Open c4-bot-10 opened 8 months ago
0xEVom marked the issue as primary issue
0xEVom marked the issue as sufficient quality report
kalinbas (sponsor) acknowledged
We are aware of this. Only operator accounts can call these functions and our bots monitor failed transactions. But its a valid finding as it may lead to some reverted tx for our bots. But because the check is at the beginning it helps to lower the gas cost for these reverted tx.
Like the issues with liquidations, there is no real point to this attack, as it neither profits nor truly halts the protocol. It only causes a transaction from an operator to fail and donates a minuscule amount of assets to the protocol. Therefore, I am downgrading it to low.
Additionally, why don't we just have the operator use an RPC with mempool protection? Even though this would slightly increase gas costs.
jhsagd76 changed the severity to QA (Quality Assurance)
jhsagd76 marked the issue as grade-a
Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-revert-lend/blob/main/src/transformers/AutoRange.sol#L133-L135
Vulnerability details
Impact
Anyone can add liquidity for anyone in uniswap ( no need to be the owner of the token ). By this, the malicious user can wait for the user who is calling the transform function to execute in the autorange and add dust liquidity to his uniswap position causing it to always revert, because of this if
Proof of Concept
Tools Used
Vscode
Recommended Mitigation Steps
Fix this if so that the function does not revert.
Assessed type
DoS