which is the way the contract "expects" incentives to go. Access to claiming incentives is limited to the stream creator after the stream ends.

We assume the governor is untrusted, therefore we check to ensure the depositToken and rewardToken balances don't change. The contract also prevents against direct calls to incentive token contracts that have an incentive balance: L735 https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-streaming/blob/main/Streaming/src/Locke.sol#L735

However a malicious governor could optimistically call token.approve(maliciousActor, MAX_UINT) on tokens where an incentive is expected. maliciousActor could be any address, and could then transfer out incentive balance whenever an incentive is created.

Tools Used

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Replace arbitraryCall with more targeted behavior

Inside arbitraryCall, block calls to approve and safeApprove by checking the function selector encoded in data

code-423n4 / 2021-11-streaming-findings