Week 1 Memos: Doomsday Clock and nuclear annihilation

[jamesallenevans]

Reply with your memo as a Comment. The memo should be responsive to this week's readings and 300–500 words + 1 visual element (e.g., figure, image, hand-drawn picture, art, etc. that complements or is suggestive of your argument). The memo should be tagged with one or more of the following:

origin: How did we get here? Reflection on the historical, technological, political and other origins of this existential crisis that help us better understand and place it in context.

risk: Qualitative and quantitative analysis of the risk associated with this challenge. This risk analysis could be locally in a particular place and time, or globally over a much longer period, in isolation or in relation to other existential challenges (e.g., the environmental devastation that follows nuclear fallout).

policy: What individual and collective actions or policies could be (or have been) undertaken to avert the existential risk associated with this challenge? These could include a brief examination and evaluation of a historical context and policy (e.g., quarantining and plague), a comparison of existing policy options (e.g., cost-benefit analysis, ethical contrast), or design of a novel policy solution.

solutions: Suggestions of what (else) might be done. These could be personal, technical, social, artistic, or anything that might reduce existential risk.

framing: What are competing framings of this existential challenge? Are there any novel framings that could allow us to think about the challenge differently; that would make it more salient? How do different ethical, religious, political and other positions frame this challenge and its consequences (e.g., “End of the Times”).

salience: Why is it hard to think and talk about or ultimately mobilize around this existential challenge? Are there agencies in society with an interest in downplaying the risks associated with this challenge? Are there ideologies that are inconsistent with this risk that make it hard to recognize or feel responsible for?

nuclear/#climate/#bio/#cyber/#emerging: Partial list of topics of focus.

For one session over the course of the quarter, you may post a memo that reflects on a film or fictional rendering of an existential challenge. This should be tagged with:

movie / #novel: How did the film/novel represent the existential challenge? What did this highlight; what did it ignore? How realistic was the risk? How salient (or insignificant) did it make the challenge for you? For others (e.g., from reviews, box office / retail receipts, or contemporary commentary)?

[timok15]

nuclear, #salient, #origin

When considering the issue of nuclear war from a personal standpoint, I find that these two feelings well up in me: unreality and mortal impotence.

In the 1970s and 1980s, there existed a large movement of people against nuclear armament. However, as the US and USSR signed their treaties and the latter imploded, nuclear war seemed to people, and so also to me growing up in the aftermath, to disappear into the realm of outdated Cold War fears that came along with silly ideas of using your classroom desk as a nuclear bunker (though that wasn’t the idea: if you were outside of the zone of total destruction, then it would be a way to hopefully avoid burns and serious injury from falling debris [to my understanding]). All the while however, nuclear weapons bided their time. I was (along with many others) in an unreality about the threat.

Now, the risk of nuclear conflict has never been higher. Until recently, I was hard pressed to find the fear of nuclear war necessary for action, which was so common and serious during the Cold War, in myself. The Soviet Union was gone. China and Russia were shaky acquaintances with the Western nuclear armed powers, but there was peace and Pakistan and India were far away. North Korea makes its periodic appearances that while worrying in the moment become much ado about nothing with things reliably returning the status quo ante (until they don’t of course). Not until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, did the risk really feel so real and dire to me with an open proxy-war between nuclear armed states. In fact, in the journal I keep, I have made more than one entry about the acute feelings of the threat of nuclear war I was feeling when the war first began. Though these feelings have now dissipated, my passive awareness of the threat is higher than it was before the war. Additionally, US relations are more strained than usual with China, another nuclear armed power, which I am more aware of since Ukraine has gone hot.

Meanwhile, my other feeling is one of mortal impotence. In other words, powerlessness as a mortal being faced with the knowledge of such an insurmountable, almost godly, force as nuclear armaments. With people caught unaware and mostly unorganized against nuclear arms since the end of the Cold War, the strongest opposition to these developments rests with the words of the dedicated watchdogs (words which are sadly far too easily ignored), like the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and the small protests/marches of the most dedicated. Mortal impotence for me is the knowledge that if the commander-in-chief of any nuclear armed state decides that it is time to launch, then it is time to launch.

All together, despite the importance of nuclear war, particularly the lack thereof, moving against its possible fruition, versus hoping it just does not happen, does not seem to be in the cards at the present instant.

Below: An image of the US nuclear football.

[cbgravitt]

nuclear, #salience, #framing

This is on a similar theme as the question I asked this week; specifically, the potential difficulties scientists face in trying to warn public officials who hold vast amounts of power through their control of nuclear arsenals.

As reflected in the Doomsday Clock statement, the Biden administration has made solid strides in getting scientific authorities involved with policy in a meaningful way. This statement may not hold in other countries, or even in the future of the United States. The spread of public misinformation and distrust for scientific institutions has been on the rise for years, and it has not excluded the atomic sector. Distrust towards the nuclear sciences community is generally expressed through disagreement with nuclear energy policies and recommendations, but as the medical sciences have seen, once one thing is not trusted, nothing is trusted.

Fortunately, the atomic sciences community does not need to convince every random conspiracy theorist or nuclear energy opponent of the benefits of nuclear energy or the terrible side effects of nuclear war. They only need to convince the elected officials who ultimately make the decisions regarding how nuclear products are used. But, with distrust for conventional scientific institutions growing massively as a political platform, and hundreds of compounding issues weighing on the minds of officials, it is looking less and less like political and military authorities will take all the advice of nuclear scientists. If they did, the threat of nuclear war would be non-existent!

Then, there is the issue of dealing with non-elected leaders, such as in Russia and North Korea. Since these figures have no one holding them accountable, the motivation for them to heed the advice of atomic scientists is tenuous at best. If nuclear weapons will guarantee victory, or even just a strategic advantage, they have little reason to consider the warnings of atomic scientists of side effects that they can protect themselves from. We have already seen this in Putin's many nuclear threats throughout the war in Ukraine. Those warnings mean very little to someone with access to a fallout shelter, but lacking in empathy.

Atomic scientists, and the scientific community in general, must find a way to reach even the most aggressive of leaders in a meaningful way, but that's far easier said than done.

Picture: World leaders at the G-7 summit in May of 2023, during which they called for nuclear disarmament globally. Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-leaders-call-world-without-nuclear-weapons-statement-2023-05-19/

[lucyhorowitz]

nuclear #policy

One of the major policies adopted during the Cold War was Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which postulates that two powers, each armed to the teeth with a quantity of nuclear weapons that could easily destroy the other, would take no offensive action because doing so would result in retaliation that leaves the initial attacker completely destroyed. This is a fundamentally game-theoretic concept, based on the idea of a Nash equilibrium and payoff matrices etc. etc., but it really requires both parties to be thinking the same way.

I read recently (unfortunately I do not remember where) that while non-Soviet mathematicians and scientists were going on about how mathematics is the universal language and therefore even aliens would understand such concepts as prime numbers, the Soviets were not using any game theory to inform their actions. In fact, I believe they thought that they would be able to survive any scale of nuclear attack the US could undertake at the time.

It is incredibly difficult to gain knowledge about other agents’ knowledge, yet it is absolutely vital for making your own decisions when someone else's knowledge could result in your complete annihilation. It seems as though almost any policy short of one that involves gaining direct and objective information (as far as that is possible!) carries the risk of being misguided and actions taken in accordance with that policy could result in the deaths of millions.

Even those one would think are the best people to influence policy (I have in mind the scientists who were involved in the Manhattan Project who tried and failed to influence political leaders' decisions) can be mistaken, and even if they are not mistaken, people in power tend not to listen to them for any number of reasons (maybe more mistakes, maybe not!). Samo Borja and Zachary Lerangis wrote an in-depth analysis of this phenomenon here.

So what are we left with? Spies, mandatory reciprocal inspections... and these all carry risks of their own. But it is important for anyone involved in decision making to fully understand that it is impossible to have a full picture of an opponent's knowledge. No matter how good the intelligence, people are unpredictable. Who could have known in advance that Stanislav Petrov would make the call to disobey orders to fire? We should all be very grateful that he did, but we would do well to remember that in 1983, it wasn't policy that saved us from certain destruction.

[miansimmons]

nuclear #salience

Overall, it has been difficult to mobilize around non-proliferation due to the ongoing application of nuclear deterrence, which essentially means that a country's possession of nuclear weapons prevents others from utilizing their own due to the threat of retaliation. The idea that nuclear weapons can circumvent wars only exacerbates the issue and downplays the risks associated with their creation.

