Week 7 Memos: Policy & Government

[deholz]

Reply with your memo as a Comment. The memo should be responsive to this week's readings on Policy & Government from Governor Jerry Brown, with 300–500 words + 1 visual element (e.g., figure, image, hand-drawn picture, art, etc. that complements or is suggestive of your argument). The memo should be tagged with one or more of the following:

origin: How did we get here? Reflection on the historical, technological, political and other origins of this existential crisis that help us better understand and place it in context.

risk: Qualitative and quantitative analysis of the risk associated with this challenge. This risk analysis could be locally in a particular place and time, or globally over a much longer period, in isolation or in relation to other existential challenges (e.g., the environmental devastation that follows nuclear fallout).

policy: What individual and collective actions or policies could be (or have been) undertaken to avert the existential risk associated with this challenge? These could include a brief examination and evaluation of a historical context and policy (e.g., quarantining and plague), a comparison of existing policy options (e.g., cost-benefit analysis, ethical contrast), or design of a novel policy solution.

solutions: Suggestions of what (else) might be done. These could be personal, technical, social, artistic, or anything that might reduce existential risk.

framing: What are competing framings of this existential challenge? Are there any novel framings that could allow us to think about the challenge differently; that would make it more salient? How do different ethical, religious, political and other positions frame this challenge and its consequences (e.g., “End of the Times”).

salience: Why is it hard to think and talk about or ultimately mobilize around this existential challenge? Are there agencies in society with an interest in downplaying the risks associated with this challenge? Are there ideologies that are inconsistent with this risk that make it hard to recognize or feel responsible for?

nuclear/#climate/#bio/#cyber/#emerging: Partial list of topics of focus.

For one session over the course of the quarter, you may post a memo that reflects on a film or fictional rendering of an existential challenge. This should be tagged with:

movie / #novel: How did the film/novel represent the existential challenge? What did this highlight; what did it ignore? How realistic was the risk? How salient (or insignificant) did it make the challenge for you? For others (e.g., from reviews, box office / retail receipts, or contemporary commentary)?

[timok15]

gov, #framing, #salience

Reading “Washington’s Crackpot Realism” has made me consider another angle that needs to be considered, beyond simple bad analysts in a position of influence. The US wars against terrorism have cost $8 trillion with little to show for them. Clearly, this is a simple case of crackpot realism leading American taxpayer dollars to be thrown down the drain. However, to my mind, these $8 trillion were not wasted, at least not for everyone involved. That $8 trillion loss for the American people was some $8 trillion of juicy profits divided up among the various companies of the American military industrial complex.

I am not saying that defense analysts are not on the large part off their rocker. On the contrary, I certainly think they are and have thought them to be so, even before Brown so nicely encapsulated their worldview as “crackpot realism” because, while they seemed cogent, they at same seemed unworried about the ultimate conclusion of their projects (like large scale war between nuclear-armed peer adversaries) in a way tantamount to madness. Rather, why is it that these analysts who advocate open, belligerent jockeying, are still in the backseat and allowed to give proverbial driving advice that has shown itself malicious? I contend that it is because the defense interests who finance the campaigns of this or that politician are pleased by these analysts’ appointment by those same politicians because their mode of thought makes them big profits.

Individuals are important and it is necessary to consider how their actions and influence play a part in the unfolding of world events. However, people don’t live isolated in Platonic space, rather they live in societies with institutions that they play some part in, whatever that part may be. I think it is so difficult and even easy to forget to think systematically because people’s everyday lives and interactions are (at least ostensibly) with individuals (they might represent an institution). Consequently, there is an impulse to consider only the thinking of this or that person in this or that position for why that person chose to approach or resolve a problem the way they did. In fact of course, there are other pressures influencing them either directly (like that an oil company will only accept the most militant defense of their interests) or indirectly (like the belligerent analyst who received their position from someone under pressure to be more hawkish, or even themselves hawkish and got the funding to reach their position because of their own hawkishness).

1935 cover of Major General Smedley D. Butler’s War is a Racket (This book is a good read. I've read it and I recommend it. It covers the massive wealth that American industry raked in for a few magnates from the murderous and brutal WWI. It also looks at the US entering WWI itself and the waste from oversupplying the US military.)

[DNT21711]

policy, #risk, #solutions

A critical analysis of Governor Jerry Brown’s advocacy for addressing existential threats, particularly nuclear proliferation, underscores the urgent need for a singular, innovative policy: the implementation of a Global Nuclear Risk Reduction Framework (GNRRF). This policy aims to mitigate the escalating risk of nuclear conflict, leveraging technological advancements and international diplomacy.

Policy Justification and Risk Analysis

The existential risk posed by nuclear weapons, as detailed in Brown's writings, is both immediate and potentially catastrophic. The likelihood of accidental or deliberate nuclear exchanges between states, exacerbated by geopolitical tensions and technological mishaps, presents a clear and present danger to global security. This policy proposal seeks to address this risk through a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach that includes de-escalation protocols, enhanced communication channels, and robust verification mechanisms.

Solutions Through GNRRF

The GNRRF would operate on several levels to ensure effectiveness:

1. International Cooperation: Establish a coalition of nuclear and non-nuclear states committed to risk reduction, fostering a global culture of transparency and mutual trust.
2. Technological Innovation: Utilize satellite technology and artificial intelligence for real-time monitoring of nuclear arsenals, ensuring compliance and detecting potential threats early.
3. Crisis Management: Develop standardized protocols for crisis de-escalation, providing a clear pathway for resolving tensions without resorting to nuclear options. Challenges and Limitations

Critics may argue that the GNRRF's success hinges on unprecedented levels of international collaboration and trust, potentially unrealistic in the current geopolitical climate. However, the escalating risks of inaction—highlighted by Brown's analysis—necessitate bold steps forward. By prioritizing dialogue and cooperation, the GNRRF lays the groundwork for a safer global future.

In conclusion, the GNRRF represents a targeted, actionable policy response to the existential threat of nuclear proliferation. Drawing on Governor Jerry Brown’s insights into the dangers of nuclear escalation, this proposal emphasizes the need for innovative solutions grounded in cooperation and technology. Through the GNRRF, the international community can make significant strides toward mitigating nuclear risks, ensuring a more secure and peaceful world for future generations.

[lubaishao]

origin #framing #policy

As a pessimistic offensive realist, I actually don't believe that China and the US can avoid a fierce confrontation through dignified compromises, as Jerry Brown suggested. Structural realism argues that states need to take responsibility for their survival and security in the anarchic international society. Defensive school believes the international system has a tendency to form the balance of power, while offensive school believes each unit (state) will pursue unlimited power until (regional) hegemony, which can best secure their chance of survival. Therefore, the United States' strategy in Asia is to act as an offshore balancer, preventing China from becoming a hegemon. China's goal, on the other hand, is to become a hegemon in Asia. This matter is not about ideology, values, or political systems. It is solely related to the security of the two countries. The only question, and one that is impossible to resolve, is how to convince one country that the improve of power of one country will not affect the other’s security. Because they care only about relative power, one grows, one declines.

