Allow the user to specify multiple acceptance policies. If a certificate satisfies quorum under any policy, flag it as accepted.
This could help achieve a better mix of availability and security - for example, a user might trust a certificate if either 100% of notaries have seen a certificate consistently for 3 days,or at least 50% have seen it consistently for a month. Some users currently inspect Perspectives results and implement this behaviour by hand - it would be good to make it happen automatically.
Carl says: "This would give resilience when notaries are unavailable, and quickly adapt when certificates legitimately change or new sites are added, while still imposing a high barrier on anyone trying to subvert the system. With the example rules above, an attacker must either maintain control of every notary for 3 days, or maintain control of at least half the notaries for a month. Both scenarios are unlikely and indicate a very powerful attacker (such as a government) who could probably subvert traffic in other ways (like DNS poisoning)."
The improved availability of such a setup could make much stricter policies feasible - "Without a fallback, I would never configure the addon to require 100% agreement, but with alternative policies in place, I might."
Allow the user to specify multiple acceptance policies. If a certificate satisfies quorum under any policy, flag it as accepted.
This could help achieve a better mix of availability and security - for example, a user might trust a certificate if either 100% of notaries have seen a certificate consistently for 3 days,or at least 50% have seen it consistently for a month. Some users currently inspect Perspectives results and implement this behaviour by hand - it would be good to make it happen automatically.
Carl says: "This would give resilience when notaries are unavailable, and quickly adapt when certificates legitimately change or new sites are added, while still imposing a high barrier on anyone trying to subvert the system. With the example rules above, an attacker must either maintain control of every notary for 3 days, or maintain control of at least half the notaries for a month. Both scenarios are unlikely and indicate a very powerful attacker (such as a government) who could probably subvert traffic in other ways (like DNS poisoning)."
The improved availability of such a setup could make much stricter policies feasible - "Without a fallback, I would never configure the addon to require 100% agreement, but with alternative policies in place, I might."
Credit and thanks to Carl Antuar for the idea