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dhicks / comp-HOPOS

Building a comprehensive* dataset of 20th century philosophy of science
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Non-binary gender and trans identity #18

Open dhicks opened 4 years ago

dhicks commented 4 years ago

Currently, gender is handled as a binary variable (w/m), and there is no way to indicate whether an individual is trans.

This comment focuses on trans gender identity.

With one possible exception, I'm not aware of any publicly trans individuals who appear as philosophers of science in the current dataset. Some publicly trans scientists who have made philosophical contributions include Deirdre McCloskey and Joan Roughgarden; however, none of the names that have been suggested to me (again, with one exception) satisfy the threshold definition of "philosopher of science" that we use.

The one exception is a trans individual who does appear in the dataset. But I have not yet checked whether they are publicly trans.

If trans identity is represented in the dataset, it should be distinct from the gender identity/presentation variable.

dhicks commented 4 years ago

This comment focuses on nonbinary gender.

I am currently aware of three individuals who have a public nonbinary gender identity: Daniel Hicks (myself), Quill R. Kukla (see also #19), and Catherine Stinson. I have confirmed that Hicks and Kukla appear in the dataset as philosophers of science; I expect that Stinson does as well.

Perhaps even more so than trans identity, nonbinary gender requires us to think through the relationship between gender identity, gender presentation, and gender representation in the dataset.

On the one hand, I think the dataset should focus on gender presentation, for two reasons. First, for the most part we have no way to gather data on the gender identity of deceased individuals in the dataset, and we currently do not have the resources to survey gender identity of currently-living individuals. Second, insofar as the dataset can support explanations of phenomena, it can best support macro-level sociological explanations, rather than psychological or micro-level sociological ones. At the macro level, gender presentation (how an author is regarded by other authors in general) is likely to be more important than gender identity (which may only be known to one's immediate colleagues).

At the same time, public nonbinary identity should not be rendered invisible, such as by simply using binary gender values. Identifying a few individuals as exceptional cases is unlikely to undermine analysis. This suggests adding a third value for the gender variable, such as "n" for nonbinary.