Since the problem cannot be fundamentally resolved, what I have been exploring is how to mitigate this conflict. Firstly, establishing a broad dialogue mechanism, with the most important being dialogue in the security domain and between militaries. Realists believe that information opacity is a significant cause of interstate conflicts, and mutual fear can easily lead states into a spiral model of security. The large bodies of water separating China and the US provide a significant advantage, as each country knows the other lacks the motive and capability to occupy its territory, reducing fear. Based on this, dialogue is useful and necessary. Secondly, cooperating in areas where cooperation is possible. China and the US are not currently in a state of full-scale war, so both need to address common issues as part of their responsibility of major powers, such as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and artificial intelligence. At the end of 2023, Xi Jinping and Biden reached consensus in the field of artificial intelligence, specifically on maintaining human control over nuclear weapons in the era of artificial intelligence, rather than integrating nuclear weapons into AI systems. The rationality of leaders is an important aspect of mitigating the problem.

As a Chinese, I still hope that ten years from now I will still be able to travel freely between China and the United States. War brings nothing but pain to ordinary people. Most ordinary people gain nothing from war. I remember when I graduated from the GWU, the dean told us that we must remind our government that we deserve a better future.

[ldbauer1011]

origin #framing

International political science is a field that is deeply divided. Given the political nature of the discussions this week, I felt it would be good to provide a brief synopsis of the current political fields of thought regarding international politics. Though there are many disparate schools of thought, they can broadly be separated into three major schools: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism.

Finding lenses for understanding the various machinations that drive states, companies, and people around the world was once considered simple. For much of history, especially since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, political leaders have treated the state as the most important player in international politics. The state’s interests and goals were the primary motives behind why states acted, and those states were guided by rational actors (code for white, rich, Anglo-Saxon men). International politics was a zero-sum game, where to win, others needed to lose. Additionally, states could never be entirely certain of other states’ motives, leading to increased uncertainty and thus fear of what other states might do. This encouraged militarization and hostility, the popularity of high diplomacy, “great man” politics, and the rise of nationalism. This lens, Realism, is where C. Wright Mills derived his “crackpot realism” from.

Liberalism gained traction in the aftermath of WW2 and the rise of importance of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations (UN). Liberals were among the first to drive cracks in the realist worldview by arguing that the international regimes put into place by states were the first steps in what is known as “global governance”, or the creation of a form of world government. Regimes like the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the UN were the first steps into the beginning of a globalized society where the state was just a cog in the great mechanism that is the world. As such, international politics was not a zero-sum game, as benefits and harms cannot be localized on a state level. What affected one state also likely affected the states directly around it, and inevitably the rest of the world. This understanding of the complexities of world governance would shatter the perceived reality of state isolationism, and force states to sometimes act against their immediate self-interest in order to achieve long-term benefits, with the understanding that world policies could be enacted and enforced by IGOs.

Then, the Soviet Union fell. Suddenly, the world lived in an American world, where it had the sole authority to reshape these IGOs so states would follow American interests and ideals. When this didn’t happen, Constructivists began to argue that societal norms played a larger role than previously expected. IGOs had established norms that coerced states, sometimes voluntarily, to respect the rights of minorities and the ideals of democracy and consent. Even authoritarian states needed to pay lip service to these norms to remain on the international stage, staging “elections” and participating in democratic diplomatic discussions. If not, international finance, communications, and power were stripped away as “pariahs”, or outcasts to the international order, were ostracized. Essentially, constructivists argue that FOMO is a key reason states and other international actors, like corporations and non-governmental organizations, continue to engage in international politics and even adopt policies that might run against their own direct interests.

[miansimmons]

policy #solutions #salience

Given the global magnitude of the existential threats we face, there is a strong need for international collaboration in order to combine knowledge, facilitate coordination, and incentivize action. International law is currently lacking mechanisms to urge other nations to tackle existential risks and ensure cooperation. However, international collaboration between countries and their institutions could unlock new solutions that would otherwise be difficult to execute. As Toby Ord put is, "the incentives of a nation are only aligned with the incentives of humanity if we share the costs of these policies just as we share the benefits" (Ord, 2020, p.199).

Collaboration between institutions at the global level allows for innovations in disaster management. Let us consider climate change effects in Japan, for example. Japan is prone to natural disasters, such as typhoons, earthquakes, and floods, and about 58% of natural disasters in Asia occur in East Asia (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific). As a result of the climate change predicament, natural disasters are on the rise and offer increased opportunities for collaboration to provide humanitarian assistance. The formation of more nonprofit strategic partnerships will allow for the development of capacity-building initiatives, quick deployment of humanitarian funds and aid, and improved cross-culture communication. For instance, an American NGO without an office in Japan can take advantage of their Japanese partner's offices and support mechanisms during a humanitarian emergency, deploying resources while avoiding the startup costs required of a new venture.

In terms of policy to make more cooperation like this happen, I advocate for an international agreement that builds global support for existential risk reduction. A panel of experts with representatives from participating nations will quantify and bring attention to existential risks, developing a binding contract for their nations to counteract these risks within their borders and as a unified front. They will also provide education for their citizens on the threats being combatted. Further, we should conduct scenario planning at the international level for threats like global pandemics (naturally occurring and engineered). As we learned from COVID-19, pandemics can strike at any time and minimizing deaths depends on our ability to coordinate and expand international capacity. These threats are constantly evolving and require global expertise.

As Jerry Brown highlighted in his writings, international collaboration is often difficult to execute in practice. Global leaders are often blinded by nationalist ideals and may make reckless decisions while believing themselves to be rational. When it comes to nuclear weapons, for example, many nations for not want to pursue disarmament first and instead think it more rational to rapidly build up their nuclear arsenals. Despite the disagreements that can arise in cooperation efforts, the potential benefits of collaboration to existential threat mitigation make it worth pursuing.

"The clearest challenge the world faces is how to address complex global problems amid growing skepticism about the benefits of multilateralism and continued global integration." -IMF

[M-Hallikainen]

policy #solutions #fraiming

Reading Corinne Purtill and Toby Ord's readings this week, I found myself suspicious of the style of effective altruism and longtermism being advocated for. I was having trouble putting my finger on where I had heard about it before until I dug up the video essay by actress and youtuber Abigale Thorn The Rich Have Their Own Ethics: Effective Altruism & the Crypto Crash. The video is largely centered on dissecting the philosophy of effective altruism as it applies to finance and the most recent crypto crash, but it also has a significant section dedicated to longtermism, delving into both the Toby Ord book this weeks chapters were pulled from and the works of Will MacAskill that Purtill cites. I think her arguments very clearly articulate the social dangers in entrusting existential threat management to effective altruism, both in terms of how we tackle those threats and how our prioritization of threats shapes the societies of today. Firstly and most pressingly, the focus given to the hypothetical existential threats of the future often comes at the expense of of the lesser threats of today. As illustrated by the "pascal's mugging" thought experiment, when the potential consequences of a far off long term threat are near instant societal extinction, that hypothetical threat draws attention and resources away from both contemporary but progressive existential threats like climate change and lest dire but still critical issues like social and economic inequality. In singularly focusing on the goal of "safeguarding the future," the proverbial adult version of of our teenage species, we risk perpetuating the greatest ills of modernity into that future. Moreover, as is highlighted by the end of Thorn's essay, effective altruism and longtermism are not merely arguments for addressing longterm existential threats, but arguments that said action should only occur in specific ways. In particular, the effective altruist arguments for exclusively research driven solutions (seen in Ord's descriptions of research on existential risks) and charity as engines of change favor change within systems driven by the most powerful actors within those systems. It is significantly easer to test and generate quantitative data for solutions within our contemporary sociopolitical system than it is to explore solutions outside of them, particularly when the institutions and individuals funding research have vested interest in the current sociopolitical status quo. I find the example of the contraceptive pill on pages 215-216 of the Ord reading illuminating in this respect. Like him, I agree that the development of the contraceptive pill was of revolutionary good to society, but Ord uses it as an argument for philanthropy and charity as engines of global social change. I don't think it is wise or effective to trust such mechanisms to guide our collective future because it relies on a shared vision of the future and the threats it faces between the general public and the most powerful members of society. Put bluntly, I don't want to live in the future billionaires think is ideal, and I don't think billionaires would agree with what I consider a pressing threat to humanity. Per the Abigale Thorn video, "MacAskill and Ord write a lot about progress and humanity's potential, but they say almost nothing about who gets to define those concepts. (...) Whose vision of the future gets listened to? In my opinion, those aren't side questions to hide in the footnotes. There're core to the whole project."

