The change made in Pool.sol as part of E4 involves addition of the function _adjustReservesForSwapNoRevert() which is meant to handle the edge case of aribitrage revert when there is zero SALT/WETH liquidity.
Analysis
The above PR successfully achieves the intended goal. However, it is to be noted that the final code base given to us on the contest page is https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-saltyio-mitigation.git and it does not have these changes. The function _adjustReservesForSwapNoRevert() does not exist here.
Hence, inclined to mark this as unmitigated even though the PR itself looks good.
Lines of code
https://github.com/othernet-global/salty-io/blob/6998661013e86a50c7db552d189fadb0521dbeb0/src/pools/Pools.sol#L298
Vulnerability details
Summary
The change made in Pool.sol as part of E4 involves addition of the function
_adjustReservesForSwapNoRevert()
which is meant to handle the edge case of aribitrage revert when there is zero SALT/WETH liquidity.Analysis
The above PR successfully achieves the intended goal. However, it is to be noted that the final code base given to us on the contest page is https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-saltyio-mitigation.git and it does not have these changes. The function
_adjustReservesForSwapNoRevert()
does not exist here.Hence, inclined to mark this as unmitigated even though the PR itself looks good.
Assessed type
Other