Feedback regarding FIA_TSM_EXT.1

[jfisherbah]

Regarding the EAs for FIA_TSM_EXT.1:

• Test 1 talks about having the evaluator "exercise the method to invalidate a trust store element." There should be a TSS activity that requires the ST to state the method of doing this. And with regards to the guidance EA, the language of "invalidating" elements should be re-used there for consistency. It should be implicit that "managing trust store elements" includes this but it's still better to be unambiguous.
• For test 2, is the expectation here that the TSF always checks certificates imported into its trust store for revocation regardless of use? For example, a cert loaded into the TOE's trust store to be the TOE's own TLS server cert could potentially be treated differently from an intermediate CA cert used to sign leaf certs presented to the TOE. Unclear how common such behavior currently is and what the threat being mitigated is here if revocation status of the cert would be checked on each use. It can also be trivialized by claims that the package permits. For example, if FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 says that the TSF handles certs with undetermined revocation status by accepting the certificate, one could bypass the check and install a revoked certificate onto the TOE simply by taking it offline when the installation is done.

[jfisherbah]

For test 1, agree with the request to align the test with TSS and guidance EAs.

For test 2, clarified by adding a note to say that certs are not checked during installation if the required connection is not available during loading or when a defined exemption for this applies to revocation checking.

Believe this can be closed.