Open deholz opened 10 months ago
How humans can prevent AI from interfering with or replacing human decisions to launch strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, including autonomous threat detection, autonomous targeting, autonomous launching of nuclear weapons, and use of nuclear weapons for defense/retaliation? In 1962, the destroyer USS Beale began dropping depth charges on the Soviet nuclear submarine B-59, which was lurking near the Cuban blockade line. The submarine captain mistook them for live explosives. The captain ordered his men to arm the submarine's only nuclear-tipped torpedo and prepare for an attack. Eventually the B-59's second in command, Vasili Arkhipov, refused the attack. But if this situation happens again and AI-dominated system is convinced that it’s a real attack, autonomous AI nuclear-armed defense system may launch a nuclear attack in response before the submarine is took done. Human irresponsibility coupled with the autonomy and accuracy of AI could well lead to an unavoidable nuclear war. How to prevent? Block AI-weaponization or data-driven autonomous AI system? It seems impossible.
In the statement you wrote on the Energy Department's Oppenheimer decision, you highlighted the dangers of the U.S. Government using personality and politics to silence dissenting views. The 2023 Doomsday Clock Statement echoes this sentiment, stating that cyber-enabled disinformation continues to run rampant in the United States (e.g. strong political opposition to the proposal for a "Disinformation Governance Board"). From your perspective, how should the government balance quelling disinformation, managing political differences, and keeping the public informed? Additionally, are films like Oppenheimer a good strategy for educating the public on historical events?
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is probably most famous for its yearly doomsday clock assessment and so that there is so much about the most existential issues, like nuclear conflicts or climate change, makes sense. However, I am curious about how the Bulletin thinks not just about the next few years or decades up to a century into the future about some existential topic, but longer from centuries to millennia, in so far as this is possible, about even the small issues that are at least “less-existential.”
For instance: How does the Bulletin consider the long-term health of the human species in relation to the problems of the long-term, safe storage of nuclear waste from reactors or weapons tests, like Bikini atoll? Or perhaps the destruction of the Great Plains and Prairie ecosystems for farming, or microplastics?
What is the methodology used by The Bulletin for the Doomsday Clock and how has the methodology changed over time? More specifically, how does The Bulletin weigh different threats, from climate change to the nuclear threat to AI, when making its determination? How quantitative or qualitative are these determinations? In addition, did the methodology change due to fact that the possible nature of catastrophe has evolved since the Cold War? How does The Bulletin wrestle with the challenge that while changes to the countdown clock's time may accurately reflect changes to the likelihood of disaster, it can be hard to prove these changes are accurate, given the nature of catastrophe?
Can media about nuclear war, be it films, books, games, webpages like "Nowhere to Hide," or even the Doomsday Clock itself, accurately communicate the true costs of nuclear exchange? Is there more value in a dry analysis of casualties, famine, and ecological collapse, such as that of "Nowhere to Hide," or an unflinching depiction of the horrors of nuclear war like those in movies like Threads (1984). Should the aim of media supporting nonproliferation be to scare people with the realities of nuclear war, or does such media breed a wider fear of all nuclear technologies and engender a feeling of hopelessness at a perceived inevitable doomsday?
A lot of students at UChicago are always curious to read the annual announcement about the Doomsday clock and find out whether the clock has moved closer to midnight. However, do you think that the clock in recent years feels a lot less important to the general public and is discussed less compared to previous decades? Furthermore, since 2018, the clock has shifted to under two minutes until midnight, closer to midnight than its position during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the majority of individuals now perceive a greater sense of security than during the Cold War. Do you believe that bringing the clock even closer to midnight might diminish its impact on public consciousness?
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists talks about these nuclear explosions and how it can effect the lives of individuals and the overall world that we live in when it comes to climate change and other affects an explosion may have on the atmosphere, lands, oceans etc. I am curious to know and understand how accurate these interpretations are when it comes to the numbers. It is evident that the numbers have and continue to increase. As the Bulletin talks about what could lead up to these next years and even centuries, how much have these numbers increased since the Cold War? As most recent calculations have shown effects of nuclear war and how they are interpreted as longer-lasting and have more of an effect more than ever before, how much have these numbers changed overtime?
Ultimately, the tremendous and grave responsibility of using nuclear weapons lies in the hands of very few world political and military leaders. These people are not all elected, and none of them are chosen purely on the basis of their nuclear policies and education. They handle a very wide range of issues and may rarely have time to sit down and be briefed on the specific long- and short-term dangers of nuclear weapons. What is the international atomic sciences community doing to ensure that these extraordinarily powerful figures understand the power they yield and the scale of the consequences? What is done to ensure that these people with potentially limited scientific background fully respect the authority atomic scientists yield? Are these warnings falling on deaf ears, seeing as tensions continue to rise despite constant effort?