Though 190 countries are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the implementation of disarmament - one of the three treaty objectives - has yet to be enforced. The responsibility then falls on countries like the U.S., Russia, and China to pursue disarmament while instituting full-fledged nuclear modernization programs. This results in a paradox where many states collectively oppose proliferation, yet simultaneously attempt to grow their nuclear arsenals, whether it be out of fear of attack or the desire to catch up to the global superpowers. Further, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel remain noticeably absent from the NPT but possess nuclear weapons of their own. For instance, India and Pakistan continue to bolster their arsenals (which are about the same size) and nuclear conflict between the two nations would be enough to trigger nuclear winter and extreme starvation in developing countries.

When nuclear deterrence is the focus of a country's security policy and defense strategy, as is the case with America, there is a vested interest among government officials to mitigate the public's perception of nuclear risks. For example, some scientists directly involved in the development of nuclear devices, such as Oppenheimer, called for the weapons to be placed under international control and the institution of guardrails on scientific advancement. Consequently, the government stripped Oppenheimer of his security clearance in part because he did not support the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb. It is evident that when political leaders and scientists conflict, the government predominantly takes precedence.

The world's fear of not being able to retaliate in the case of nuclear warfare bars real progress from being made. Ironically, if weapons are launched and others follow suit, it is the end of the world as we know it. From my perspective, progress hinges on the aggressive implementation of disarmament.

Picture: nickledanddimed.com

[M-Hallikainen]

nuclear #framing

I think it is worth considering how the politics of nuclear proliferation and disarmament stand within the wider global context of colonialism and its legacy. Discussed in Nowhere to Hide, nowhere in the world would be unaffected by even a small nuclear exchange, and a vast majority of the worlds nuclear weapons reside within the hands of the worlds superpowers and current/former colonial powers (as seen in the map below created by the Arms Control Association). For many of these nations, the development of nuclear weapons was directly contingent on colonial holdings and resources (including but not limited to the testing of weapons in Bikini Atoll by the United States and Algeria by France)

Even after decades of nonproliferation treaties, the world still seems very much divided into the nuclear superpowers, whos position of nuclear weapons makes them nigh untouchable even to other super powers, and the non-superpowers who live under the same global threat of nuclear annihilation without any of the political protective power owning those weapons grants. This dichotomy is highlighted particularly well in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine; a former colonial territory that surrendered its nuclear weapons being invaded by a nuclear power that knows it will likely face no wider international military retaliation by virtue of its nuclear capabilities.

Under such circumstances, where the threats of nuclear conflict are omnipresent, the benefits of nuclear capabilities controlled by few, and the speed of nonproliferation not showing signs of changing the status quo any time soon, is there not strong motivation for smaller nations to develop nuclear programs to grant them a seat at the table? Despite the grave global danger even a small and ill equipped nuclear program provides, the power it grants in both political clout and protection against global superpowers is undeniable.

In my mind, its an idea that shifts the focus of nonproliferation away from the nuclear superpowers of the world choosing to slowly disarm and towards the the great number of nations who choose not to arm. The answer to "why shouldn't we develop nuclear weapons" can't just be participation in nuclear sharing treaties or the threat that any nation developing nuclear weapons will be attacked before they can finish. At some point, nonproliferation will have to extend past nuclear weapons and into the global political inequalities that motivate armament in the first place.

[hannahmrittenhouse]

nuclear, #risk, #climate

Thinking about the issues of nuclear war and the outlook individuals have on it is something to be aware of and to target our focus. The Russian's war on Ukraine has opened a whole perspective and outlook on the awareness of many individuals more recently. From a personal perspective, I think the awareness and perception of nuclear war needs to be more aware since this war began. It opened the perspective that this could happen anywhere at any time at anyplace and people need to be more aware of that. This war, and previous wars before it, have continued to increase danger and conflict in places and people need to become more alert and focus their attention on how much of an impact it has on individuals lives and their surroundings.

Specifically relating to the Russian Ukraine war, the risk of individuals lives, families and surroundings have and continue to be affected. At least 10,000 have died, including 560 children. Individuals lives and lifestyles are at risk. This war has led to destruction to homes, buildings, and places where explosions hit. This causes may individuals to go without places to live and changes the lifestyles of many individuals based on the impact an explosion can have. The risk is significantly high when it comes to a nuclear war and can have a major impact on many people’s lives, but also affecting the environment climatically.

The effect of nuclear war has significant damage on the climate. Once soot is injected into the atmosphere it could takes months or even years for it to disappear. This results in a decrease of sunlight which causes low temperatures. This soot can affect the limit in sunlight but also with the low temperatures to the ocean and overall effect in weather. The smoke and soot overall have a significant impact that can affect the direct sunlight which can limit the number of crops produced and can create severe ice expansion. This can cause significant affect to the ecosystem under water and can harm much of the life that lives within it. This is also a major component to be aware of when it comes to climate change and how much nuclear explosions can have on an environment. It can also leave destruction to homes, buildings, and places where an explosion may hit. This causes many individuals to go without places to live and changes the lifestyles of many individuals based on the impact an explosion can have.

Picture:

[GreatPraxis]

nuclear #risk

The readings discussed the potential consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation in a modern city, sparking a sense of dread. This led me to wonder what would happen to me or any UChicago student living in Hyde Park if a nuclear bomb was dropped in downtown Chicago. Using the NUKEMAP website, one can get a first-order estimation of what would happen in this scenario. While the worst-case scenario involves a Tsar Bomba, the largest thermonuclear weapon ever designed, being detonated downtown, a more plausible scenario involves an ICBM rocket reaching Chicago due to the challenges of transporting such a massive bomb.

In contrast to the Tsar Bomba, which might be intercepted before detonation, ICBMs like China's Dong-Fen-5 can be launched quickly from afar, making interception difficult. Despite being less powerful, such a weapon can still result in catastrophic effects. For instance, as we can see in the picture below, the Thermal Radiation radius in the NUKEMAP simulation indicates a 100% probability of third-degree burns and scarring for those exposed to the bomb, with UChicago falling within this radius. A somewhat positive aspect is that UChicago is far enough from the city center so that students in the university would escape the fireball and moderate damage radius, which would likely result in the immediate deaths of a large percentage of students.

The website estimates 1,166,340 fatalities and 1,709,830 injuries, with areas from River North to the South Loop facing instant vaporization. This projection suggests that around 40% of Chicago's population would vanish on the day of the bomb drop. Notably, this estimate excludes long-term casualties from fallout. As discussed in the reading "Nowhere to hide" from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, a significant long-term problem would be famine induced by the explosion. With Illinois' farmland covering a substantial portion of the country (around 75%), an explosion in Chicago could contaminate a vast amount of food, leaving urban residents, including students, struggling to access sustenance.

While these effects may be temporary after a single nuclear explosion, a nuclear war outbreak could lead to large-scale famines, potentially causing up to 5.3 billion deaths after two years, as indicated by the reading. Hence, a favorable scenario post-explosion involves preventing a nuclear war outbreak and focusing on recovering from initial blast effects. However, if a city with extensive potential civilian casualties like Chicago is hit, the possibility of nuclear war becomes more likely due to retaliatory attacks. In this context, those who perish in the initial explosion might be considered the more fortunate ones. Regardless, a UChicago student, being surrounded by sufficient radiation protection, could survive the initial blast. To enhance survival chances, relocating away from major cities vulnerable to attacks and securing a non-contaminated and adequate food and water source would be crucial and the first priorities in order to increase the likelihood of survival.

