Closed c4-bot-6 closed 8 months ago
Picodes marked the issue as duplicate of #746
Picodes marked the issue as satisfactory
Picodes marked the issue as selected for report
Picodes marked issue #844 as primary and marked this issue as a duplicate of 844
Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty/blob/main/src/dao/Proposals.sol#L259-L293
Vulnerability details
Impact
A user having staked SALT can vote for a proposal, initiate unstaking of his SALT, transfer the tokens to an other address, and vote again with the same SALT.
The user has to wait for the period to unstake his SALT (a minimum of 2 weeks) but taking into account that the initial
ballotMinimumDuration
is set to 10 days (changable up to 2 weeks) and the fact that ballots will likely not be reaching the quorum immediately after that period is reached, it is completely possible for a user to execute this action.Proof of Concept
Check this foundry test
Setup:
Proof of Concept:
Output traces:
Tools Used
Manual review
Recommended Mitigation Steps
Creating voting power snapshots for users would disable this action
Assessed type
Governance