Open wrygiel opened 7 years ago
Can't say it with 100 % certainty, but any solution involving any requirements in DNS records is probably not feasible for us.
Can't say it with 100 % certainty, but any solution involving any requirements in DNS records is probably not feasible for us.
I also believe that Poland would prefer Solution 1 for itself (it doesn't make use of DNS and seems sufficient for partners which cover whole countries).
I don't believe that all of our customers would be able or willing to add such an entry to their dns. Currently only ~5 out of 50+ customers which use our mail server were able/willing to add a SPF record to their dns. Although this would probably be the better solution.
One possible solution similar to 3 would be that they can host this text somewhere on their homepage, which is somehere under their domain and probably serverd via https with the same certificate as the domain represented by their schac. This would remove the need to alter their DNS entry. And most IROs are able to publish to a website of the university.
One possible solution similar to 3 would be that they can host this text somewhere on their homepage
If we intend for this verification to be automatic, this would need to be much more specific. Because "somewhere on their homepage" might include "anonymous comments below some unimportant article".
Here are some verification methods Google uses. They also seem to have an API which the Registry might make use of. However, all of Google's verification methods require direct access to the server. An admin would need to be involved, IROs wouldn't be able to do this themselves.
For now, solution 1 ought to be good enough. Stealing the scope of other HEIs should violate the Terms of Service for the EWP network.
This topic is important, but it didn't seem urgent enough to bring it up before. Still, we should begin considering it. @erasmus-without-paper/all-members
The Problem
When a new partner
X
wants to join the EWP Network, it first publishes its manifest file. In this fileX
states that it covers HEIsA
andB
. Then, he sends the HTTPS URL of this manifest file to the EWP Registry maintainers.A
andB
indeed agree to be covered byX
?Solution 1 (the current one)
The current solution hasn't been discussed nor officially agreed with anyone. It's perfectly okay for development, but it will probably not be enough for production use (especially once more HEIs start to join the network).
It builds on the fact that the Registry maintainers know all the partners first hand:
<hei-regex>
element they type into the Registry'smanifest-sources.xml
file (when they're adding the partner's manifest to it).It currently looks like this:
We are also thinking about using this feature as means of delegating trust. For example:
manifest-sources.xml
file, provided that all their<hei-regex>
values end with.se
.This solution has drawbacks though. In case of partners which will cover a large number of HEIs in different countries (such as SOP), we would (probably?) need to simply allow them to cover any HEI.
Solution 2 (Porto)
Copied from here:
Solution 3 (WP4)
We make use of the HEI's TXT DNS records (as Solution 2 does, but with different entries):
We require the HEI to state which manifest file(s) it allows itself to be covered by.
For example,
uw.edu.pl
would be required to contain a TXT record similar to this one:Now, the validation can be performed by the Registry automatically:
X
states that it covers some HEI IDY
, the Registry fetches TXT records forY
's TLD and makes sure thatcovered-by-erasmuswithoutpaper-manifest-url=X
is present among them.X
TXT entry disappears fromY
, then the Registry removesY
from the list of HEIs been covered byX
(and issues a warning at the manifest's<admin-email>
).Manifest URLs are not supposed to be frequently changed, so HEIs will not be required to update their TXT entries later in time.
The only possible downside of this solution is the necessity of sustained presence of EWP TXT entries in the HEI's DNS entries. But I don't think it's a major problem.
Solution 4 (= 1 + 3)
A mixed solution: We use different strategies for different partners (e.g. for Poland, we stick with Solution 1, while for SOP, we require Solution 3). The Registry administrators express these requirements in the
manifest-sources.xml
file.For example:
This solution also allows for even more validation methods to be introduced in the future.