[oliviaegross]

solutions #policy #salience

Throughout the quarter we have taken on the challenging task of approaching various existential risks through a critical lense, and some of us have even proposed potential solutions to the problems we have discussed. In contrast, and as Jerry Brown articulates, many government officials tend to take a different approach. Unfortunately, America's leaders tend to delude themselves and often fail to ask basic questions about the ultimate goals of matters like war, prior to invading. Brown emphasized that government leaders do not take the time to reflect and analyze areas like the human and financial costs of war, its benefits, or how it could end. Our current defense industrial base is an existential threat. More specifically Brown further focused on how morality is used as a vehicle for such an approach, “Too often the language of morality is used to obfuscate, not elucidate.” (Washington’s Crackpot Realism, p. 1). I wonder how morality can be used, as we have attempted in this class, as a manner to inspire clarity rather than invite it. One manner this is seen is by way of collaboration. Jerry Brown emphasized in his writings that putting collaboration into practice is often challenging. Despite the hurdles and disagreements that may arise in collaborative endeavors, the potential advantages in mitigating existential threats make the pursuit of collaboration worthwhile. An indirect manner we see such collaboration taking place is in the privatization of the defense industry itself. However, many of the Defense prime contractors have the wrong incentives and the industry needs disruption focused on technology, “Perry writes that he started young, at the age of twenty-six in 1954, as a senior scientist at Sylvania’s Electronic Defense Laboratories in what is now called Silicon Valley. Today we think of this part of the world as the home of Apple, Google, and Facebook, but back then the principal work was defense, the business of mass destruction.” I found this quote kind of hilarious as one of the manners in which many are attempting to combat the existential threats of war that the world is facing is in… Silicon valley. There is growing concern that the current period, marked by Russia's two-year war in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel, may be considered a relatively calm phase before a potential storm. If China were to take action against Taiwan, it could lead to conflicts in three regions, with the U.S. becoming involved in all of them. This might eventually be perceived not as separate wars but as part of a single global conflict. Over the past fifty years, especially since the end of the Cold War, many Americans have enjoyed a sense of safety. However, the attack on a country with advanced security measures on October 7 served as a significant wake-up call, prompting questions about the possibility of similar events occurring in the United States. I wonder how we feel about companies like Anduril Industries (an $8.5 billion company that develops drones, autonomous vehicles, submarines, rockets, and software for military use) and VC firms like 8VC who are attempting to disrupt the defense marketplace, bring Silicon Valley’s speed, creativity, and innovation to defense, and advance our national security. I would consider this one of the best solutions to many of the existential challenges we face from those in government. The defense industry needs disruption to its concerning incentives and more of a focus on technology.

[ghagle]

#salience

One of the most optimistic moments in today's set of readings was Purtill's assertion in "How Close is Humanity to its Edge?" that "we can do our part by giving to causes that support humanity's survival" instead of hoarding personal stores of resources in anticipation of a doomsday episode descending on society and, charmingly, "by having the conversations that coalesce, over time, into collective action." "Much," she says, "depends on what is imaginable" by society on a grand scale (5). Ord of course reinforces this argument in his book and Brown and Perry hint at this notion--that the collective needs to inspire the action that our governments and institutions are going to take, especially in the domain of nuclear disarmament. It was also energizing to read, for the first time in this class, more concrete, inward facing remedies to threats from foreign nations. Namely, Hart and Magsamen's "dramatic investments needed to transform American education" and "rectify...decades of poorly exercised "strategic inertia" ("Washington's Crackpot Realism", Brown, 7). This class makes me think a lot about the epistemology of the doomed question and its solutions. Lots, if not all, of today's various authors' plans seem extremely reasonable and important, not to mention implementable. But, as they repeatedly point out, they remain out of the public's mind eye--outside of the "imaginable" that Purtill writes about.

I think this this kind of description--the ones that today's authors write about--is misleading and ignores something quite gloomy about the whole issue: for the most part, people do that there are issues solvable with understandable policy, but they just don't care enough to do anything about it. They might not believe in "what is imaginable" vis-a-vis solutions to problems. Yes, the extent to which the precarious condition of nuclear weapons looms over us might not be as public as other "dooming" elements, but the reality is that the issue is still simply pushed to the periphery, its not down to poor education, bad leaders, or a lack of 'imagination.'

Take the Covid pandemic, for example. The virus was our 'dooming' element; vaccines, quarantining, and masks the solutions. There were lots of potential policies implementable that would have lead to a minimization of the issue, but many individuals and institutions chose to be lax with respect to their execution. And it wasn't because they did not know. It was because they chose to prioritize other values, pursuits, and preferences. The discomfort of masking, the loss of in-person socializing, or the disgruntlement some felt from being cornered into vaccinating, were values and preferences baked into human character that either 1) did not cut the mustard in a personal cost-benefit calculation or 2) simply were not reconcilable with the huge scale and long-term thinking that naturally does not accompany the human mindset. We are evolved to be short-term, local thinkers.

This analysis applies to the other 'dooming' issues of our class and the readings. Humans much prefer, for either reason, to prioritize their personal economic and emotional interests; not because they have no idea that there is a threat from nuclear bombs, but because maintaining the self-interested pro-domestic arming mentality is a much easier sell for politicians and interests groups, just as focusing on domestic AI capabilities without robust consideration of when the 'dooming' point might be reached is.

We are busy, greedy people. That is the hurdle that needs to be overcome, not grassroots educational and imaginative discussions to raise awareness.

[AnikSingh1]

risk #solution #salience

Upon reading both "Washington's Crackpot Realism" and "Nuclear Addiction", I am unfortunately a pessimist when it comes to governmental and political activity with regards to international affairs. The readings have given me insight into believing that a lot of powerful countries such as China, Russia, and Japan are ultimately enduring (or have endured) political turmoil with the United States, being mere seconds away from engaging in warfare to attack both the people and pride of nearby nations. More specifically, I believe the overarching problems that affect these nations combined with the unpredictability of political warfare leads to an unhealthy future where the only solution is cooperative evasion. While these two words might make it seem easy to achieve, we circle back to a problem of differing cultures, lifestyles, and political views - and with so much threat behind every decision, it's quite difficult to see multiple nations cooperating even if it could be in the world's best interest.

