Note the for this payoff matrix the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) condition (i.e., 2 * PiAA > PiaA + PiAa is satisfied. The only difference between these payoffs and the ones used in the previous example is that the payoff to exploiting altruism has been reduced. As posited by @markeschaffer, imposing the IPD condition seems to eliminate the stable/balanced polymorphism (i.e., interior equilibria).
Males are relatively effective at screening
In this second case, both types males are relative effective at screening...
Case where IPD condition is not satisfied
In the plots below, I use the following payoff matrix:
Note the for this payoff matrix the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) condition (i.e., 2 * PiAA > PiaA + PiAa is satisfied. The only difference between these payoffs and the ones used in the previous example is that the payoff to exploiting altruism has been reduced. As posited by @markeschaffer, imposing the IPD condition seems to eliminate the stable/balanced polymorphism (i.e., interior equilibria).
Males are relatively ineffective at screening
In this first case of imperfect screening, both types of males are relatively ineffective at screening...
Case where IPD condition is not satisfied
In the plots below, I use the following payoff matrix:
Note the for this payoff matrix the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) condition (i.e.,
2 * PiAA > PiaA + PiAais not satisfied.Case where IPD condition is satisfied
In the plots below, I use the following payoff matrix:
Note the for this payoff matrix the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) condition (i.e.,
2 * PiAA > PiaA + PiAais satisfied. The only difference between these payoffs and the ones used in the previous example is that the payoff to exploiting altruism has been reduced. As posited by @markeschaffer, imposing the IPD condition seems to eliminate the stable/balanced polymorphism (i.e., interior equilibria).Males are relatively effective at screening
In this second case, both types males are relative effective at screening...
Case where IPD condition is not satisfied
In the plots below, I use the following payoff matrix:
Note the for this payoff matrix the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) condition (i.e.,
2 * PiAA > PiaA + PiAais not satisfied.Case where IPD condition is satisfied
In the plots below, I use the following payoff matrix:
Note the for this payoff matrix the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) condition (i.e.,
2 * PiAA > PiaA + PiAais satisfied. The only difference between these payoffs and the ones used in the previous example is that the payoff to exploiting altruism has been reduced. As posited by @markeschaffer, imposing the IPD condition seems to eliminate the stable/balanced polymorphism (i.e., interior equilibria).@markeschaffer , @PaulSeabright your thoughts?