[lubaishao]

risk #policy #solutions #cyber #AI

In the article “More hands needed on the nuclear football” by Rachel Bronson and Sharon Squassoni, authors proposed more people should be responsible and be part of a necessary process of nuclear decision-making procedures. And they also propose the US should adopt no-first-use idea, which I think is great.   My personal opinion:   The three most important points of a State's nuclear policy should lie in a high degree of stability, consistency and predictability. The nuclear problem actually maximizes the assumption of the principles of anarchy and self-help in international relations ---- that each country must be responsible for their own survival in extreme ways. Thus, a nuclear policy, whether unstable or unforeseeable, affects the expectations of one state with respect to another, just as Putin has consistently stated that he is prepared to use destructive weapons if Russia faces an existential threat. And such a situation would fall into the trap of the Spiral Model, which reinforces the hostility of both sides towards each other.   Thus, a country should not only adhere to a consistent nuclear policy during decades, but also clarify the nuclear decision-making procedure and prevent it from being undermined by the top leaders. Secondly, the no-first-use principle of nuclear weapons sets clear expectations for other countries to the greatest extent possible. On the contrary, reserving the right of first use of nuclear weapons actually give other states enough reasons to start a preventive nuclear war. Thirdly, technology should be prevented from undermining the nuclear decision-making procedure. Since the cyber age, nuclear weapons have been subject to cybersecurity threats from time to time. Finally, the impact of artificial intelligence on nuclear weapons should be the most serious concern this century. While AI-enhanced nuclear command and control systems can effectively mitigate many of the deficiencies inherent in human strategic decision-making in the "fog of war," such as sensitivity to sunk costs, skewed risk judgment, cognitive heuristics, and inefficient collective decision-making, two kinds of risks still exist.   On the one hand, the basic technical errors may lead AI decision-making cause irreparable nuclear war. For example, due to the failure of the field detection equipment, the AI-dominated system misjudges the situation and concludes it’s under a serious nuclear threat. On the other hand, artificial intelligence technology may be used in Generative Adversarial Networks to create Deepfakes video or audio material, leading to strategic miscalculation of a country.

Movie “WarGames”: Discourse about the plot of “WarGames” usually focuses on the scary idea that a computer nearly launches World War III by firing off nuclear weapons on its own.

[imilbauer]

The methodology of the Doomsday Clock raises questions not only about how the risk of nuclear catastrophe is framed scientifically but also how the framing of the possibility of nuclear catastrophe by the clock can encourage action in the public to prevent it. Although, I could not discover a methodology outlined on the website of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the website did note that its Science and Security Board is responsible for determining the time that the clock is set at. This board is composed of a group of prominent scientists, policy leaders, and security officials. Evidently, the group is not entirely oriented towards working on nuclear issues so the board must value expertise about a number of other threats. One wonders how the board determines how to weigh the threats that factor into making the determination of the clock time. Is there a set percentage of the determination that is designated for the climate threat compared to the nuclear threat? Or, is the determination more holistic? Does each board member have their own methodology or do all the board members follow the same methodology? How does the board define “catastrophe”? Catastrophe might mean something different in the case of nuclear disaster or climate disaster? Has the methodology to make the determination changed over time?

Other framings may aim to convey existential risk by other means. Other frames might use more variables, such as by distinguishing between the risk of types of threats to different regions. Also, others might distinguish more between long-term risk and short time risk. However, there are drawbacks to these more technical framings. A more clear message, as conveyed by the Doomsday Clock, might compel public action more effectively. In addition, a more direct message might more effectively reach important lay actors, like politicians, more easily.

In addition to these questions about framing existential risk, I am curious about how the measure the accuracy of this way of framing risk. While changes to the clock’s time may accurately reflect changes the the risk of catastrophe, it is hard to verify whether these changes are accurate. Evidence from the Cold War suggests one way that the risk can be verified. For example, we now know Soviet submarine captains were close to firing nuclear weapons during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Still, this type of evidence is hard to obtain. We may only know how close we are to catastrophe many decades later or after a catastrophe has come to pass. Some catastrophes may come to pass in ways that unevenly influence different parts of the world further complicating the accuracy question. For example, an explosion at a nuclear power plant in Ukraine will predominately hurt Ukraine. Perhaps the risk of this type of catastrophe shows how the clock can get extremely close to midnight while still functioning. But perhaps the clock also suggests, by having only one variable, that in terms of salience, even catastrophic risks with uneven effects should lead to mobilization across the board. These risks can quickly spiral.

nuclear #framing #risk #salience

Picture:

Salvador Dali’s The Persistence of Memory shows how clocks can be complex, don’t necessarily work in the most typical fashion, but can be very compelling nonetheless.

[madsnewton]

nuclear, #salience

Nuclear famine feels like a forgotten effect of nuclear war. The focus always seems to be on the instantaneous effects—ground zero, the blast radius, radiation exposure, etc.—versus what the Earth could look like in the years after nuclear war. This is why I enjoyed the insights provided in reading Nowhere to Hide: How a nuclear war would kill you—and almost everyone else by François Diaz-Maurin. This reading considered the instant casualties, as well as total casualties that could be caused by nuclear famine. They estimate that nuclear famine could be more than 10 times as deadly as the explosions from nuclear weapons in a global conflict with the majority of people facing starvation.

It seems like nuclear famine is less often thought about because it is extremely difficult to conceptualize. When I personally think about a global nuclear conflict, I do not consider an “after”. Nuclear war already seems difficult to imagine, so its even more difficult to imagine what it would be like for survivors of a global nuclear conflict. I think the concept of “mutually assured destruction” also distracts from any thoughts of what happens after a nuclear conflict. There can be some minor comfort in mutually assured destruction and think a nuclear conflict would never happen because both countries would likely end up annihilated by nuclear weapons.

Is nuclear famine something that should be considered more urgent in regard to nuclear conflicts? Is there any way to prevent it? A 2022 report does not seem to think so. In Nuclear Famine, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War conclude that in the event of a nuclear war, there is nothing that can be done in the aftermath. Even if 3% of nuclear warheads were used, the Earth would still experience a nuclear winter and resulting famine (2022). So it seems that instead of being an opposite challenge, nuclear famine is just another consequence that falls under the “mutually assured destruction” umbrella. There is no preventing nuclear famine—there is only preventing nuclear war.

[DNT21711]

origin:

The shadow of nuclear weapons, cast during WWII, continues to loom over global politics. The concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) during the Cold War, relying on a finely tuned balance of power, laid the groundwork for today's nuclear dynamics. It's both intriguing and alarming to realize that these weapons, products of scientific innovation, now play a key role in international diplomacy and national defense.

risk:

The threat of nuclear warfare, once considered a far-off danger, has alarmingly re-emerged in recent times. The intricate web of global politics brings a level of unpredictability to an already tense situation. Misunderstandings or errors in judgment carry catastrophic risks, endangering not only the nations directly involved but the entire planet. The idea that a solitary decision or mistake could trigger such widespread havoc is deeply unsettling.

policy:

Initiatives like the Non-Proliferation Treaty are crucial, yet they struggle in an era of nuclear advancement. The divide between scientific advice and political decision-making is concerning. Leaders often overlook scientific viewpoints, leading to policies that might not fully grasp the seriousness of nuclear dangers. This gap underscores the importance of policies that not only manage nuclear proliferation but also merge scientific knowledge with political strategies, aiming for a safer and more knowledgeable approach to nuclear matters.

solutions:

Confronting the nuclear issue demands a mixture of diplomacy, education, and the fusion of science and policy. It involves fostering trust among nations and ensuring that scientific insights guide policy-making. Boosting public awareness and comprehension of nuclear matters is vital. This challenge extends beyond governments and scientists; it's about everyone grasping the risks and pushing for sensible policies. It's an ambitious goal that requires collaboration at all levels, from international diplomacy to community activism, but it's crucial for the survival of our planet.

framing:

Nuclear matters are often viewed through the lens of national security, but this view is limited. It's a worldwide concern that goes beyond national borders and interests. Seeing it as a humanitarian issue, not just a strategic one, could encourage collective efforts. This global perspective highlights the indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons and the necessity for a joint approach to disarmament and peace. It represents a shift from perceiving these weapons as symbols of power to recognizing them as worldwide hazards.

salience:

The inconsistent public focus on the nuclear threat is worrisome. Keeping such an abstract issue in the forefront, especially when overshadowed by more immediate problems, is a challenge. Recent events, though, have rekindled a sense of urgency. Educating the public, fostering open discussions, and pushing for clear policies are essential to maintain this issue's prominence. We must recognize that the threat of nuclear conflict isn't just a relic of the past but a continuous and adapting challenge. It's about staying alert and actively participating in crafting a nuclear-free future.

[tosinOO]

origin #risk #policy #salience

The existential threat posed by nuclear war, as presented in the 2021 Doomsday Clock Statement and accompanying literature, is the product of historical, technological, and political developments. World War II saw the introduction of nuclear technology under the Manhattan Project; postwar the Cold War period saw rapid increases in nuclear arsenals which caused geopolitical tensions to arise as well as arms races.