Throughout "Nuclear Addiction", it is clear that both the United States and the Soviet Union are in a powerful stalemate, described as "nuclear giants that are paralyzed by their own mutual hostage relationship. Try as they will, by testing, developing and deploying more nuclear weapons systems, neither will break out of the curse of assured mutual destruction" (12). Just as we discussed in the first week of this class, the security and safety countries begin to feel once amassing nuclear weaponry allows for a level of control that is unparalleled. Discussions and cooperative solutions start to hold less weight as the threat of nuclear weaponry holds more in terms of future attitude than current debates. The risk we see here is the "hostage relationship", that results in a stalemate - neither country wants to wage war, as it would drive profits down. But the threat of these powerful tools allows for a country to do one of two things: force other countries to comply, or do nothing that can cause harm, both beneficial for the country that holds the weapons. This concept applies similarly to China, as mentioned in "Washington's Crackpot Realism", where the threat of what can happen in the future holds more value than current actions.

I cite these conditions as important as I believe they are what ultimately drives political and governmental policies to have significant impact. With no country willing to cross boundaries with another due to these threats, we reach a net cooperative stance. It is unwise to threaten another unless there can be a cooperative, peaceful result from these actions as heavy as described. The political agendas of one country should not be as high as they can be to sabotage not only themselves, but allies or civilians. In this case of little action, the stances that nations bottle themselves up into leads to little control in anybody's hands, unless it is wise to wage war and attempt to "win out" the peace. If relationships hold, there shouldn't be an issue -- but one foot in the wrong spot and it is easy to see how pessimism can take over in a flash.

Comic of neutrality being the end all be all. Little action = neutral (good!), more action = less neutral (bad!)

[jamaib]

solutions #policy

I particularly enjoyed Ord’s outlook on existential risks for two reasons. First, is his recognition and insistence on “humanity's capacity for greatness”. When thinking about hopelessness I feel that we often forget how vast human potential is. Covid-19 is evidence, though not without troubles humanity was able to more or less curb the worst effects of a global pandemic through effective policy and creating a vaccine in under a year (impressive). Humanity has quite the ability to adapt and survive under intense pressures.

However, as he mentions in order to avoid potential existential risks, we need to overcome our tendency of “scope neglect” which as he puts it “is the cognitive bias that makes it harder to understand the full scale of problems the larger those problems get”. This happens at the individual level but more importantly at the organizational level. This unfortunately leads to delayed responses to new problems, as we often fail to recognize the reality or potential of a problem before it reaches dangerous levels. How often do we see antiquated laws, rules, or regulations in place at governments, institutions, etc.? This is the case for nuclear weapons, Climate change, and many of the other major topics we’ve discussed thus far. In order to combat rapidly growing and varying problems, our actions and implementations of “answers” must be quicker. Although we as humanity tend to hold a certain reverence for antiques or the past, this line of thinking will not serve us well. Instead, we must consider what is best for our future selves. Specifically, I think his philosophy of effective altruism, rooted in the idea of using reason and evidence to maximize positive impact, will be important in collective action addressing existential risks. The collective action of individuals could help to spur older organization (who cling to tradition or are simply narrow sighted) into action.

[imilbauer]

nuclear #framing

The question of nuclear war disaster rests on the kind of strategic logic that we employ when we make calculations about the potential behavior of foreign actors. Jerry Brown’s “Washington’s Crackpot Realism” article criticizes the rationalism employed in grand strategy when strategists are willing to tolerate the chances of a “limited” nuclear armed conflict in order to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony in Asia. More broadly, grand strategy around nuclear weapons use makes calculations about self-preservation and what countries are willing to use nuclear weapons in order to preserve. In the case of regional war in Asia, these strategists are willing to risk nuclear disaster in order to prevent the loss of the U.S.’s status as a global super power. So, self-preservation can be conceived of as the maintenance of a political arrangement. Jerry Brown’s position, as apposed to strategist’s like Colby’s, seems to be that preservation should primarily be a matter of the preservation of human life — imperiled by a nuclear war -- but that these concerns go hand in hand with political concerns--although maybe Colby would argue the same about his position. A third conception of self-preservation is the self-preservation of an idea, like an a idea of what it means to be human, which Ord writes in Precipice is also at risk when he states, “if we radically change our nature...if we diversify our forms, we fragment humanity.” (192) Evidently, when we talk about self-preservation, we may be talking about different things, the preservation of a political arrangement, of human life, or of a shared idea. When we conceive of the preservation of a political arrangements or a shared idea, we generally understand these forms as enabling the life of millions if not billions of people, so there is a collective quality to each of these three forms as well. Nevertheless, although each form is collective, there are ways that they may be at odds with one another or different actors may have different definitions. A system like the one in The Machine Stops might enable the preservation of human life, but not preserve an idea of being human. It is unclear to me to what degree these types of self preservation are in competition or can build off one another, but Jerry Brown seems to argue that preserving human life can accompany continuity in a political arrangement, modifying the arrangement but not uprooting it either. I think we must recognize that the idea of collective self-preservation has a historical ontology. Prior to the enlightenment, preservation was often thought in terms of the preservation of a monarch. During the enlightenment, a more humanistic and dialogue-based approach began to take hold. I wonder, to what extent today, if we turn people into dictators or a rigid idea into a monarch of thinking, we lose an understanding of self-preservation as collective—-and a balancing act between interconnected domains of preservation.

Picture: Ping pong diplomacy shows cooperation is possible.

[agupta818]

origin #gov

Political realism attempts to "explain, model, and prescribe political relations" and that "power is (or ought to be) the primary end of political action, whether in the domestic or international arena." In his article, Jerry Brown states that both Doshi and Colby both use this philosophy in their arguments, but I see clear oppositions to this line of thought in Doshi's argument. He believes that there will be international cooperation from China in transnational challenges such as nuclear proliferation and climate change. However, if the origin of the issues between the country are money and power, which comes from having nuclear weapons and using cheap fossil fuel sources to power their economies, how can this be? In fact, the chairman of Fact Global Energy said that the oil industry is dependent on "China, China, China," demonstrating the relatively high consumption of nonrenewable energy by an economic powerhouse like China. If the industries in China and the United States have economies that spend trillions on energy that produces fossil fuels from their beginnings, and have not yet shifted to total renewable energy, then it is hard to believe that these two countries will cooperate in the transition if it is of great cost to them. Furthermore, thinking about the politics of nuclear weapons since their deployment in World War II and the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction during the Cold War, it is clear that possessing a large number of nuclear weapons is sign of power since their creation. If power is the primary end of political action, then it seems with the elephant in the room of Russia, China and the US may be more hesitant to combat nuclear proliferation, especially if it means countries like Russia could in the meantime gain a greater nuclear arsenal and thus have more power. I think given political realism, this theory always assume competition between the US and China, thus, it is hard to believe that given the origins of these "transnational challenges" a mutual agreement to combat climate change and nuclear proliferation will be hard to come by...it's all about power and being number 1, so given political realism, who would want to give that up? This is why I think Doshi might have to reevaluate their conclusion on the two countries seeing eye to eye.

[briannaliu]

#policy #risk #solutions

I believe that the American policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate many of the characteristics that Jerry Brown expresses in his criticism of the American government’s crackpot realism in declaring war on Afghanistan.