How does the Bulletin view nuclear power in relation to the risk of proliferation? From what I understand, the enrichment process for fuel in nuclear reactors is similar to the enrichment process for use in weapons, and people get really nervous whenever Iran in particular says they are doing nuclear energy. Given that nuclear is a reasonably climate-friendly form of power generation (and Germany's decision to decommission all of their nuclear plants ahead of schedule has left them more reliant on coal and on Russian natural gas), what balance can be struck between the benefits of cheap and abundant, low-emissions energy and the risks of nuclear proliferation?
In, "An existential discussion: What is the probability of nuclear war?", published by Martin Hellmann, and Vinton Cerf (2021), Hellman states that, “If someone argues that 0.1 percent per year or some other value is an acceptable level of risk, society can then judge whether or not it agrees.” How can there ever be an acceptable risk of nuclear Armageddon? Isn’t any point value above 0 unacceptable? Moreover, what kind of society is able to judge this? More than just a few nuclear warheads are in the hands of autocratic leaders, however, it would also be foolish to assume that nuclear warheads under the control of democratic nation-states make them somewhat “safer”.
The Doomsday Clock was created in 1947, and nuclear weapons have since become more advanced, as well as other factors becoming more prevalent such as climate change and biological threats. Given these new factors and the advancement of weapons, how has the Doomsday Clock adapted throughout the years? Further, the Doomsday Clock has been less than two minutes to midnight since 2020. Does this carry the same weight as it would have upon its creation in 1947 and throughout the Cold War? How can the Doomsday Clock stay relevant and practical when less than two minutes to midnight has become the new normal?
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists cites nuclear threats relating to Ukraine War as one of the major reasons behind their decision to move the clock forward in 2023. During the initial Crimean invasion and the recent escalation in 2022, one argument that I have heard in various circles is that the conflict could have been prevented or otherwise mitigated if Ukraine did not agree to give up their nuclear weapons in the Budapest Memorandum. What is the Bulletin's perspective on mutually assured destruction as a safeguard against smaller scale conflicts that could still threaten a significant portion of humanity?
The Doomsday Clock just ticked closer to the end of the world — we're now at 90 seconds to midnight. Could you shed some light on why this particular time is so crucial? What does it mean in terms of the dangers and challenges the world is facing? Who came up with the Doomsday Clock, and how do they decide where to set it each year? What goes into figuring out how near we are to 'midnight'?
When it comes to nuclear threats, do you think hunkering down in nuclear shelters or underground bunkers is a real way to save a lot of lives? Would these steps actually work if a nuclear disaster happened?
Lastly, what's your take on the best ways to prevent a slide into nuclear war? Are there certain diplomatic moves or policy directions that you think are our best bet for keeping the world safe and peaceful?
For the Council on Foreign Relations' video primer on nuclear proliferation, what are the main factors contributing to its spread in the 21st century, and how do these interact with global politics and security issues? I'd like to keep in mind the delicate balance between nuclear deterrence and the catastrophic potential, what diplomatic/policy measures may best work in curbing further proliferation; what role could international organizations and treaties like the NPT play?
I remember the (2022, I think) Doomsday Clock releasing, a UChicago News article going out, and my friends angrily messaging our group chat to lambast "fearmongering" and the encouragement of anxiety from the university. In response to the 2023 announcement, I get the feeling that many peers choose ignorance of the nuclear threat (and larger existential risks in general) rather than tackling it as a reality perhaps more deeply embedded in our lives than it was for our parents practicing drills in the 80s. How can modern messaging of nonproliferation and communication of these risks address apathetic populations? What has shifted with the marginal increase in existential risk awareness prompted by conversations surrounding topics like the Oppenheimer film and AI's public reach?
Additionally, what would modern statecraft and war look like without the presence of nuclear weaponry? Pre-WWII conventional warfare seems like such a distant memory in the aftermath of mutually-assured destruction. Furthermore, and I think somewhat in tandem with Lucy's question, do you think there would ever be political or popular support for non-development of existentially risky technologies, in the (smaller-scale) vein of Google's deaccession from certain facial recognition technologies (as reported in the NYTimes, "The Technology Facebook and Google Didn’t Dare Release")? I was in a course last quarter on technology and human rights and some of our readings focused on choosing not to develop (Zimmermann 2021 being particularly relevant: https://carrcenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/cchr/files/zimmermann_the_power_of_choosing_not_to_build.pdf), but I'm also unsure of how compatible that is with academic pursuits as well as modern economics, modern statecraft, and modern notions of well-being.
