New devices attempt to load keys for historical messages from key backup; however, in order that they can trust key backup, they check for a signature on that backup from the user's master cross-signing key.
Occasionally we see cases in which a user has a key backup, but it has not been signed. This could happen for a number of reasons; for example:
Backup was reset from within a device which has not been verified, and therefore does not have a copy of the private master cross-signing key. Implementations should not allow you to do this, but it's possible that some client implementations have bugs that allow it.
TODO: open specific issues against clients if we have evidence of this happening
New devices attempt to load keys for historical messages from key backup; however, in order that they can trust key backup, they check for a signature on that backup from the user's master cross-signing key.
Occasionally we see cases in which a user has a key backup, but it has not been signed. This could happen for a number of reasons; for example: