The limitation to five token whitelisting proposals at any given time introduced a vulnerability where the system can be intentionally or unintentionally DOS'd, blocking new proposals until existing ones are resolved. This mechanism, while designed to manage the flow of proposals, can be exploited or triggered by accumulating the maximum allowed pending proposals, thereby preventing the addition of new, potentially legitimate tokens. This issue is exacerbated if the maximum pending proposals limit is reduced. Any one can propose token whitelisting and thus crux of the problem was in the line below:
require( _openBallotsForTokenWhitelisting.length() < daoConfig.maxPendingTokensForWhitelisting(), "The maximum number of token whitelisting proposals are already pending" );
The mitigation effectively removed entirely the restrictions on proposals for token whitelisting. now an unlimited number of proposals for token whitelisting can be made.
Lines of code
Vulnerability details
Lines of code
Vulnerability details
C4 Issue
https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-01-salty-findings/issues/991
Comments
The limitation to five token whitelisting proposals at any given time introduced a vulnerability where the system can be intentionally or unintentionally DOS'd, blocking new proposals until existing ones are resolved. This mechanism, while designed to manage the flow of proposals, can be exploited or triggered by accumulating the maximum allowed pending proposals, thereby preventing the addition of new, potentially legitimate tokens. This issue is exacerbated if the maximum pending proposals limit is reduced. Any one can propose token whitelisting and thus crux of the problem was in the line below:
Mitigation
https://github.com/othernet-global/salty-io/commit/ccf4368fcf1777894417fccd2771456f3eeaa81c
The mitigation effectively removed entirely the restrictions on proposals for token whitelisting. now an unlimited number of proposals for token whitelisting can be made.
Conclusion
LGTM