Nuclear weapons pose profound and long-lasting risks that cannot be underestimated, according to Martin Hellman and Vinton Cerf. Their discussion highlights that while its probability may be difficult to pin down over a prolonged period, its probabilities remain alarmingly significant over time. Accidental launches, miscommunication, misunderstandings, escalation in volatile regions, accidental launches as well as their environmental and humanitarian repercussions are catastrophic with long-lasting global ramifications far beyond immediate blast zones.

Effective strategies to limit these risks have ranged from disarmament treaties and diplomatic engagements, to disarmament treaties. Examples of effective policies to control nuclear proliferation are provided by START and NPT as historical examples of these efforts. As Elisabeth Eaves' article about America's $100 billion nuclear weapon shows, modernization and investment in nuclear arsenals continues despite deterrence theory justifications. An innovative policy solution lies in transitioning away from deterrence towards active disarmament, reinvigorating international cooperation, and trust-building measures, and taking advantage of emerging technologies for verification and monitoring disarmament processes.

The nuclear issue can be perceived in various ways across different audiences. Some see it through the prism of national security and deterrence while others perceive it as a moral and humanitarian crisis. Mobilizing around this issue presents its own set of difficulties: nuclear war is perceived by many as distant threat overshadowed by more immediate matters; further contributing to this perception are defense industries and political ideologies who play down risks or regard nuclear arsenals as symbols of power and prestige.

[WPDolan]

nuclear #risk #solutions

In addition to the long-term effects on the climate and food supply that are mentioned in Nowhere to Hide, the complete destruction of modern civilization in a nuclear conflict may also hinder the development of new civilizations in the far future.

One of the driving forces behind the development of modern human civilization has been our ability to exploit Earth’s natural resources. While the acquisition and use of some natural resources pose their own existential risks (either via global warming or ecological destruction), their exploitation jumpstarted technological revolutions that have significantly improved many aspects of human life. However, our supply of fossil fuels is limited; even if modern civilization never realizes any nuclear existential risks, we are predicted to eventually deplete all of Earth’s fossil fuels within the century.

While we will likely be able to offset the loss of fossil fuels with the creation and adoption of cleaner renewable energy sources, there is a significant gap between the technologies required to exploit renewable sources vs fossil fuels. (https://aeon.co/essays/could-we-reboot-a-modern-civilisation-without-fossil-fuels) Would a future society without the ability to exploit fossil fuels be capable of independently discovering and exploiting renewable sources of energy? If a new set of human (or otherwise sapient) civilizations are created in the aftermath of our destruction, they may not have access to many natural resources that were essential steppingstones to the development of our modern world. Without an industrial revolution of their own, their technological development may be significantly slowed or halted until these resources naturally replenish in millions of years.

Another smaller concern is that the long-lasting radiation from nuclear waste sites may be unintentionally unearthed by future civilizations. If modern civilization is destroyed, future civilizations may be unaware of the danger associated with radiation and may be unable to understand our language. Projects in nuclear semiotics try to address this issue by creating language-independent graphics for waste sites that depict the dangers associated with the location. These graphics are intended to convey general information pertaining to the threat: “What is here was dangerous and repulsive to us,” “The danger is still present,” and “The danger is unleashed only if you substantially disturb this place physically.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-term_nuclear_waste_warning_messages) With little knowledge of the culture of future civilizations, these images attempt to depict danger concepts that are hopefully universal to all methods of understanding.

Picture: (Pictogram from the Department of Energy)

The ominous image depicts a man disturbing a nuclear waste site by digging and exposing buried waste materials.

[AudreyPScott]

nuclear #salience

The psychological stronghold of nuclear terror runs deep, yet varies by generation. While my mom remembers very distinctly growing up a child of the Cold War, my own generation only seems to recall the pressing reality of nuclear proliferation when it becomes a hot topic of the news cycle, as it was during the initial buzz around Russia and Ukraine. Why would we, in some cases, when we've seen so clearly the destructive possibilities of disasters that seem so much more personally pressing? The devastation of 9/11 and its aftermath, of school shootings, of COVID, of generational memories of bombs such as the Daisy Cutter that were devastating enough without radioactive elements -- events that vary in existential risk, but are personally felt to a degree that is intentionally shielded when nuclear weapons are concerned.

From this week's readings, I was particularly struck by the Eaves article from 2021. I was too young to be involved with the news cycle when Obama was in his first term, but despite my being relatively tapped in with the defense and aerospace community (I won't reiterate my resume for this point, but I share a GitHub and LinkedIn username), I hadn't heard of the GBSD. To what extent are these victories quiet on purpose? Obviously, lobbying is loud, and the military industrial complex itself is no secret, but nuclear bombs readied in the American plains are less pressing on the conscious than conventional dropped elsewhere. Furthermore, I was awed by the opinions of the Montana populace regarding the presence of bases and missile silos: financial benefit over all else took the reign. Eaves points to the reality of missile silos as a probable site of attack in case of actual war, would representatives be so joyful about airmen that come into mom-and-pop restaurants when those diner booths are full of corpses?

The lack of focus of nuclear risk is a dizzying flurry of ideologies, affected by generational differences, attitudes towards war and imperialism, attitude towards military contractors (something coinciding with a rebrand from "war" to "defense" over the past decades), and readiness to be faced with ideas that conflict with one's own peace of mind (as I referenced in my question for our guest, I have friends that have been particularly combative to thinking about existential risk at all). I'd appreciate further discussion on these ideologies and their intersections that create muddied pictures of risk, as well as the profit motives of a balance between fear and reverence of the bomb: I was particularly interested in Frank Kendall's observations, quoted in the Eaves article, of the power of prime contractors and the slimming of defense into single corporate monopolies (something mimicked for much of the 20th and early 21st century in spaceflight, but I don't foresee a blossoming startup culture in nuclear weaponry as has happened with the space domain in the past 15 years).

Also pulling from my question post, I'd like to discuss #solutions that involve non-development (as is discussed here https://carrcenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/cchr/files/zimmermann_the_power_of_choosing_not_to_build.pdf in the AI context) and what effect that would have on how we conduct research and systems of knowledge creation. When do we, as academics, look at the search for fundamental truth and its application and say enough? When do we pull the plug or cripple capabilities -- if ever?

For my memo, I wanted to highlight a favorite site of mine since I was in middle school and first became enraptured with nuclear war after seeing a trailer for Fallout 4. NUKEMAP (https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/) allows visualizations and rough quantizations of nuclear devastation for any location and bomb preset: as a kid, I'd experiment with yields ranging from Little Boy to Tsar Bomba on my own city of Houston, a game to myself that caused me to look for the nearest feasible shelters wherever I'd have long-term residence (in Houston, the salt mines were the best bet -- here, the fire station across the street from my apartment has a workable solution https://southsideweekly.com/shelter-fallen-favor/). The simulation shown here is with the 1 Mt yield of W-59, the Minutemen I.

[Hai1218]

nuclear, #salience, #framing

The recent setting of the Doomsday Clock at 90 seconds to midnight by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists signals an alarming escalation in global risk, primarily driven by the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. This war, now potentially entering its second year, not only endangers Ukraine's sovereignty but also upends the stability of European security frameworks established since World War II. Russia's thinly veiled nuclear threats, in direct contravention of its commitments such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, have raised serious questions about the erosion of international conduct norms and nuclear safety, especially given the conflict's proximity to nuclear sites like Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia.

In this context, John J. Mearsheimer's (from UChicago!) argument in "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent" becomes particularly relevant. Mearsheimer posits that Ukraine's retention of nuclear weapons post-Soviet Union could have served as a critical deterrent against Russian aggression. This perspective challenges the conventional view on nuclear disarmament by suggesting that a paradox exists within nuclear warfare: the presence of nuclear weapons, while inherently dangerous, can also act as a powerful deterrent to prevent nuclear annihilation. However, this approach is not without its complexities and risks, especially given the current volatile situation.

The war has also been characterized by a shift in warfare tactics, with significant reliance on modern technologies such as cyber warfare, surveillance, armed drones, and precision-guided munitions. These technologies have changed the nature of combat, demonstrating effectiveness against traditional military forces and altering the landscape of warfare.

Beyond the immediate conflict, the war's impact on global security is profound, hindering efforts to address other critical global challenges like climate change. The breakdown in trust and cooperation among major powers further complicates the situation, making a coordinated response to existential threats more challenging.

