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FreeType 2.5.3 Mac font parsing heap-based buffer overflow due to integer signedness problems #154

Closed GoogleCodeExporter closed 9 years ago

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago
In the freetype/src/base/ftobjs.c file, we can find multiple auxiliary 
functions for handling uncommon or exotic font formats. One such function is 
"Mac_Read_POST_Resource", which heavily operates on user-supplied data:

1586:    FT_Long    len;
1587:    FT_Long    pfb_len, pfb_pos, pfb_lenpos;
1588:    FT_Long    rlen, temp;
...
1628:      if ( FT_READ_LONG( rlen ) )
1629:        goto Exit;
...
1676:      if ( pfb_pos > pfb_len || pfb_pos + rlen > pfb_len )
1677:        goto Exit2;
1678:
1679:      error = FT_Stream_Read( stream, (FT_Byte *)pfb_data + pfb_pos, rlen 
);
1680:      if ( error )
1681:        goto Exit2;
1682:      pfb_pos += rlen;

On 32-bit builds, the "rlen" variable is a fully controlled signed integer. 
While the if() statement in line 1676 attempts to perform bounds checking, all 
variables included in the expressions are of signed type, resulting in both 
comparisons being signed, too. If the value of "rlen" is negative, the check is 
bypassed, and the value is passed as the last parameter to FT_Stream_Read, 
which expects an unsigned count (ftstream.h):

367:  /* read bytes from a stream into a user-allocated buffer, returns an */
368:  /* error if not all bytes could be read.                             */
369:  FT_BASE( FT_Error )
370:  FT_Stream_Read( FT_Stream  stream,
371:                  FT_Byte*   buffer,
372:                  FT_ULong   count );

As a result, the function attempts to read an inadequately large number of 
bytes into a heap-based "pfb_data" buffer, thus resulting in memory corruption. 
This is illustrated by the attached example proof-of-concept sample (2.ttf), 
which triggers the following AddressSanitizer output:

=================================================================
==11824== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf5d3eeeb 
at pc 0xf5fd9ad8 bp 0xffc84fa8 sp 0xffc84f9c
WRITE of size 1 at 0xf5d3eeeb thread T0
    #0 0xf5fd9ad7 in FT_Stream_ReadAt freetype2/src/base/ftstream.c:145
    #1 0xf5fd98a1 in FT_Stream_Read freetype2/src/base/ftstream.c:114
    #2 0xf5fc3c5e in Mac_Read_POST_Resource freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:1679
    #3 0xf5fc443f in IsMacResource freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:1811
    #4 0xf5fc4ad9 in IsMacBinary freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:1888
    #5 0xf5fc50a8 in load_mac_face freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:2003
    #6 0xf5fc59fe in FT_Open_Face freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:2165
    #7 0xf5fc24ff in FT_New_Face freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:1254
    #8 0x804b5a8 in get_face ft2demos-2.5.3/src/ftbench.c:705
    #9 0x804bc64 in main ft2demos-2.5.3/src/ftbench.c:924
0xf5d3eeeb is located 2862 bytes to the right of 236477-byte region 
[0xf5d04800,0xf5d3e3bd)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0xf61cf854 (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.0+0x16854)
    #1 0xf5fb6df7 in ft_alloc freetype2/builds/unix/ftsystem.c:102
    #2 0xf5fded74 in ft_mem_qalloc freetype2/src/base/ftutil.c:76
    #3 0xf5fdebde in ft_mem_alloc freetype2/src/base/ftutil.c:55
    #4 0xf5fc35de in Mac_Read_POST_Resource freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:1609
    #5 0xf5fc443f in IsMacResource freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:1811
    #6 0xf5fc4ad9 in IsMacBinary freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:1888
    #7 0xf5fc50a8 in load_mac_face freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:2003
    #8 0xf5fc59fe in FT_Open_Face freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:2165
    #9 0xf5fc24ff in FT_New_Face freetype2/src/base/ftobjs.c:1254
    #10 0x804b5a8 in get_face ft2demos-2.5.3/src/ftbench.c:705
    #11 0x804bc64 in main ft2demos-2.5.3/src/ftbench.c:924
    #12 0xf5e13a82 (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x19a82)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow 
freetype2/src/base/ftstream.c:145 FT_Stream_ReadAt
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x3eba7d80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3eba7d90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3eba7da0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3eba7db0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3eba7dc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x3eba7dd0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa]fa fa
  0x3eba7de0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3eba7df0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3eba7e00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3eba7e10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3eba7e20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
  Heap left redzone:     fa
  Heap righ redzone:     fb
  Freed Heap region:     fd
  Stack left redzone:    f1
  Stack mid redzone:     f2
  Stack right redzone:   f3
  Stack partial redzone: f4
  Stack after return:    f5
  Stack use after scope: f8
  Global redzone:        f9
  Global init order:     f6
  Poisoned by user:      f7
  ASan internal:         fe
==11824== ABORTING

Please note that this problem is very similar to 
https://savannah.nongnu.org/bugs/?30658, and is in fact caused by the fact that 
the fix introduced back then is not sufficient to prevent all types of attacks.

