The issue presents an edge condition which will expand the error of the RToken oracle price. It can come into play when one RToken is using another RToken as collateral either directly or indirectly through an LP token. If there is RSR overcollateralization then this issue is mitigated.
The mitigation only adds some comments and docs to remind developers of this. There is no change in the code for mitigation.
But, IMO, I really agree with the way the development team handled it. I mark it as "unmitigated" just for calling the judge's attention to this no code mitigation.
Lines of code
https://github.com/reserve-protocol/protocol/blob/master/contracts/plugins/assets/RTokenAsset.sol#L50-L57
Vulnerability details
comments
The issue presents an edge condition which will expand the error of the RToken oracle price. It can come into play when one RToken is using another RToken as collateral either directly or indirectly through an LP token. If there is RSR overcollateralization then this issue is mitigated.
The mitigation only adds some comments and docs to remind developers of this. There is no change in the code for mitigation.
But, IMO, I really agree with the way the development team handled it. I mark it as "unmitigated" just for calling the judge's attention to this no code mitigation.
Assessed type
Context