In conclusion, the Russo-Ukrainian war, as reflected in the Doomsday Clock's advance, illustrates a complex and dangerous global situation. The paradox highlighted by Mearsheimer – that more nuclear weapons could theoretically prevent nuclear annihilation – adds a layer of uncertainty to the already challenging task of maintaining global stability. I am particularly cautiously optimistic - if more nuclear proliferation is the best prevention of a nuclear war, the Doomsday Clock will continue to tick down, approach 0 infinitely, and never reach 0.

This film echos with the pictures posted by @lucyhorowitz , another soldier who disobeyed - Vasily Arkhipov, who alleged prevented a thermal-nuclear war between the US and USSR. The film illustrates a paralleled story of the Cuban-Missile Crisis.

[emersonlubke]

solutions

I'd like to say I'm keenly aware of American propaganda and its influences on my thinking, but it's honestly very hard to discern fact from state-endorsed fiction. Propaganda is an incredibly effective tool, it is unfortunately almost exclusively used for selfish and short-sighted ends. I feel like a potentially effective way of mitigating the risks of nuclear war -- that has, I would say, already taken effect to some degree -- is an international propaganda campaign fearmongering about the risks of nuclear war. I think it would lead to a ubiquitous understanding of the existential risk of nuclear war and lead to a denuclearized future. I attached a piece of American Red Scare propaganda, because while it was an anticommunist campaign from decades ago, its thoughts and rhetoric are still very pervasive throughout American thought today. Propaganda is very effective at swaying people and I feel like the general public today does not have a sufficient terror of our capacity to destroy all of human civilization.

My thinking is that over the course of say a half-century, a combination of US, Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and European propaganda campaigns would lead to a global public that has an overwhelming consensus that nuclear weapons are a uniquely threatening and terrifying force in this world that we should be very afraid of. I understand a moral opposition to this idea, that it shouldn't be up to the few to decide what the many should think, but I feel like in this specific case it is justifiable because humanity is potentially at stake. If I'm going to be entirely forthcoming, I understand that this is naively idealistic and that no government is going to actively undermine themselves as a nuclear power, but I really do believe that this would be an effective tool to further quell any use of nuclear bombs. I think that we are getting too far away from the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and I worry that people won't have a lived experience of the aftermath of nuclear weapons and will thus be more inclined to use them, which is why I think it needs to be engrained in thought that nuclear weapons represent the end of everything.

[AnikSingh1]

salience #solutions

Similar to the question I put up this week built upon the idea of coordination - upon reading through the doomsday clock and policies regarding nuclear nonproliferation, I find myself curious to understand the layers behind this challenge of nuclear weaponry. As a byproduct of their deadly nature, being forced to play the game of weighing nuclear warfare onto the opposing countries with differing political, structural, or strategical viewpoints can be extremely stressful. Hence, nuclear nonproliferation seems to be a starting point in assessing this tension - eliminate the stimulus of nuclear weaponry, and the stress of having to deal with it is much simpler if not gone entirely.

If it were only so easy. The coordination between the differing viewpoints of multiple countries that each have risk in every financial decision made can be difficult to get people aligned. Countries do not have to state their nuclear programs entirely to the public, and while they are expected to be transparent, it relies entirely on an honor system. It is difficult to be consistent with building a nonproliferation campaign if the push to make it happen only comes from one singular interest of a country, rather than the world; why would a country give up their fearmongering card in the grand scale of the world? I find it to be quite difficult to send through entirely.

I think in order to successfully limit the progression of the end of this nuclear warfare, it might be to leave them on the table but not entirely call them into the subject frame. Something as deadly as nuclear weaponry cannot be hidden away as simple as a box in a closet, and they will always be the ultimate trump card for brutal annihilation. However, the weight of the damage done is so intensely high that I wonder if it will just stay that - a concept / discussion tool used to get a country’s way most of the time. Letting nuclear discussion continue from time to time, but not making any strong moves feels like the easiest (and maybe too easy??) way to limit the actual use of nuclear weaponry. Out of sight, out of mind - with the challenge being so drastic, it is difficult to think about ways to limit nuclear annihilation in a world where everybody sees the value they hold. Nukes hold so much threat to other industries and especially monetary challenges - so it is natural that they should never be acted on, but maybe kept in the background for other challenges to take the reigns.

[gwharris7]

nuclear #origin

Before the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the world understood war as incredibly deadly and destructive. However, this destruction occurred in semi-predictable ways, and over the period of months or years. The dropping of the atomic bombs signified the beginning of the end of conventional warfare, and opened the world's eyes to a new threat with more destructive power than ever before. It also heightened the political importance of nuclear weapons and sparked discussions about how best to limit nuclear proliferation, leading to the signing of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. However, the NPT was a relatively nearsighted solution in my opinion - it focused on the countries which had nuclear weapons at the time, and was not strict enough on countries without nuclear weapons, many of which would inevitably develop them. A stricter treaty with more direct consequences (strong sanctions at least) would have been a much larger deterrent against countries without nuclear weapons choosing to develop them. Also, while the treaty included a commitment for all countries with nuclear weapons at the time to disarm, there was no deadline for their disarmament, and as a result, all five countries with nuclear weapons at the time still possess them.

Since then, the Cold War and the nuclear stockpiling that occurred as a result of the policy of mutually assured destruction (MAD) have only heightened the existential risk posed by nuclear war. As nuclear weapons proliferate, and more nations with varying political agendas gain access, the probability of global nuclear war increases at least proportionally, and possibly more so due to heightened international tensions caused by proliferation. I am most concerned about the possibility of accidental nuclear war caused by a malfunctioning system or human error - there have been many nuclear close calls that came within an inch of sparking global nuclear conflict. Thankfully, the number of nuclear weapons has drastically decreased in recent years (see graphic), but there is still plenty of work to be done before we no longer need to be worried about nuclear weapons posing an existential threat.

[JosephineLyy]

Nuclear #AI #Human Being

The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons systems represents a dangerous acceleration towards global catastrophe, symbolized by the advancing of the Doomsday Clock. I always think that AI's application in this domain significantly increases the risk of nuclear conflict, thereby hastening the approach to midnight - a metaphor for global disaster.

AI, in nuclear warfare, introduces an alarming level of unpredictability and instability. Unlike human decision-makers, who can weigh ethical considerations and the grave consequences of nuclear war, AI operates on algorithms that lack this critical capacity for moral judgment. The speed and efficiency of AI-driven decisions, while seemingly advantageous, actually exacerbate the risk of miscalculation. In a nuclear standoff, where decisions must be made under intense pressure and within narrow time frames, AI's propensity for rapid response diminishes the opportunity for diplomatic de-escalation and increases the likelihood of premature or unwarranted nuclear launches.

The risks of AI in this context are amplified by the complexity and opacity of AI algorithms. These systems can develop unforeseen behaviors, and their decision-making processes may not be fully understood, even by their creators. This lack of transparency and predictability in AI systems poses a significant threat when applied to nuclear weapons, as the stakes involve global survival.

Misinterpretations or errors in automated decision-making related to nuclear weapons could lead to devastating consequences. Historical incidents, like the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident, underscore the risks of automated decision-making in high-stakes scenarios. Thus, establishing stringent international agreements for AI applications in defense is critical to prevent catastrophic consequences

Moreover, the integration of AI into nuclear weapons could trigger an arms race, with states seeking to develop or acquire advanced AI capabilities to maintain strategic parity. This competition would likely lead to a destabilizing buildup of nuclear weapons and AI-enhanced systems, further increasing the risk of accidental or intentional nuclear conflict.

In light of these considerations, it is evident that the application of AI in nuclear weapons systems not only increases the risk of catastrophic conflict but also represents a significant step towards the midnight of the Doomsday Clock. The international community must recognize the gravity of this development and urgently establish comprehensive treaties and regulations to prevent the uncontrolled proliferation and integration of AI in nuclear warfare. The focus should be on maintaining human oversight and control, prioritizing global security and ethical governance over technological advancement in the arena of nuclear weapons. Only through deliberate and concerted efforts can we hope to reverse the advance of the Doomsday Clock, safeguarding the future of humanity.

[ani-gogineni]

The challenge of thinking and talking about the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons is complex and multifaceted. Various factors contribute to the difficulty in mobilizing around this issue, including the interests of certain agencies in society, inconsistent ideologies, and the influence of the military-industrial complex.

One significant hurdle is the financial incentive for the military-industrial complex and large weapons manufacturers, such as Boeing, Raytheon, Honeywell International, and Lockheed Martin, to downplay the risks associated with nuclear proliferation. The co-published report by PAX and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) sheds light on the extensive involvement of companies like Lockheed Martin in the production of nuclear weapons. Private companies, including Huntington Ingalls Industries, Lockheed Martin, Honeywell International, General Dynamics, and Jacobs Engineering, are being paid at least $116 billion to build nuclear weapons, according to the report.

Lockheed Martin and Huntington Ingalls Industries, among others, stand out with billions of dollars in outstanding contracts related to nuclear weapons production. Last year saw a near-record $778 billion in spending for the Pentagon, including work on nuclear warheads, surpassing the requested budget by $25 billion. This immense financial investment creates a powerful lobby with a vested interest in perpetuating nuclear armament, influencing policy decisions, and potentially downplaying associated risks.

The Pentagon budget itself is criticized for its gargantuan size, replete with waste ranging from overcharges for spare parts to investments in weapons systems that are expensive and fail to deliver on promises. Examples include the F-35 combat aircraft, which has been plagued by numerous defects and cost overruns, with an estimated lifetime cost of $1.7 trillion. The military-industrial complex's influence extends beyond financial considerations, with arguments for such projects often framed as job creation measures, further complicating efforts to rationalize defense spending.

The broader issue of a "cover the globe" military strategy, with over 750 military bases worldwide, contributes to the challenge. This strategy, coupled with a massive nuclear arsenal, diverts resources from pressing global issues such as public health, climate change, and global inequality. Despite the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Pentagon continues to focus on maintaining substantial bases in the Middle East and increasing the troop presence in East Asia, driven partly by the narrative of a growing threat from China.

The challenge, therefore, lies in reshaping the budget and priorities to address genuine security problems like public health and climate change, an existential crisis of increasing magnitude in its own right. This requires not only fresh thinking but also persistent public pressure to slash the Pentagon budget and reduce the influence of the military-industrial complex. Without a significant change in course, there is a risk that the focus on military spending will overshadow crucial investments needed to combat urgent global challenges.

salience

[agupta818]

The article from The Hill caused me to question many things about the conversation on the authorization of using nuclear weapons and enforcement of nuclear agreements. I find it surprising that a country that based its foundation on part on checks and balances has failed to implement just that on the President's ability to use nuclear weapons. To someone else who is unaware of this power, it might seem shocking upon discovery as there is no way to overturn or approve the President's decision. I wonder why a check on this power has yet to exist, given recent scares during the end of the Trump administration, and why it seems difficult to approve this protocol which seems to be beneficial to all parties involved in terms of accountability for the consequences from the release of such weapons. Looking into the origins of this power, it seems as though when Harry Truman refused to drop more atomic bombs, he created this nuclear authority. Then JFK ordered Permissive Action Links to further limit others' access to the nuclear weapons. While I believe the access to the codes should be limited, as JFK tried to limit after Eisenhower, I do not believe that one person should have this power alone, essentially having the power to end the world as we know it. What we as citizens have to grapple with is that once the "button" is pressed, there is no return and we have no control over the matter.

Another point the article mentions is the no-first-use policy that currently exists between China and Russia. There is also the belief that this same agreement reached between Russia and the US would alleviate tensions for a time being. While I can see a deescalation of the current threats from the Russia during the Russia-Ukraine war, I do not see this as the most promising agreement. What is to prevent a leader from turning back on this agreement? Where is the accountability, and if someone was to break the agreement, does it really matter? Once the weapons are deployed they cannot be stopped, and the damage will be done. It seems like an agreement is more for appearances and to ease tensions on the surface, but besides the obvious disastrous consequences from falling back on the agreement, I fail to find other ways that it can be upheld or would be enforced.

origin #nuclear #policy

article for background: https://outrider.org/nuclear-weapons/articles/presidents-sole-authority

[oliviaegross]

Throughout the readings I was of course thinking about the puzzling and multifaceted existential threat that is posed by nuclear weapons. While I was first exposed to the Doomsday clock as a first year, I had not sufficiently recognized how such a “device” helps us recognize and amplify the risks associated with nuclear and many other existential risks we are facing. In Bronson’s “More Hands Needed on The Nuclear Football Field '' the no-first use idea is discussed and was in fact suggested as necessary in the 1980 Doomsday Clock statement. If universally followed by great powers, this no-first use idea productively combats the threats posed by other countries increasing their postures when fielding more weapons. As while countries have the freedom to build and keep stock of weapons, those that signed such an agreement would be doing so in the name of defense, and never offense. However, in the American case, cultural ideologies of freedom are inconsistent with this policy, that however potentially productive, are hard to imagine being implemented in many nations. This is precisely why I find the Doomsday clock so effective. It presents a cultural solution in starting conversation, and at the end of day sometimes it is a number that is most effective in starting difficult discussions. The clock specifically focuses on technology and how science is advancing and being governed. In our current moment, governance on such topics is very weak. However, in looking at the history of nuclear weapons, we learned that science has the ability to move very quickly, and in examining nuclear energy, it is apparent that science has massive benefits and significant risks. The critical tension is then presented as to how we mitigate those risks so that we can benefit from science, as if we cannot mitigate the risks, we must limit those benefits. This can be seen with nuclear energy but also most classically by way of the industrial revolution.
The challenge therefore, is coming up with a visual that can additionally represent this tension of both progress and risk. One manner that can be productive in dealing with this challenge, is widening the scope of an individual's perspective. In showing people that our impact and time on earth is significant, awareness is raised around our ability to successfully innovate and simultaneously mitigate risk. This can be seen in the mission of Jeff Bezos’s 10,000 year clock. The average mammal life span is 3.5 million years, we are at 200,000 years. The 10,000 year clock is a model that helps individuals take in the fact that humans are technologically advanced enough to create not only extraordinary wonders but civilization-scale problems. So long-term thinking is critical more than ever. This clock helps us understand and take in perspective and serves as another model, like the Doomsday, that opens up critical conversations that must take place in order to continue to weigh the challenges that scientific progress invites.

[acarch]

Hello, I apologize for the late post. I recently added into in the class, but now I am all caught up.

salience - The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists describes itself as addressing many audiences: among them, scientists, policy makers, and above all, the general public (https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/). The public mission of the Bulletin seems key to its identity as a free-access media organization. It is also core to the Doomsday Clock, a powerful symbol clearly designed to grip the popular imagination. The nature of the work of the Bulletin implies a commitment to the belief that public opinion moves policy. This idea is a hopeful one, and it speaks powerfully to humanitarian and democratic values. But it is also not something to be taken for granted.

From one point of view, the very nature of the nuclear situation suggests a chasm between the public and the elites that govern them. It could be the case that the average American believes that their government should have a nuclear arsenal (although this is certainly arguable). But even if people knew how much nuclear technology had advanced since the detonations of August 1945—even if anybody can be said to “know” something so utterly inconceivable—would most Americans really agree that our government needs upwards of 5,000 atomic bombs? That is already almost half of all the nuclear warheads on the planet. Just one would be ten times as powerful as those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, combined (Diaz-Maurin, 2022). If the US actually used the bombs it already has, it would destroy virtually all life on earth, not just from the bombs, the radiation, or the fires, but from a stratosphere full of soot and an ocean of ice that would choke global supply chains and put an end to the agriculture that feeds us (Diaz-Maurin, 2022). And according to the Federation of American Scientists, our government wants even more: they write that “the only thing that appears to have prevented the [congressional] Commission from recommending an immediate increase of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is that the weapons production complex currently does not have the capacity to do so” (Kristensen et al, 2023). Do most people really believe that not only do we need nuclear weapons, we need enough to destroy life on Earth not once, not twice, but many times over? If public opinion significantly influences policy, why are we in this situation at all?

According to journalist Vincent Bevins, more people participated in protests between 2010-2020 than ever before in human history. But he questions whether mass protests have actually led to much change. Of course, “while none of these movements can be described as an unequivocal triumph, they also did not really fail” (Wallace-Wells, “While the number of protests and protesters soar, Vincent Bevins writes, little seems to improve,” New York Times, 2023). With stakes so high, a little bit of movement, or a little bit of hope, can be enough of a reason to continue pushing for public momentum. And even if it is right that public opinion lacks much influence (I hope it’s not!), there are still options: for instance, perhaps organizations should invest more time and energy in policy makers and scientists than in the public—or maybe the opposite is true, and they should invest in public infrastructure so that people really do have the means to make a change.

Public opinion at work?

[aaron-wineberg02]

Hello! I just joined the class. My apologies for the late submission, I wrote this up as soon as I got access to Canvas.

framing

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists suggests there is a connection between saber rattling and nuclear armageddon. True, nuclear weapons have often been viewed in the light of armageddon. But I will argue this is a false lens to evaluate a conflict. I acknowledge there have been many nuclear close calls including the Cuba Missile Crisis, the 1983 NATO Able Archer exercises, and several missing nuclear warheads throughout the Eastern Bloc and Greenland. However, military tacticians have typically used nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Even rouge states such as North Korea estimate that the use of a tactical nuclear bomb would result in an unprecedented military response. This means that the use, and retaliation, with WMDs leaves states in a field of frozen tension.

When we are evaluating the risk of President Putin using a nuclear bomb in Ukraine, ask this question: is this a negotiating tactic? I argue this is often the case. Consider the Yom Kippur War, where Israel armed its nuclear warheads in the event of a Syrian breakthrough in Golon. This signaled to the US and to the Soviet Union that Israel would go to any length to defend itself. Rather than risk a nuclear escalation, the US resupplied Israel with conventional arms. However, some reports suggest this was a bluff and Israel was not prepared to escalate the conflict.

When the Nuclear Posture Review argues for a nuclear buildup, this is a bid to improve our military deterrence. It is a highly visible signal to China, Russia, Iran, and others that the US could use its nuclear weapons. This establishes deterrence through uncertainty. For example, would China risk invading Taiwan if it believed the US would send nuclear arms to Taiwan?

Many of these decisions must be viewed from the lens of deterrence, rather than escalation. Nuclear armageddon is not likely. However, the risk of a nuclear accident from military incompetence remains a legitimate question.

[mibr4601]

Hi, I also just joined the class.

Salience #Climate #Nuclear

As talked about in The Bulletin's article about the Doomsday Clock, we are closer to atomic war than ever before. With Russia threatening to use atomic weapons in the Ukrainian War, policymakers have to consider the best options to ensure that we don’t end up in a global atomic war. While Russia is currently one of two global superpowers with the largest nuclear forces, many other countries are working their way up as well. I do believe that Russia is largely using its nuclear forces more as a tactic and a threat to get what they want, it is likely that this trend will continue since no one wants an all-out war. Other countries can then do the same to get what they want and then it is not implausible that this does eventually turn into a country fulfilling their threat.

Negotiations are very key in these times as mentioned in World101. It is critical to try and limit the growth of nuclear weapons in countries that already have them and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that don’t have them. While the treaty itself is not necessarily shown to be incredibly influential everywhere, limiting the number of nuclear weapons and the likelihood that any rogue organization can get their hands on them is of utmost importance. Even for countries that don’t have similar visions and despise each other, negotiations and peace treaties must occur to limit the threat. Not only are negotiations important for nuclear weapons, but it is also important that we have a focus on climate in these times. With war impacting trading between countries, many countries have relied on resources that are not good for the environment such as more fossil fuels. The rise in prices only causes more of a reliance on bad resources creating a rise in carbon emissions. I think that negotiations in the face of war is one of the most important things to stop the Doomsday Clock whether it be for the environment or nuclear energy.

[kallotey]

salience #nuclear #emerging

It is possible that mobilizing around a threat as huge as nuclear warfare–something that can result in billions of deaths in a matter of two years–is incredibly difficult because people will ultimately deny the possibility of such an outcome. This is not a rare psychological phenomenon where people go into denial over something incredibly shocking especially when it is terrifying and involves weapons and deaths. Generally speaking, avoidance over the idea would be easier, especially at the individual level if it seems so far away from the norm—because how could the average citizen expect a bomb to demolish their neighborhood when bills or school is their priority?

At the same time, there are individuals who are very aware of this possibility and risk, so they make sure to stay informed about all things relating to this outcome. The readings this week explain that ongoing wars and geopolitical tensions, specifically with the Russia-Ukraine war, hold great weight in the development of nuclear war. While people can find news of this online, I think it is still possible that they can still deny it especially if they have a strong sense of nationalistic pride and optimism, ideally if they are an American. Because while you can find information regarding the climate of the international politics, you can also find information on the current state of the United States’ current nuclear arms defense systems and weaponry as well as influence.

Something else that I think may also contribute to this difficulty to mobilize and/or downplay the risks associated with nuclear war is the fact that the internet will do what it does best: make jokes about it. While this is not a joke per se, that image that I have inserted here is from a game called 60 Seconds! Or 60 Seconds! Reatomized where the story surrounds Ted or Dolores a husband/wife who hear the “nuclear bomb alarm” and have 60 seconds to collect all the necessities they can (including their spouse and kids) before running for their bunker to take cover. This game follows the narrative of the “short-term” effects of a single nuclear explosion as there are happy endings in the game. I think these sort of simulation games that feed into these bleak futures have a very interesting desensitizing effect as well. However, they are just a simulation that can never compare to the real thing, and I highly doubt that hearing an actual alarm will have people remaining as calm as they would playing this game.

Source: https://images.app.goo.gl/8qxNcxvTwnmbZSsF7

[summerliu1027]

salience #nuclear #climate

When we talk about nuclear weapons as ordinary people who will never participate in the nuclear talks, it all seems so far away from real life that I've often heard comments about "nuking North Korea" or "nuking ISIS." Even if we only talk about instant deaths caused by immediate impact, the death toll numbers are beyond imagination; it often seems easier to express empathy for someone hit in a car accident than to express empathy for someone lost to a nuclear bomb, because car accidents are easier to imagine and more engrained in daily life. The "Nowhere to Hide" article presents the cold, long numbers in a manner that is visually shocking and impactful; the long, red panel of 5 billion deaths was so long that I thought the webpage froze. I think this is a great way of educating the public about the true impact of nuclear bombs and should be promoted at all levels of education. If the public understood better what a first nuclear bomb might mean, perhaps it would become easier to gain traction and apply pressure on world governments when nuclear talks do not go as planned.

The climate aspect of nuclear bomb impacts should also gain more exposure. The nuclear education in our system (if any at all) completely ignores the devastating aftermaths of nuclear explosions to the ecosystem. The mention of famine should be incorporated into future nuclear education. Similar to what I've argued above, famine is a much more imaginable threat than oceans dropping in temperature and soot covering the sky. A visible threat can motivate the public to collect influence, someday enough influence to perhaps apply pressure to world governments. Otherwise, one is and will continue to be much more inclined to deal with a present issue (making a living or dealing with an ongoing social issue) than to deal with a nuclear one.

The most fascinating of all is, after reading these contents, you're left wondering if the world leaders that have access to nuclear codes have any reliable knowledge of this power they wield.

[briannaliu]

#nuclear #origins #policy #solutions #framing

Origins: The nuclear age has had a turbulent history dating back to 1939, when the US secretly launched the Manhattan Project to compete with Germany’s attempt at building the first uranium bomb. A few years later, the US conducted the first-ever nuclear test, and after entering WWII, dropped the first atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, resulting in over 170,000 deaths. For the next several decades, countries like the Soviet Union, the UK, France, China, and India developed their own nuclear weapons. There were various calls for global disarmament – in 1963, JFK called for the reduction of nuclear development, and in 1968, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation (NPT) was signed by 190 countries. But today, the threat of nuclear destruction still looms amid competition between the US, North Korea, and Russia, among others.

Policy: I found the U.S.'s Strategic Posture Commission Report from October 2023 to be extremely interesting. First off, the name of the commission itself suggests a more defensive stance by the US in response to nuclear threats. Indeed, US officials called for a build-up in arms under the guise of a "defensive" stance, insisting that it was the only way to protect the US from the threat of dual aggression by Russia and China. The irony, however, is that this peer aggression by Russia and China is highly unlikely, and by building up its arms, the US is placing Russia and China on high alert and making the otherwise improbable alliance much more likely.

Framing: This discussion about nuclear war made me think about how arms races can be framed as strategic game theory (see graphic below). We can model the game such that both countries tend to prefer to have more weapons than the other country, and they would generally prefer to be more armed than less armed for defensive purposes, which happens to be the case in many arms races we've witnessed in history. When two countries share these values, their pursuit to be the country with more weapons will lead to the less desirable outcome of nuclear war, but if both countries agreed to not build weapons, everyone would be better off, representing a Prisoner's Dilemma game. This is a highly simplified framing of nuclear war but I think it demonstrates why the threat of nuclear war isn’t so easily done away with because it relies on cooperation and trust.

Solutions: As the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists explains, the threat of nuclear war has never been higher as Russia hints at nuclear war and the last remaining nuclear weapons treaty between Russia and the US expires in two years. To prevent the threat of nuclear war, I believe it is necessary to forge new nuclear weapons treaties as soon as possible, which means beginning peaceful negotiations proactively rather than later on. The only way that countries will cooperate for the common good is if they have assurance and trust in other countries. This means that countries should make credible commitments to abide by the treaty and commit to not renouncing it, for this will lead to mistrust and uneasiness among all parties involved.

[wheflin]

Hi - I also just joined the class. My apologies for the inconvenience!

nuclear, #origin, #salience

To give a little context on the history of the threat of nuclear annihilation, from the World101 video, the genesis of the idea of nuclear weapons began when the famous Albert Einstein and other physicists directly warned president Franklin D. Roosevelt that Nazi Germany was researching and working to develop nuclear weaponry, specifically, a uranium based bomb. The physicists encouraged Roosevelt to develop a nuclear research and development program within the U.S. in order to reach these nuclear capabilities before the Nazis did. As a result, the U.S. created the Manhattan Project where thousands of scientists worked secretly on developing a nuclear fission based bomb, or in layman’s terms, an atomic bomb. Ultimately, the United States succeeded and dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan which was a major factor in ending the war in the pacific. However, while the atomic bomb helped end the war, it created another problem in the process. As many other countries witnessed the power and destruction of the atomic bomb, others quickly raced to develop nuclear weaponry of their own. Consequently, with countries aiming to gain power, protection, and prestige through developing such weapons, it poses a greater threat of a nuclear war that could annihilate the human race. While acts of nonproliferation and multiple foreign policies have worked to slow the spread of nuclear weapon development, such as the NPT, nonetheless, there are many countries that have made nuclear additions to their military arsenals.

From a more personal standpoint, learning about issues like such are truly eye-opening. As a busy college student, I find myself very focused on my studies and general college life that I forget such devastating threats like nuclear annihilation are one button, bad decision, or conflict away from occurring. My parents, who grew up during the cold war, would tell me stories about how their schools would practice nuclear bomb drills, as Russian attacks on the United States posed a serious threat. Now, years later, nuclear war is still a major possibility. Currently, the war between Russia and Ukraine is still at large. As the fight escalates and prior nuclear treaties begin to erode, the chance of a nuclear exchange isn’t out of the question. This is incredibly hard to process because of multiple reasons. One, nuclear bombs have been dropped in the past and we have seen first-hand the destructive capabilities. The power of these weapons is massive and has the ability to wipe out a large portion of the human race. In addition, today, there are multiple world superpowers that have nuclear capabilities, as well as current ongoing conflicts that could lead to a nuclear exchange. Not to mention, how quickly and swiftly ordering such an attack would be. All in all, it truly is a scary concept to digest.

[ghagle]

#framing #risk

It's pretty clear that the threat of a mistakenly detonated bomb, a local nuclear war, and most certainly a global nuclear conflict all constitute a worryingly real amount of risk. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientist's 5.3 billion person casualty estimate following global nuclear war speaks for itself. However, there is considerable risk--often unspoken--that constantly accompanies the risk of detonation and conflict: the risk that flows from nuclear injustice, something playing out today in Ukraine. Nuclear injustice--the fact that some states have access to nuclear arms while most do not--historically results in serious, bloody, and non-nuclear proxy or one-sided wars that destabilize countries, expend tremendous resources at the cost of taxpayers and the environment, and sustain the discouragingly evident wealth gap between nuclear wielding and nuclear non-wielding states. During the Cold War and now in Ukraine, the presence of wealthy countries' nuclear arms carried more risk than just detonation, it carried the risk of the exportation of destabilization and war to other nations.

Disparities in nuclear arm possession across different states risks the generation of injustice and, thus, bad things. During the Cold War, for instance, the possession of bombs between the West and the USSR essentially imbued both sides with an untouchability. Not just between each other, but from the rest of the world. This led, in turn, to the exportation of conflict. Vietnam, Afghanistan, and lots of Latin America, for example, were on the receiving end of a new system of injustice predicated on the possession of nuclear arms--and paid the price for it. Today, Russia has again engaged in unjustly imposing conflict on a non-nuclear nation: Ukraine. The fact that Russia is able to harness the threat of nuclear attack gives it considerable power over the conflict itself and military imperviousness from the rest of the world. In short, Russia's nukes allow the war and the death to continue.

As a nuke-wielding nation, we also risk exporting conflict and suffering to other countries. America's efforts in the Middle East could serve as examples of our conflict exportation, exportation enabled by our robust untouchability domestically. It is a risk that is not super tangible. It is not as clear when nuclear injustice causes pain as when it would be if we had a nuclear war. But, nonetheless, the risk that countries exploit their possession of nuclear arms is real, and should be considered when we discuss the risks that accompany nuclear arms.

Just look at how few countries actually have them. There is a lot of room for the big, powerful countries to play toy soldiers, oblivious to the injustice they are "proliferating."

[jamaib]

policy #solutions

When considering ways to alleviate the threat of nuclear warfare, it is difficult to imagine that one of the most effective solutions is not to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Although there are significant positives of the treaty, there are also negatives. Particularly, the lack of concrete disarmament goals has allowed for the threat of nuclear warfare to be prevalent. This problem can only be solved through the cooperation of the main nuclear powers - the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. New agreements need to be made between these countries, however, there seems to be a lack of desire from the different parties. For example, the parties meet every five years to discuss how to achieve the treaty’s goals of nonproliferation and eventual disarmament. This in my opinion is much too long, especially considering what is actually achieved during these meetings. Take this excerpt from the UN - “Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ended this evening without reaching agreement on substantive conclusions and recommendations, due to the Russian Federation’s opposition to a summary document presented by the presidency, the adoption of which required consensus. This marked the second Review Conference in a row, after that of 2015, which has failed to produce a substantial outcome document, and many delegations deplored this failure, while affirming that it did not call into question the content of the Treaty itself, nor the achievements of previous Review Conferences. The next Review Conference will be held in 2026.” Nothing is achieved in these conferences because of “irreconcilable differences” between the parties all the while the threat of nuclear warfare looms. So, what can be done? Perhaps stricter rules and punishments for not abiding to these rules can be implemented (i.e. If a country refuses to comply with an otherwise majority-voted regulation, then said country may receive heavy trade restrictions). In addition, security and surveillance measures of countries respective nuclear materials need to be improved to ensure rightful compliance as well as making sure these materials do not fall into the wrong hands. Ultimately, the actions these countries take regarding nuclear weapons will be the standard for the rest of the world.

[maevemcguire]

risk #policy #solutions #salience

I really enjoyed the readings from this week, as well as having the opportunity to read others’. I thought that these readings provided an interesting contextual starting point for our class, with the Doomsday Clock used as a symbol to recognize and stress the importance of understanding the existential risks and threats associated with nuclear power and proliferation. I thought that the commission's report was also helpful for understanding the prospective threats of nuclear expansion, especially in the modern context of US relations with Russia and China. ‘Nowhere to Hide,’ outlines the risk of nuclear destruction of modern civilization, but also the hinderance of the development of future civilizations. 
It is interesting to consider the immense influence that public opinion and cultural ideologies can have over policy issues like nuclear weaponization. On the other hand, it is interesting that sometimes political decisions so poorly reflect the perspectives and desires of policymakers’ constituents. These readings effectively addressed the how intersection of technology, artificial intelligence, and nuclear decision-making require international cooperation. Policies and initiatives, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, must evolve to address the complexities of the modern nuclear landscape, bridging the gap between scientific insights and political decision-making. 
Modern-day context, especially in relation to US-China relations and the war in Ukraine, provides unique challenges as there is a simultaneous and paradoxical pursuit of nuclear disarmament as well as nuclear modernization. Nuclear energy proves to be a potentially powerful and effective alternative energy source to burning fossil fuels. However, political distrust of scientific institutions, and the complex global dynamics complicate – with justified salience – mobilization. Addressing the complexities of nuclear issues requires collective efforts, diplomatic initiatives, and a commitment to fostering global equality.
The photo attached is a propaganda poster circulated widely throughout the US during the Cold War and highlights the prevalence of awareness surrounding nuclear threats during the Cold War, further highlighting the paradox between modern-day perspectives and understandings of nuclear threat compared with modern-day perspectives.