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This PR contains the following updates:
==1.26.10
->==1.26.19
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2023-43804
urllib3 doesn't treat the
Cookie
HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify aCookie
header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly.Users must handle redirects themselves instead of relying on urllib3's automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the
Cookie
header, thus we decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.Affected usages
We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:
Cookie
header on requests, which is mostly typical for impersonating a browser.Remediation
redirects=False
when sending requests.Cookie
header.CVE-2023-45803
urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 303 "See Other" after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like
POST
) toGET
as is required by HTTP RFCs. Although the behavior of removing the request body is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers.From RFC 9110 Section 9.3.1:
Affected usages
Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable.
Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability:
Remediation
You can remediate this vulnerability with any of the following steps:
redirects=False
.redirects=False
and handle 303 redirects manually by stripping the HTTP request body.CVE-2024-37891
When using urllib3's proxy support with
ProxyManager
, theProxy-Authorization
header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected.However, when sending HTTP requests without using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the
Proxy-Authorization
header even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat theProxy-Authorization
HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects.Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the
Proxy-Authorization
header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident.Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the
Proxy-Authorization
header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.Affected usages
We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:
Proxy-Authorization
header without using urllib3's built-in proxy support.Remediation
Proxy-Authorization
header with urllib3'sProxyManager
.redirects=False
when sending requests.Proxy-Authorization
header.Release Notes
urllib3/urllib3 (urllib3)
### [`v1.26.19`](https://redirect.github.com/urllib3/urllib3/blob/HEAD/CHANGES.rst#12619-2024-06-17) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/urllib3/urllib3/compare/1.26.18...1.26.19) \==================== - Added the `Proxy-Authorization` header to the list of headers to strip from requests when redirecting to a different host. As before, different headers can be set via `Retry.remove_headers_on_redirect`. - Fixed handling of OpenSSL 3.2.0 new error message for misconfiguring an HTTP proxy as HTTPS. (`#3405Configuration
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