As Jerry Brown writes, “It is clear now that America’s leaders deluded themselves and failed to ask basic questions about the ultimate goal of the war before invading: its human and financial costs, its benefits, or how it would end.” Similarly, during the pandemic, I believe America’s leaders failed to ask themselves basic questions when devising their pandemic policy response, resulting in severe life-and-death costs to citizens. For instance, in January and February 2020, the CDC insisted on devising its own test that would detect COVID-19 as well as other viruses rather than using German tests that had already been proven effective. The CDC’s new test was stalled after the test failed to correctly identify viruses other than COVID, costing the CDC valuable weeks that could have been used to track the virus’ spread in the U.S. and contain its spread. If the CDC had simply asked itself: “What is the purpose of creating our own test? Do we want to target the virus at hand (COVID), or concern ourselves with other, less pressing viruses?” I believe that the government would have taken the WHO’s advice to use the German tests and gotten ahead of tracking and containing the virus.

Another costly decision by the U.S. government was President Trump’s decision to downplay the threat of the pandemic by likening it to the flu without considering the widespread effect that this could have on Americans’ perception of the virus. This early designation of the virus as non-threatening ultimately played a role in many Americans’ disregard for quarantining and mask-wearing practices and contributed to America’s exceptionally high per-capita death toll. Decisions like these by the Trump administration seem to align with Mills’ term “crackpot realism,” referring to “leaders who he believed were making incredibly reckless decisions with little understanding of the consequences, while believing themselves to be exceptionally rational.”

In addition, Jerry Brown’s discusses how nationalism can overwhelm diplomacy and human judgment. For instance, the U.S.’s “confrontational and Manichean zeal” toward China that Brown describes can also be seen in the American government’s pandemic response. President Trump pinned a global, natural viral threat on a major rival power by naming COVID-19 the “Chinese virus.” By seeing the crisis as an opportunity for competition with China rather than cooperation, Trump’s administration was more concerned with damaging and narrow-minded nationalism than the U.S.’s self-interest in containing the pandemic.

Another instance of the U.S. government prioritizing competition over cooperation when fighting the pandemic was the U.S.’s continued trade war with China during the pandemic which reduced the U.S.’s ability to import urgently-needed medical supplies from China, such as protective gowns and masks. In a similar vein, American trade sanctions on Iran hindered Iran’s access to the U.S.’s COVID-19 vaccines and medical supplies, showing a prioritization for international economic competition and a lack of regard for the global health issue at hand. These policies toward China and Iran again went against the U.S.’s own interest in curbing the pandemic and failed to acknowledge that COVID-19 posed a far greater risk to America (and the world) than Iran or China could.

I believe that the American government made missteps during the pandemic by allowing nationalism to cloud its judgment on policy decisions and failing to consider the costs of them. In line with the “joint strategic framework” that Rudd proposes, successfully confronting a threat like a virus, which has no international boundaries, requires global cooperation and a recognition that the danger affects all of humanity.

[briannaliu]

#novel #policy

The novel The Handmaid’s Tale is set in the future, in a state called Gilead that has replaced the United States. Gilead is a totalitarian and theocratic state responding to the existential challenge of dangerously low reproduction rates. To combat this reproductive crisis, the government has created a system in which women, called Handmaids, are assigned to bear children for elite couples that have trouble conceiving. That is, every month, Handmaids must have ritualized sex with their assigned Commander while the Commander’s wife sits behind them, holding their hands. The freedom of women is completely restricted in this society; women are only allowed to leave the house for shopping trips, they must leave their bedroom door open at all times, and they are under constant surveillance by Gilead’s secret police force, the Eyes. In essence, women are completely subservient to men, and their sole purpose is to bear children for others and combat population decline.

I believe that this risk of a reproductive crisis is somewhat realistic, especially since global birth rates have been declining for decades. In the US, the birth rate has dropped by almost 23% between 2007 and 2022. Today, the average American woman has about 1.6 children, down from 3 in 1950, and significantly below the “replacement rate” of 2.1 children needed to sustain a stable population. But the US is not alone; countries around the world are experiencing declining birth rates. Taiwan, for instance, has introduced monetary incentives for having children, including 6 months of paid parental leave and tax breaks for parents of young children. Countries like China, South Korea, and Italy are experiencing similar declines.

The novel certainly made the reproductive crisis more salient to me, as I believe not a lot of attention is paid to the state of birth rates today and I could imagine that this continued rate of decline could become a serious issue in the future. But even more alarming to me was the policy response by the totalitarian government toward this existential crisis, which threatened the freedom of women. The regime managed to restrict women’s liberties and reduce them to baby-birthing machines under the “noble” guise of societal preservation. These efforts are so successful, in fact, that even some women have subscribed to the regime’s ideologies.

After reading the book, I began thinking about how dangerous this kind of mindset toward women can be and the ways it could manifest in the real world. I began reading about different governments’ policy responses to declining birth rates. In China, at a meeting on women’s issues, male Communist Party officials neglected talks of gender equality and instead urged women to “establish a correct outlook on marriage and love, childbirth, and family.” Instances like these give chilling insights into the ease with which people can slip into dangerous dialogues that fit women back into tight roles of domestic life and childbearing. For me, this novel serves as more a warning against the dangers of totalitarian government than the risks of low reproductive rates.

[cbgravitt]

salience #framing

At the end of his review of William Perry's book, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, Jerry Brown poses and attempts to answer the question of why nuclear annihilation is so far from the minds of most Americans. People are currently very concerned about (or at least aware or) the threats of pathogens, climate change, and emerging technologies. So what's going on with nuclear? Perry and Brown each offer a few solutions: nuclear annihilation and war are "unthinkable", and thus are not thought of; the misguided belief that defense against a nuclear strike is actually possible; the hope that deterrence strategies will really deter; even something as simple as the pure physical distance between most people and a nuclear silo. I agree that all of these points are accurate, but I think there's a larger cultural force at play. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were a novel destructive force, as revolutionary as they were terrifying. We weren't quite sure what they were capable of, and new technologies surrounding them were being developed by both the US and the USSR rather frequently. As such, people were scared and/or excited, much like how many people feel about AI today, especially those at the forefront. The problem now is the nuclear weapons are a part of history, just another chapter in an already dense textbook of American history. What really drives this belief, I think, is that in any US history textbook in any high school in America, you will see the Cold War described as the greatest period of nuclear tension in history. You will also find the well-known fact that the cold war ended 30 years ago. While the latter is true, the former is no longer accurate. Without a country-wide narrative shift on the relative danger we face now compared to the time of the USSR, the general public won't take nuclear threats seriously because they have been taught that "it can't be worse than the Cuban Missile Crisis". The history of nuclear technology is over 100 years old, but it's still going strong. We can't let our conversations about it slip into the past tense.

[mibr4601]

When looking at how to lessen any of our existential risks, we require there to be a level of international collaboration and coordination. For an individual nation, there is not enough of an incentive to try and solve issues such as climate change alone. There aren’t enough international laws that spur all countries into action. Thus, an ideal situation for a country is to free ride off of other countries. However, this means that noone will take action. Ord says that our system causes “risk-reducing activities to be under-supplied and risk-increasing activities to be over-supplied”(Ord, 2020, 199).

I think this largely comes from the overcompetitiveness between governments. As governments don’t believe that issues such as climate change are their issues, they are willing to partake in more risk-increasing activities. This is not just limited to climate change. As Jerry Brown discussed, many presidents follow a highly dangerous path of achieving nuclear “parity” with Russia. This competitive nature does not cause the risk to decrease and does not help either side. Instead, it just causes escalation without any end. Furthermore, you can apply this to AI and large language models. Other nations such as China are racing to catch up to and pass the capabilities of the LLMs in the US. This means that not only are other nations willing to cut corners, but the US also is willing to in order to stay ahead. Instead of prioritizing safety regulations, and minimizing existential risks, the focus is on staying ahead. You can make the same arguments for many different fields as well such as with energy and cyber weapons. This practice of competitiveness in the government has been around for a long time as we saw with the space race. However, now that we are closer to midnight than we have ever been, it is time to reconsider whether competitiveness is the best approach for humanity.

There are countless benefits to governments working more closely together. Governments should have to take accountability when adding to the risk that all of humanity faces. There should be deterrents for risk-increasing activities and incentives for risk-reducing activities. Furthermore, if nations group together to reduce these risks, they will be able to share advances that are beneficial to human safety as a whole. It is important to hold climate change conferences and agreements like the Paris Agreement. While we are far from eliminating any of the existential risks that we face today, better international collaboration and coordination would help kickstart the process. Climate change and other existential threats are not just one nation’s problem.

[Hai1218]

framing #origin #policy

Jerry Brown, in his piece for The New York Review of Books titled "Washington’s Crackpot Realism," addresses the way some political realists view the US-China relationship solely as adversarial. Brown proposes an alternative strategy, "planetary realism," which stresses the importance of both nations working together and competing in order to tackle global challenges such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, pandemics, and emerging disruptive technologies—issues that no single country can overcome on its own. He points out the positive steps both countries have taken towards collaboration, especially their joint promises made at the 2021 Glasgow climate summit. Brown also warns against the dangers of amplifying military threats from China. He advocates for acknowledging the distinct differences between the two nations, concentrating on domestic improvements, and aiming for a lasting peaceful coexistence. This strategy, he believes, is essential given the United States' history with costly conflicts and the urgent need for a new approach that prevents warfare and promotes joint efforts to solve worldwide problems.

I did a little sidebar research, and found that the term “crackpot realism” was coined by a sociologist named C. Wright Mills. His concept of "crackpot realism" critiques a mindset where lofty moral rhetoric is mismatched with pragmatic maneuvering amidst widespread, undirected fears and demands. This outlook finds solace in the prospect of war, as it presents a simplified, albeit catastrophic, solution to complex global dilemmas. For "crackpot realists," war resolves the endless anxiety and unknown fears by replacing them with a clear and familiar crisis. They see military intervention, such as deploying Marines, as the go-to solution for geopolitical paradoxes in regions like the Middle East, Europe, the Far East, and Africa, clinging to outdated notions of war where victory was clear and meaningful. However, they fail to articulate what "winning" actually entails in the modern context, revealing a preference for the apparent simplicity of conflict over confronting and solving the underlying complexities of international relations.

I see my perspective as extending beyond the "crackpot realism" , positing that the concept of an unarticulated victory serves as a self-preservation tactic for America as both a political and social project. I believe America inherently needs an enemy, whether ideological or physical, to survive. If America is the "thesis," it must consistently seek or even create its "antithesis." I ask myself, what are labor unions without bosses? What is communism without capitalists? What are Republicans without Democrats? What are the Avengers without Thanos? What would have become of Trump’s border policy if the border bill had passed under Biden’s administration? Just like these metaphors and simplistic hypotheticals suggest, America, as both a political project and an ideal, needs to identify an enemy, a target to thrive against, to continue giving meaning to its existence.

In sum, my realist/annalistic view suggests that the concept of opposition or conflict is not just an external strategy but a core component of America's identity and continuity. The creation or identification of adversaries is not just a matter of foreign policy but a fundamental aspect of maintaining national cohesion and purpose. Remember the Axis of Evil? Coined in 2002 by Bush, invented by John Bolton, to conjure up America's most pressing adversaries after the fall of the Soviet Union. China is becoming the new place holder.

[maevemcguire]

This was the first I have learned about the nuances of the Cuban Missile crisis – that Vasili Arkhipov of Russia could be solely responsible for the avoidance of a nuclear war by countermanding the order to launch nuclear torpedoes. This begs the question of how much responsibility and effect one individual’s actions can have when it comes to something as powerful as nuclear weapons. I also thought it was interesting that Silicon Valley used to be known for its principal work being defense and that Perry’s first successful job at The Electronic Defense Laboratories was figuring out a way to literally save the lives of 50 million people.

Perry’s discussions of “surreal thinking” and the growing nuclear contemplation is extremely interesting to contemplate in modern times. Just today, The New York Times released an article that Russia is developing a new, space-based nuclear weapon targeted at America’s satellite network. The article also clarified that “since Russia does not appear close to deploying the weapon, they said, it is not considered an urgent threat. I wonder how this relates to Perry’s discussion of “surreal thinking” as well as his claim that many Americans have an incessant faith in nuclear deterrence. However, with headlines such as this popping up on Americans’ phones everyday, I challenge Perry’s notion that today a nuclear catastrophe is as far from the minds of most Americans as it was when he was writing. I think that this is definitely caused by a raise of external, imminent threats, as well as the growing political turmoil that is American politics. I do not think most Americans’ today would trust that “leaders will always have accurate enough instantaneous knowledge, know the true context of events.”

[summerliu1027]

framing

As appealing as Governor Jerry Brown's "planetary realism" and global cooperation sound, this vision might not result in any tangible changes to the global political situation. On one hand, Brown may have underestimated the strategic motivations driving China's actions on the international stage. I think the concept of strategic competition is not solely about military strength but also about economic, technological, and ideological tensions. China's assertiveness in territorial disputes, such as in the South China Sea, its stance towards Taiwan, and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are all indicative of a broader strategy; the heavy technological investment also indicates a determination to dominate the tech industry. At this stage in the global political sphere, I fail to see how a nuanced "competition and cooperation" might come into play, especially when dominating the other country has benefits for both countries. Covid has proven that neither country needs the other country to survive; they might have fared as well without a major trading partner, but both discovered replacements for their respective needs. On the other hand, Brown's vision may be extremely difficult to carry out, especially for the US and its allies. I have a hard time picturing a non-ambiguous "cooperative" US foreign policy strategy: when does the US turn to cooperation and when does it not? Ambiguity in US foreign policy strategy could lead to misinterpretations of US intentions both by allies and adversaries, potentially destabilizing existing alliances and encouraging adversarial nations to test the limits of US resolve. It could also lead to fragmentation among allies, therefore weakening collective responses to challenges posed by China and other strategic rivals. Therefore, I have a hard time picturing that the White House would sacrifice existing ally stability to achieve unpromised global cooperation, especially when the other party might act in unpredictable ways.

What does it take to pull the lead balloon? Probably a lot.

[kallotey]

framing #solution

In “How Close is Humanity to the Edge?” Purtill writes about the philosopher, Toby Ord, who finds himself in a unique position amid the global upheaval caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. His work delves into the potential catastrophes that threaten the very existence of humanity, ranging from nuclear war to catastrophic climate change, nothing we haven’t discusses already in class. The pandemic in particular has had far-reaching impacts and presented a stark reminder of the fragility of human civilization and the importance of preparedness in the face of existential threats. In assessing the response to the pandemic, Ord's emotions appear to be a mix of concern and cautious optimism. On one hand, the rapid spread of the virus and its devastating toll on lives and livelihoods worldwide underscore the vulnerability of modern society to unforeseen crises. The pandemic has laid bare systemic weaknesses in healthcare infrastructure, global cooperation, and crisis management, highlighting the need for greater resilience and preparedness in the face of future existential risks.

