Closed dbosk closed 6 years ago
Section 7, besides Eve and Rusuk, there are Alice and Bob who might want to inflate numbers and then there's Caroline the counter
Not sure I understand Caroline's role.
protester (not necessarily an agent of Eve's). (Is Rusuk a name? Maybe Russell?). What can they do?
Russell is a good name. I made Rusuk up: it comes from Russia, US and UK --- as they're the historically most notorious for interfering with other people's business :-)
Hopefully they cannot do anything. If we solve the Sybil problem by the assumption of the national ID card, then a foreign state cannot perform a Sybil attack (see #35), which was my original concern.
In either case, judging from the news, foreign states apparently have a lot of interest in meddling with the business of other states. So, we want to ensure that they cannot affect the result of the protest in any way.
@dbosk Naming issues: Eve is usually an eavesdropper, so not quite what we want to associate. Perhaps Grace is better https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob "Grace. A government representative. For example, Grace may try to force Alice or Bob to implement backdoors in their protocols. May also deliberately weaken standards" Instead of Russuk, I suggest Mallory or Oscar:
Mallory[13][14][15] or (less commonly) Mallet[16][17][18][19] A malicious attacker. Associated with Trudy, an intruder. Unlike the passive Eve, Mallory/Mallet is an active attacker (often used in man-in-the-middle attacks), who can modify messages, substitute messages, or replay old messages. The difficulty of securing a system against Mallory/Mallet is much greater than against Eve.
Oscar. An opponent, similar to Mallory, but not necessarily malicious.
Alice is usually not assumed to be malicious, not sure if she's usually assumed to be honest either.
Speaking of names, for the impersonating verifier - how different is that from impersonation fraud? All types of fraud X are called XF and they all refer to the prover, right? Should we still follow that convention but say XF_v to denote it's on the verifier side? For our example, IF_v (subscript) impersonation fraud by the verifier.
After having read a few more papers I'll skip the impersonating verifier. This is covered implicitly in what is called "public-key distance-bounding" as opposed to "symmetric-key distance-bounding" where the verifier must be honest.
I've adapted Section 5 to this.
On Wed 28 Feb 2018 06:02:20 GMT, sbuc wrote:
Speaking of names, for the impersonating verifier - how different is that from impersonation fraud? All types of fraud X are called XF and they all refer to the prover, right? Should we still follow that convention but say XF_v to denote it's on the verifier side? For our example, IF_v (subscript) impersonation fraud by the verifier.
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changed attacker names, added explanation about public-key db. Closing.
Nice names. I used Eve as someone evil in our context. But your suggestions are much better --- and they have a nice reasoning behind.
On Wed 28 Feb 2018 13:27:21 GMT, sbuc wrote:
@dbosk Naming issues: Eve is usually an eavesdropper, so not quite what we want to associate. Perhaps Grace is better https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob "Grace. A government representative. For example, Grace may try to force Alice or Bob to implement backdoors in their protocols. May also deliberately weaken standards" Instead of Russuk, I suggest Mallory or Oscar:
Mallory[13][14][15] or (less commonly) Mallet[16][17][18][19] A malicious attacker. Associated with Trudy, an intruder. Unlike the passive Eve, Mallory/Mallet is an active attacker (often used in man-in-the-middle attacks), who can modify messages, substitute messages, or replay old messages. The difficulty of securing a system against Mallory/Mallet is much greater than against Eve.
Oscar. An opponent, similar to Mallory, but not necessarily malicious.
As foreign states, say Rusuk, might have interest in affecting the result, maybe we should cover that.
Since the PRF-key $k$ will be signed by the government, we can detect if the key of a proof is signed by a foreign government. Thus Rusuk cannot create valid proofs to increase the number of any foreign protest.