Original issue reported on code.google.com by mjurc...@google.com on 5 Nov 2014 at 2:03

Attachments:

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago
Reported in https://savannah.nongnu.org/bugs/?43539.

Original comment by mjurc...@google.com on 5 Nov 2014 at 2:06

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago

Original comment by mjurc...@google.com on 5 Nov 2014 at 2:07

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago
The developer tried to fix this in 
http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=35252ae9aa1dd
9343e9f4884e9ddb1fee10ef415, but the vulnerability can still be triggered for 
very large files (> 2GB).

I'm pinging the developer to complement the fix with an additional check.

Original comment by mjurc...@google.com on 26 Nov 2014 at 12:03

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago
In fact, when 
https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=153 is 
properly fixed, the issue should be resolved. I'm marking this one as fixed, 
then.

Original comment by mjurc...@google.com on 26 Nov 2014 at 12:07

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago
All fixed by upstream:

FreeType 2.5.5

2014-12-30
FreeType 2.5.5 has been released. This is a minor bug fix release: All users of 
PCF fonts should update, since version 2.5.4 introduced a bug that prevented 
reading of such font files if not compressed.

FreeType 2.5.4

2014-12-06
FreeType 2.5.4 has been released. All users should upgrade due to another fix 
for vulnerability CVE-2014-2240 in the CFF driver. The library also contains a 
new round of patches for better protection against malformed fonts.

The main new feature, which is also one of the targets mentioned in the pledgie 
roadmap below, is auto-hinting support for Devanagari and Telugu, two widely 
used Indic scripts. A more detailed description of the remaining changes and 
fixes can be found here.

Original comment by cev...@google.com on 26 Jan 2015 at 5:27

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago
Information in this issue does not seem to be correct.

This is the version of the code form the time of the report (early Nov 2014):

http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/tree/src/base/ftobjs.c?i
d=bbd8313#n1574

Description above quotes the following code:

1628:      if ( FT_READ_LONG( rlen ) )
1629:        goto Exit;
...
1676:      if ( pfb_pos > pfb_len || pfb_pos + rlen > pfb_len )
1677:        goto Exit2;
1678:
1679:      error = FT_Stream_Read( stream, (FT_Byte *)pfb_data + pfb_pos, rlen 
);

It does not quote another important code in between the above lines:

1639       /* the flags are part of the resource, so rlen >= 2.  */
1640       /* but some fonts declare rlen = 0 for empty fragment */
1641       if ( rlen > 2 )
1642         rlen -= 2;
1643       else
1644         rlen = 0;

Hence 'If the value of "rlen" is negative, the check is bypassed' should never 
happen, as rlen can not be negative on line 1676.

The rlen value in the attached test case is 0x7fffffff, which is positive.  
AFAICS, this is not a separate issue, but a different test case for the integer 
overflow problems described in issue #153.

Original comment by tho...@redhat.com on 24 Feb 2015 at 8:16

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago
The part that probably can be considered to not be part of issue #153 is 
handling of temp.  As that is signed, it can reduce pfb_len counter value 
without actually making it wrap around.  When it's re-read as rlen, excessively 
long read/write in FT_Stream_Read() is avoided by the rlen check mentioned in 
comment #6 above, but having it tagged as comment would be another way.

Original comment by tho...@redhat.com on 24 Feb 2015 at 8:45

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago

Original comment by mjurc...@google.com on 25 Feb 2015 at 2:06

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago
@thoger, I have looked at the source code again and I believe you are right - 
it was not possible for a negative "rlen" to slip through up to lines 1676 - 
1679 because of the if() statement in between, so the problem is not really as 
originally described.

However, there were still multiple integer signedness handling problems in the 
quoted fragments of code, which might or might not have been 
mitigated/prevented by fixes from issue 153. The intent in creating two issues 
was to separate the wrap-around integer overflows (issue 153) and the 
signedness problems in sanity checking performed in the code (this issue). It 
has also resulted in converting the local variables in the function to unsigned 
types and introducing more in-depth bounds checking, so I am leaving the bug as 
is.

Original comment by mjurc...@google.com on 25 Feb 2015 at 2:46