However, amidst the chaos and uncertainty, Ord also finds reasons for hope. As Purtill writes, “If we can learn to value the lives of people in other places and circumstances equally to our own, then we can do the same for people situated at a different moment in time.” The unprecedented scale of international collaboration and scientific innovation seen in the race to develop vaccines against COVID-19 demonstrates humanity's capacity for collective action in the face of adversity. The pandemic has spurred a global mobilization of resources, expertise, and solidarity, showcasing the potential for cooperation on a scale previously unimaginable. For Ord, the response to the pandemic serves as both a cautionary tale and a source of inspiration. While the challenges posed by existential risks are daunting, the collective response to the pandemic offers valuable lessons for addressing future threats. By learning from our experiences and prioritizing proactive measures to mitigate existential risks, humanity can build a more resilient and secure future for generations to come.

[WPDolan]

framing #solutions #nuclear #climate

Jerry Brown's article A Start Nuclear Warning cites passivity as the primary reason as to why discussion of nuclear risk is muted in overall American political discourse. The article cites defeatism, fear, and an overall belief in our leaders and defense capabilities as the primary drivers for this passivity. I find that this set of reasoning closely mirrors a lot of our earlier discussions on action regarding climate change. While passivity is also a major barrier for climate action, which is driven by similar feelings of defeatism or apathy, class discussions around the issue are much more optimistic. Why is this the case?

Climate activists can point to a vast array of data and can identify key problem areas which require action. Activists can then leverage this information in tandem with stories of those most affected by current climate catastrophes to demand specific policies from decision makers. The public can measure the effectiveness of any resulting policy through the continued stream of climate data and stories from the global community. While some aspects of the climate crisis are irreversible, on a timescale of a few centuries, a significant amount of climate harm can be undone through this type of climate action. All of these factors generates continued interest and and political pressure to address climate change.

Unlike climate risks, which are primarily realized through the slow and tangible degradation of the environment, the realization of nuclear risks are instantaneous or may never be realized at all. Victories towards nuclear disarmament can also be quickly undone if any signatory publicly or privately decides that it is in their best interest to do so (this is most recently evident in Russia's suspension of their participation in New START). Nuclear decision making is often restricted to a very small group of people, and the public's knowledge of the nuclear capabilities of individual nation states is limited to what is explicitly stated in reports.

To overcome these barriers, at least partially, I primarily agree with Perry and Collina's focus on encouraging education and awareness of nuclear risk. Concerned groups can develop a wider engagement with the topic by incorporating nuclear risks into related mass movements concerned with the long-term sustainability of humanity. While these discussions may inherently be more abstract than those around topics like climate change, an informed, or at least concerned, public will be better positioned to know what to ask of their decision makers and of the international community. Even if the public is unable to have a complete picture of the nuclear landscape, they have the capacity to elect officials in alignment with their beliefs who can do so.

Picture: President Obama and Dmitry Medvedev short after signing the New START treaty

[aaron-wineberg02]

framing #solutions #nuclear

I have dedicated other response papers to the idea of nuclear proliferation. In this text, I would like to identify how misunderstanding — for lack of a better phrase — will come into play with the US-China strategic competition. Note, I am using the term ‘strategic competition,’ which the Biden administration officially uses to explain its tense relations with the People’s Republic. Governor Brown’s article discusses this form of thinking in relation to nuclear escalation. He notes that small-scale nuclear conflict is a possibility in Taiwan— and military leaders recognize this. However, escalation is dismissed by the realist hegemony in DC circles.

This begs the question of what would lead to nuclear warfare in future US-China conflicts. Brown suggests miscalculation is a potential force. But I suggest that more than miscalculation is miscommunication a major danger. No longer needed is a Soviet nuclear hotline. However, this conflict exists in a period of misinformation. Both the western and Chinese governments accuse each other of escalatory behavior and make claims that undermine the credibility of the other. China, particularly, has been accused of neo-colonial behavior that has prompted tensions with neighbors. Military advisors now must sort through the claims of escalation when assessing the danger of armed conflict.

Similarly, if war were to come to Taiwan or Hong Kong, for example, misinformation will dictate the terms of the conflict. I want to understand what the pressure points are when either great power chooses to escalate their presence in the region. AUKUS represented an escalation according to the Chinese yet you will find few western leaders who will make the same claim around a defensive pact.

The NY Times article mentions PM Rudd’s suggestion to establish red lines that would lead to armed conflict. I suggest this is a false premise to prevent escalation. In the 2010s, President Obama established red lines with Syria when Russia interfered militarily. Despite having clearly laid out the US rules for when to escalate, the White House backed down. Similarly, during the administration of President Trump, the president made regular threats to world leaders that were not enforced. US credibility may no longer exist.

Ironically, Dr. Strangelove may have proposed the best solution to a lack of credibility: a device that sets off nuclear war irregardless of input from leaders. This is not to say that I endorse this school of thought, but I find it ironic that the film predicated these debates by several decades.

My concerns lie in two main categories: a lack of credible deterrence and an assumption about world affairs that may be incorrect. These two may prove a deadly combination. Negotiation leverage may be key in any de escalation attempts— especially if China is to be understood as wanting to avoid nuclear conflict.

[AudreyPScott]

Three words stood out to me the most in Jerry Brown's 'A Stark Nuclear Warning': "Luckily, it wasn't." (3). The brief statement caps a cynically comedic rule-of-threes account of Arkhipov's nuclear dissent in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the close call of aerial border crossings, and the test launch of a intercontinental ballistic missile out of Vandenberg -- lucky, indeed, that it was not falsified as a legitimate strike. The terror in nuclear war lies in the luck. Ord, in The Risk Landscape, codifies this Russian Roulette by describing the chance of extreme catastrophe, and the chance of extreme catastrophe by anthropogenic causes, as one in six within the next hundred years (Ord, 167). The trick, then, of policy recommendations is perhaps an inability to model these sorts of risks. We can create predictions for climate, we can prepare (and hopefully not defund again) pandemic response teams, but our aversion of nuclear catastrophe seems to have been, up to now, a matter of near Godly intervention. As such, I question our ability to adopt policies as outlined in Perry's "The Atomic Titanic." Governor Brown notes in his piece that nuclear risk is not well conceptualized; we would be remiss to assume it's at the top of mind for middle-of-the-road, defense-blind policymakers. In the discussion of phasing out the ICBM as it's not an acceptable second-strike weapon while providing a nuclear devastation target to Middle America (210), I'm reminded of the article we read at the beginning of the quarter that noted local communities thrived when the nuclear folk came to town. Thus, it feels -- and feel is an operative word here, I'd love to discuss it more concretely -- that the level of meaningful engagement with nuclear policy that might do anything to put the US at a slight disadvantage would be met with popular resistance from the median voter. Therefore, what might be a more meaningful policy? How would it be communicated as a necessity? How do we talk to the American people about the role of nuclear weapons in our government and global positioning? The American reconnaissance flight got lucky: Korean Air Lines 007 ventured into Soviet airspace during a particularly tense period in the early 80s and was shot down, killing everyone on board. The desire to maintain hegemony seems to invariably slaughter innocents.

