E-02 MitigationConfirmed

[c4-bot-3]

Lines of code

Vulnerability details

Additional Scope Issue

https://github.com/othernet-global/salty-io/commit/75901cae57382a87b5f049d7afb9c5d9b9ba4c19 https://github.com/othernet-global/salty-io/commit/7de25bca740332ae7a4b2f25c3a6f6419eaa7569

Comments

The commits are specifically aimed to add a few code optimizations to reduce gas used when attempting arbitrage. code was also refactored and made cleaner. for example the function "_adjustReservesforSwapNoRevert" were removed, since its basically a replica of _adjustReservesForSwap, but with the additional check that reserves were more than dust. so the check was done by the caller of function instead, and the original _adjustReservesForSwap was used, as such:

       // Only swap for SALT with sufficient reserves
    if ( ( reserves.reserve0 > PoolUtils.DUST ) && ( reserves.reserve1 > PoolUtils.DUST ) )
        {
        uint256 saltOut = _adjustReservesForSwap(reserves, flipped, arbitrageProfit);

    // Prevent users from zapping too much at once as they may encounter unexpected slippage
    if ( flipped )
        require( zapSwapAmountIn < reserves.reserve1 / 100, "Cannot zap more than 1% of the reserves" );
    else
        require( zapSwapAmountIn < reserves.reserve0 / 100, "Cannot zap more than 1% of the reserves" ); 

More importantly _adjustReservesForSwap was modified, it longer has to access storage everytime its called to get the pool reserves, but instead the reserves are passed to it by the caller.

Conclusion

LGTM

[liveactionllama]

Updating the ID label here, simply for consistency across all warden submissions.

[c4-judge]

Picodes marked the issue as satisfactory

[c4-judge]

Picodes marked the issue as confirmed for report