The Doomsday Clock seems to be narrowing closer and closer becoming less than a minute since 2017. How does the clock calculation change year to year as we see the emergence of new technologies and new catastrophes? As a biology major, I also want to ask: how are the biological threats evaluated and how do you factor in localized risks like those currently in Palestine of disease outbreaks against those that are global such as COVID-19 in the calculation and contribution? Additionally, how do you balance the four threats of climate change, biological threats, disruptive technologies, and nuclear risks?
Considering the recent advancement of the Doomsday Clock to 90 seconds before midnight, a grim symbol of escalating global threats primarily due to the Russo-Ukrainian war, and the context provided by John Mearsheimer's argument, a critical question emerges. Mearsheimer suggests that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while inherently dangerous, might paradoxically serve as a deterrent to nuclear annihilation. This presents a stark dichotomy: How do we reconcile the traditional view of nuclear proliferation as a grave risk with the perspective that more nuclear weapons could be essential for global peace and stability? Does this argument, advocating for the inevitability and potential necessity of nuclear armament, align with contemporary approaches to international security and the ongoing efforts towards nuclear disarmament?
Reading about the doomsday clock and thinking about how various nuclear powers around the world have the theoretical potential for causing the end of the world, it makes me wonder about how the bulletin of atomic scientists weight the risk of an accidental warhead detonation. I believe that the US has misplaced nuclear weapons from time to time and there have been close calls to accidental detonation, and can't help but wonder what possible metrics exist to quantify this accidental risk of blowing ourselves up. Does the bulletin consider accidental detonations or I suppose even rogue military personnel in its calculations? and if so, how? Reactor accidents such as Chernobyl or Fukushima are catastrophic but seem to come without the geopolitical implications of an accidental warhead detonation, especially not one that happens internationally and thus are less risky towards the world as a whole, so I would imagine reactor failures would be viewed and quantified differently than accidental warhead detonations, if they are quantified.
Some of the tools of nuclear nonproliferation, such as cyber tools and sanctions, seem like short-term solutions with the potential to delay nuclear weapons development for a few years (at best). However, these tools are also less risky than something like military force. What is the Bulletin's perspective on the effectiveness of various tools of nuclear nonproliferation (including diplomacy, security guarantees, cyberattacks to interrupt weapons development, and sanctions)? Is military force ever worth the risk?
In light of the increased nuclear risk resulting from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, how can the global community work together to unequivocally denounce nuclear weapons and actively pursue disarmament? Considering the article's emphasis on the potential use of nuclear weapons and the destabilizing impact of the conflict, what concrete steps can nations take to foster a world free from the specter of nuclear warfare? How can diplomatic channels and international cooperation be strengthened to not only discourage future aggression but also prioritize disarmament efforts? Discussing the urgency highlighted in the article, how can public awareness and grassroots movements contribute to mounting pressure on governments to prioritize anti-nuclear proliferation measures? Can a collective global commitment to disarmament serve as a catalyst for lasting peace, and what role should citizens play in advocating for a world where the dangerous escalation of nuclear risk becomes an unthinkable scenario?
Upon reading through the resources that attempt to spread nuclear nonproliferation, a common theme I seem to find is the coordination required from multiple parties in order to stop the spread. Whether it is government diplomacy, security guarantees, or a flat honor system, I can't help but feel as though so much of this tension is built up from fear (justifiably so, might I add!) - be it from the enemy or the civilian. If these nuclear (non)proliferation prevention measures are built up from coordinated groups of individuals weighing into the fear from both groups, is there a legitimate chance that nuclear nonproliferation could result in straining this tension between political governments to escalate potential threats that doom the world? Forcing these governmental groups of multiple different countries to coordinate each other, each with their own specific trends and biases feels quite difficult to get on the same page - and if somebody doesn't want to be on the same page, why stop weighing fear with nuclear weaponry? Really interesting to see how much of the threats played by countries are to get their way politically/socially.
One of the articles posted on the Bulletin's site was about the introduction of GSBDs, and the overall effect of nuclear silos and the presence of the military staff associated with these silos on the local economies in places like the Dakotas, Montana, and Wyoming. The article raised a very interesting point about just how powerful a few people can be in determining American defense policy, since the limited benefits given to these communities by these silos is a direct determinant in their politicians defending the existence of land-based nuclear weapons. As a result, these land-based missiles are kept active and staffed, and there is an incentive to keep these stations modernized that seemingly outweighs any negatives on a global or even a national scale. Is it possible to overcome these short-to-medium term incentives and find ways to replace these bases with more permanent and beneficial assets to the community without investing the large amounts of money needed to modernize these silos and the missiles in them? It seems there is a limited amount of political willpower to attempt to understand the needs of the local communities while cutting costs of upkeep and decommissioning nuclear missiles and silos. There is certainly a way to balance these two forces, but there isn't an obvious way to do so in the current political climate.