[madsnewton]

framing #climate

With China and the United States producing the most greenhouse gases annually, it is apparent that their cooperation and mutual commitment to lowering emissions is essential to tackling the threat of climate change. In a way, the climate crisis mimics the idea of mutually assured destruction that comes from nuclear weapons—if the United States doesn’t fix its emissions, China (and the whole planet) will suffer, and vice versa. Climate inaction from major polluters dooms us all. In Washington’s Crackpot Realism, Governor Jerry Brown recognizes this—“Framing the China threat as irredeemably antagonistic misses the reality that in order to survive, both countries must cooperate as well as compete.”—and refers to this idea as “planetary realism”. Essentially, recognizing that the existential threats posed by nuclear weapons, climate change, biological threats, etc. threaten the entire planet and therefore require global cooperation in addressing them.

In November 2023, following up on the 2021 Joint Glasgow Declaration, the US and China committed to the Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s to cooperate on energy transitions and lowering emissions in order to limit global temperature increase to 1.5°C (Sunnylands Statement on Enhancing Cooperation to Address the Climate Crisis). Despite the growing anti-China rhetoric in the United States, both countries seem committed to jointly addressing the threat of climate change, exemplifying Governor Brown’s planetary realism. Along with being the world’s top polluters, China has the largest military, and the United States spends the most on its military—each poses a significant military threat to the other. It is inevitable that two of the world’s superpowers will have conflict. The idea of planetary realism urges cooperation anyways. “The stakes for the world have never been higher, and there has never been a greater need to see the world as profoundly interdependent.” (Washington’s Crackpot Realism). The threat posed by climate change should far exceed each country’s desire for global influence. The US and China’s commitment to jointly combating climate change feels somewhat hopeful, and could set an example for the global cooperation desperately needed to confront the growing threat of climate change.

COP 28 Climate Summit

[Daniela-miaut]

risk #policy #awareness

I really like the metaphor of Titanic. For decades I and people around me are educated that the current framework of nuclear deterrence is capable of keeping the nuclear powers from engaging in a world war. The myth is that, humans will continue to live under the threats of nuclear bombs, but no one is going to use them again, and we do not need to worry about world wars anymore, because no decision maker would desire the annihilation of human civilization. This is just as people believe that the Titanic is unsinkable due to a single theoretical hypothesis. However, although it is highly possible that the ship comes back safely every time, once the undesired thing happens, the “probability” jumps to a hundred percent. It will always be too late to realize our false belief. I think similar situation has happened with the Covid-19. Even in the January of 2020, when I heard that there were cases of pneumonia caused by a new virus similar to SARS, I was not very nervous, since I did not even doubt that our technical power and social institutions are capable of dealing with a pandemic. However, just a few days later, a lot of “unthinkable” things happened in our highly developed society. For the first time I saw videos of people dying outside of the hospital, meanwhile no one can help them, for the medical resources had already been exhausted. When I heard about the shortage of masks and hazmat suits, I was like “I though there would be plenty in the reserve of strategic materials”. I can still remember watching Boris Johnson’s announcement of something like “many people are going to lose their precious ones”. This was really one of the disasters that we think we have got rid of, but it happened. I am one of the many young people who felt for the first time that we are actually on a Titanic. To raise people and the governments’ awareness of the nuclear risk, we definitely can speak against the myth of “unsinkable ship”. However, what worries me is that, how can we overcome structural obstacles to a cooperation between the governments? For instance, the bias of decision makers, the economic crisis, or any ideological fervor that the current states inevitably resort to? I began to feel that these issues are under-discussed even in our class. Pictures: memes of black humor that went around on the social media after Covid-19. I have to admit that I am also pessimistic myself.

[tosinOO]

origin #policy

Drawing from Brown Jr.'s reflections in "Nuclear Addiction: A Response," I'd like to examine the ways Brown critiques the moral justifications of nuclear armament, juxtaposing the Reagan administration's aggressive nuclear strategy against the ethical and existential conundrum it presents. He, as many of us do, questions the purported security benefits of nuclear arms escalation.

The round the clock crisis we face is not just a product of contemporary politics but a culmination of historical attitudes towards power, security, and technological advancement. Brown's writing reflects on the Cold War era's ideological battlefields, where nuclear weapons became symbols of power and deterrence, yet paradoxically, agents of existential dread and mutual destruction. I found it very interesting that the more bombs we built, the more afraid we became of each other and ourselves. The more weapons we have the more ways things can go wrong -- especially when all that power is concentrated in the hands of so few. This crisis is rooted in a deeper historical narrative of human competition, fear, and the quest for dominance. Humanity has achieved great feats because of competition so I am certainly not contending that competition is the root of all our problems, but to date it certainly has lead us down a very narrow path with little room for error. Our world ending from AI, nukes, biomedical warfare, or anything else will have all stemmed from competition -- between nations or between private sector firms.

To navigate us away from the brink of destruction brought on by the thirst for power and perfection, Brown suggests a reevaluation of our moral compass. He advocates for policies that prioritize peace and mutual understanding (something that seems impossible these days) over competition. He highlights the necessity of international collaboration to address the existential risks of nuclear proliferation, proposing a shift towards non-nuclear defense strategies and a staunch opposition to first-use policies. My main question with all of this would be how can we realistically expect so many powers, all of whom are completely self interested, to collaborate and put their private interests aside? Brown's argument aligns with the broader call for a "no first use" policy and the development of alternative defense postures as viable means of averting the existential threats posed by nuclear weapons. I believe the no first use policy is another weak attempt to push aside what is really needed: complete disarmament.

On the whole his call for humility, grace, and moral clarity are well meaning but I do think it's much of the same wishful thinking we've seen and read for years. I do not believe there can be a safe world where we all "agree to understand" each other while we have these weapons of mass destruction in our back pockets. If there is no disarmament, there is not reason to believe the world is any safer.

[GreatPraxis]

framing #policy

Reading Jerry Brown's "Washington Crackpot," made me realize that there are two distinct perspectives framing a potential conflict with China. The first perspective portrays China as an emerging superpower on a collision course with the United States, suggesting an inevitable and unstoppable conflict. This view is supported by China's economic growth, fueled by lax regulations which are particularly evident in areas like CO2 emissions and labor laws. This makes China's economic growth hard to keep up for the US as they have to follow such regulations. The book argues that if this trajectory continues, China could surpass the US economically, potentially isolating the US from key markets in Asia and posing a significant threat to American interests. This scenario draws parallels to the Cold War, where tensions over foreign interests could escalate into a full-scale war, including the possibility of nuclear conflict, if China is perceived as an arch-nemesis akin to the USSR.

On the other hand, there's a second framing that proposes a different approach: treating China as an economic partner and fostering cooperation rather than confrontation. This approach would require the US to acknowledge that it is no longer the sole superpower or the largest economy. However, this shift may be inevitable, given the rise of other BRICS economies, as depicted in the graph showing their GDP surpassing that of the G7 countries in an impressive economic growth over the last thirty years. The combined population of the BRICS nations accounts roughly for 40% of the world population and with their military resources and production ability all the BRICS nations pose a potential challenge to all of the G7 and the US. Engaging in conflict with this entire bloc would likely be catastrophic and practically insurmountable. Even in a scenario in which China’s economy stagnates the other BRICS nations will eventually reach the US especially given their high population and birth rates that do not seem to decrease. Therefore sooner or later the US will have to accept a non-western great power. Therefore, it is argued that framing China as a potential economic partner rather than a military adversary could mitigate the risk of war and existential threats. A possible policy under this perspective might be building more economic ties with China and fostering economic interdependence in that way both countries will have an incentive against attacking each other. This perspective acknowledges the changing global landscape and the necessity of adapting policies accordingly to minimize the chances of conflict and maximize mutual benefits through cooperation.