QA Report

[code423n4]

Lack of empty address checks

The following methods have a lack checks if the received argument is an address, it's good practice in order to reduce human error to check that the address specified in the constructor or initialize is different than address(0).

Source code:

• FuseTokenAdapterV1.sol#L47-L49
• WstETHAdapterV1.sol#L41-L48
• RETHAdapterV1.sol#L39-L41
• VesperAdapterV1.sol#L37-L39
• YearnTokenAdapter.sol#L21
• WETHGateway.sol#L23-L24
• TransmuterConduit.sol#L24
• TransmuterBuffer.sol#L88
• TransmuterV2.sol#L144-L147
• StakingPools.sol#L108
• EthAssetManager.sol#L201-L212
• ThreePoolAssetManager.sol#L236-L248
• AlchemistV2.sol#L258-L264

As stated in the OpenZeppelin source comments, the OpenZeppeling ERC20 safeApprove() function has been deprecated.

Using this deprecated function could result in accidental reverts and possibly fund locking. The deprecation of this function is discussed in greater depth in the OZ issue #2219.

As suggested by the OpenZeppelin comment, replace safeApprove() with safeIncreaseAllowance() or safeDecreaseAllowance() instead.

Source code:

• FuseTokenAdapterV1.sol#L71
• WstETHAdapterV1.sol#L105
• WstETHAdapterV1.sol#L129
• VesperAdapterV1.sol#L62
• YearnTokenAdapter.sol#L32
• EthAssetManager.sol#L576-L577
• EthAssetManager.sol#L620-L621
• EthAssetManager.sol#L671-L672
• ThreePoolAssetManager.sol#L782-L783
• ThreePoolAssetManager.sol#L838-L839
• ThreePoolAssetManager.sol#L879-L880
• ThreePoolAssetManager.sol#L908-L909
• ThreePoolAssetManager.sol#L987-L988

Unsafe ERC20 calls

The following code doesn't check the result of the transferFrom or approve calls. ERC20 standard specify that the token can return false if these calls fails, so it's mandatory to check the result of these ERC20 methods.

Source code:

• AutoleverageCurveFactoryethpool.sol#L26
• AutoleverageCurveMetapool.sol#L16
• gALCX.sol#L63
• WETHGateway.sol#L36
• AutoleverageBase.sol#L62

Unsecure Ownership change

The modification of an owner is a delicate procedure, as it may jeopardize the governance of our contract and therefore the project. As a result, it is advised that the owner's modification logic be changed to one that allows for verification that the new owner is valid and exists.

It is required to establish a logic for the owner's modification in which a new owner is proposed first, the owner approves the suggestion, and we ensure that the new owner's address is written correctly.

Source code:

• gALCX.sol#L40

Possible Rogue pool

The owner of the WETHGateway contract has the ability to extract all existing WETH from the contract via the refreshAllowance method. These capabilities must be limited in favor of decentralization, in order to avoid loss of reputation or user confidence.

Source code:

• WETHGateway.sol#L36

[0xleastwood]

1. Valid - non-critical
2. Valid - non-critical
3. Valid - low
4. Valid - low
5. Valid - low