How might the advent of AI and other cutting-edge technologies in the management and deployment of nuclear arsenals transform the strategic calculus of nuclear-armed states? Furthermore, in the event of a nuclear exchange facilitated by these technologies, what would be the projected consequences on global climate systems, and how might this interplay between advanced tech-enhanced nuclear warfare and climate change necessitate revisions in international security and environmental policies?
What kind of impact do you think the doomsday clock has on how young people approach the possibility of being change makers and innovators? On that same point, what kind of impact do you hope for the doomsday clock to have on how young people view the world we are inheriting? I know this moment seems particularly scary, but we have to get through it. In your mind, how does the doomsday clock navigate and confront this tension?
A situation as catastrophic as nuclear war has no real precedents. Many of the existential threats this course confronts do not, which is what makes them so high-risk. But at the same time, our only resource for understanding the present is the past. While keeping in mind the unprecedented nature of the nuclear problem, how often in history does it happen that people invent a new type of weapon and fail to use it?
The Doomsday Clock has regularly been brought closer to midnight due to geopolitical tensions. However, these conflicts can often linger without real threat of nuclear conflict. There are many tragic conflicts that risk wider conflict but without any WMDs. What sort of mechanisms exist to identify conflicts that do not pose a nuclear risk? Does the BAS argue conflict in general increases the risk of armageddon? I worry that may become a fearmongering stance when the world is far more peaceful than in the past few centuries.
With many ongoing wars happening bringing us closer to midnight on The Doomsday Clock, what do you think is the best stance for governments to take on the threat of nuclear war? With no precedence for the destruction of nuclear war, should countries give in to the threat or should they take a more firm stance and take the risk that a country threatening nuclear war is not bluffing? In regards to countries trading with others in a time of war, how much do sanctions affect the environment?
It appears that the Doomsday Clock has a particular focus on ongoing wars (nuclear to be exact). And while the Bulletin does have information on other threats such as climate change, biological threats, and technological advancement, the lives of people are constantly altered or placed in danger because of other geopolitical factors as well; Venezuela, for example, has an ongoing migration crisis that the U.S. and Canada are trying to accommodate for—the effectiveness of that isn't the concern here, it is the fact that these issues regarding emigration don't exactly stop. People leave their homes for various reasons; other governments accommodate as best they can, with the resources they have like the EU did and is doing with Syrian migrants. Do you think migration politics, human rights politics of this degree could potentially also cause tensions and affect the Doomsday Clock? How would this treatment of politics differ from nuclear armament and how would quantify it on the Clock?
It seems that the nuclear weapons scene may never reach an equilibrium – the stronger countries (economically, politically, militarily) can force other countries into giving up nuclear weapons, but the rule-enforcers themselves do not have to. Is this really the best political strategy that the world can utilize? Is there absolutely no way to impose check-and-balances on all the countries equally?
What “formula” is used to determine the time on the Doomsday Clock? How are various factors (nuclear risk, climate change, biological threats, disruptive technologies, etc.) weighed? Do these weightings change by year? All in all, how has the Doomsday Clock evolved since it was created in 1947? Do you foresee a slow and steady movement toward midnight in the next 10 years, or larger jumps, perhaps toward and away from midnight?
(Joined class late)
In today’s world, the power and influence of media is substantial, whether that be social media, film, news etc. Given the large arsenals of nuclear weaponry many countries have and the ongoing conflicts in the world, do you believe the role of media helps to alleviate the problem or increase the threat of nuclear war? I can see multiple sides to the arguments, such as the media providing a platform to inform the world of the nuclear threat and the prevailing issues pertaining to it, but the media can also be a platform that worsens relationships between both political officials but also the everyday citizens of disputing countries.
(Joined class late)
Considering the closing window that humanity has to rectify our detrimental affects on the world (climate change!) it seems that building nuclear weaponry should be an outdated issue, not only because of the expenses (which could otherwise be allocated towards something like the Green Deal) but because of the direct threat of nuclear weaponry to humanity (whether through the launching of missiles or through radioactive spillage). However, due to the nature of politics and international relationships, it seems close to impossible to completely erase nuclear weaponry. So, what can be done, in the US specifically where communities such as Great Falls still fight for the existence of these weapons? Is it the job of the media to influence the people's opinion in order to initiate change or perhaps something else?
How should policy decision-makers weigh the potential benefits that could accompany a mobilization and expansion of nuclear energy with the potential threats that an expansion of nuclear power could pose?
Questions for Rachel Bronson, about and inspired by: