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OS X sandbox escape due to XPC type confusion in networkd #92

Closed GoogleCodeExporter closed 9 years ago

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago 
com.apple.networkd is an xpc service reachable from many OS X sandboxes (via 
(system-network).)

It runs unsandboxed but as the user _networkd, this doesn't prevent it from 
being a valid sandbox escape as getting code execution
as _networkd gives access to a much bigger kernel attack surface.

The com.apple.networkd service parses many very complicated xpc messages and 
there are multiple type confusions bugs.

This PoC is a trigger for one of them which I'm pretty sure can actually be 
exploited to get code execution:

(_networkd has no symbols so these functions names are the addresses in the 
_networkd binary on 10.9.4)

__text:0000000100007421 sub_10000742
...
__text:00000001000074BD                 call    _xpc_array_get_value    ; 
return value not type-checked
__text:00000001000074C2                 mov     rdi, rax
__text:00000001000074C5                 call    sub_1000072CE           ; 
passed as first arg to sub_1000072CE

__text:00000001000072CE sub_1000072CE
...
__text:00000001000072F7                 lea     rax, off_100017668         ; 
"connect_by"
__text:00000001000072FE                 mov     rsi, [rax]
__text:0000000100007301                 call    _xpc_dictionary_get_uint64 ; 
rdi has never been checked to be an xpc dictionary
...
__text:00000001000073B7                 cmp     rax, 3                     ; if 
"connect_by" == 3
__text:00000001000073BB                 jnz     short loc_100007401
__text:00000001000073BD                 mov     [rbp+var_80], 0
__text:00000001000073C5                 lea     rax, off_100017768         ; 
"sockaddr"
__text:00000001000073CC                 mov     rsi, [rax]
__text:00000001000073CF                 lea     rdx, [rbp+var_80]
__text:00000001000073D3                 mov     rdi, rbx
__text:00000001000073D6                 call    _xpc_dictionary_get_data   ; 
same rdi, not checked to be a dictionary

xpc_dictionary_get_data will look up the key "sockaddr", check that the value 
matching that key is an OS_xpc_data object and then call
xpc_data_get_bytes_pointer. By crafting a fake xpc_dictionary (for example by 
passing an xpc_int64 as the value in the array then grooming
controlled data where the dictionary expects to find its hash bucket pointers) 
we can gain complete control of this xpc_data pointer (and
are also able to then set the type field correctly.)

xpc_data_get_bytes_pointer will call xpc_map_data_once which will pass the 
pointer at offset +0x30 of the fake xpc_data object to dispatch_data_create_map
and then dispatch_release. By crafting this dispatch object such that it can't 
be correctly mapped (eg by setting +0x28 to 0) this dispatch object won't be 
retained
such that when it's passed to disptach_release (with the retain count set to 0) 
it will be released and an objective-c method will be invoked.

Actually doing that heap grooming is a pain, but I'm quite sure it's possible 
:-)

I've included some ideas for fixing all these bugs by added extra checks in 
libxpc in the report sent to Apple.

Original issue reported on code.google.com by ianb...@google.com on 19 Aug 2014 at 3:11

Attachments:

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago

Original comment by ianb...@google.com on 19 Aug 2014 at 3:16

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago

Original comment by ianb...@google.com on 23 Sep 2014 at 7:16

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago 
Deadline exceeded -- automatically derestricting.

Original comment by cev...@google.com on 20 Nov 2014 at 12:54

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago 
Apple advisory: http://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204244

Original comment by ianb...@google.com on 5 Feb 2015 at 12:16

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago 
Apple advisory (iOS): http://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204245

Original comment by ianb...@google.com on 5 Feb 2015 at 12:23

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago 
The script what? Please explain to me, because I want in depth
http://wdfshare.blogspot.com

Original comment by the961be...@gmail.com on 18 Mar 2015 at 5:28