The file packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts implements the signature validation routine for Electron applications on Windows. It executes the following command in a new shell (process.env.ComSpec on Windows, usually C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe):
Because of the surrounding shell, a first pass by cmd.exe expands any environment variable found in command-line above.
Exploitation
This creates a situation where verifySignature() can be tricked into validating the certificate of a different file than the one that was just downloaded. If the step is successful, the malicious update will be executed even if its signature is invalid.
Impact
This attack assumes a compromised update manifest (server compromise, Man-in-the-Middle attack if fetched over HTTP, Cross-Site Scripting to point the application to a malicious updater server, etc.).
Patch
This vulnerability was patched in #8295, by comparing the path in the output of Get-AuthenticodeSignature with the intended one. The patch is available starting from 6.3.0-alpha.6.
This PR has been flagged for autoclosing. However, it is being skipped due to the branch being already modified. Please close/delete it manually or report a bug if you think this is in error.
This PR contains the following updates:
6.3.1
->6.3.2
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2024-39698
Observations
The file
packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts
implements the signature validation routine for Electron applications on Windows. It executes the following command in a new shell (process.env.ComSpec
on Windows, usuallyC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
):https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/blob/140e2f0eb0df79c2a46e35024e96d0563355fc89/packages/electron-updater/src/windowsExecutableCodeSignatureVerifier.ts#L35-L41
Because of the surrounding shell, a first pass by
cmd.exe
expands any environment variable found in command-line above.Exploitation
This creates a situation where
verifySignature()
can be tricked into validating the certificate of a different file than the one that was just downloaded. If the step is successful, the malicious update will be executed even if its signature is invalid.Impact
This attack assumes a compromised update manifest (server compromise, Man-in-the-Middle attack if fetched over HTTP, Cross-Site Scripting to point the application to a malicious updater server, etc.).
Patch
This vulnerability was patched in #8295, by comparing the path in the output of
Get-AuthenticodeSignature
with the intended one. The patch is available starting from 6.3.0-alpha.6.Release Notes
electron-userland/electron-builder (electron-updater)
### [`v6.3.2`](https://redirect.github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/blob/HEAD/packages/electron-updater/CHANGELOG.md#632) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/compare/electron-updater@6.3.1...electron-updater@6.3.2) ##### Patch Changes - [#8378](https://redirect.github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/pull/8378) [`c8fe1462`](https://redirect.github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/commit/c8fe1462d529edeed0ad3fe0b7e99e8af1ca61ac) Thanks [@s77rt](https://redirect.github.com/s77rt)! - Limit concurrent downloads to 1Configuration
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