Note the for this payoff matrix the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) condition (i.e., 2 * PiAA > PiaA + PiAa is satisfied. As posited by @markeschaffer, imposing the IPD condition seems to eliminate the stable/balanced polymorphism (i.e., interior equilibria).
"Selfish" preferring Males are better at screening
In this second case, selfish preferring males are better at screening...
Case where IPD condition is not satisfied
In the plots below, I use the following payoff matrix:
Note the for this payoff matrix the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) condition (i.e., 2 * PiAA > PiaA + PiAa is satisfied. As posited by @markeschaffer, imposing the IPD condition seems to eliminate the stable/balanced polymorphism (i.e., interior equilibria).
"Altruistic" preferring males are better at screening
In this first case of asymmetric screening, altruistic preferring males are better at screening...
Case where the IPD condition is not satisfied
In the plots below, I use the following payoff matrix:
Case where IPD condition is satisfied
In the plots below, I use the following payoff matrix:
Note the for this payoff matrix the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) condition (i.e.,
2 * PiAA > PiaA + PiAa
is satisfied. As posited by @markeschaffer, imposing the IPD condition seems to eliminate the stable/balanced polymorphism (i.e., interior equilibria)."Selfish" preferring Males are better at screening
In this second case, selfish preferring males are better at screening...
Case where IPD condition is not satisfied
In the plots below, I use the following payoff matrix:
Case where IPD condition is satisfied
In the plots below, I use the following payoff matrix:
Note the for this payoff matrix the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) condition (i.e.,
2 * PiAA > PiaA + PiAa
is satisfied. As posited by @markeschaffer, imposing the IPD condition seems to eliminate the stable/balanced polymorphism (i.e., interior equilibria).@markeschaffer , @PaulSeabright your thoughts?