Open ajvb opened 4 years ago
@autrilla What do you think?
Given all the confusion around it I think we should probably deprecate it, and also deprecate --aws-profile
. The AWS lets you use environment variables to control what profile is used, users should just use that.
It's really useful to pass the profile using --aws-profile
. I can understand reducing confusion but is it possible to just deprecate storing the aws profile in the encrypted file and keep --aws-profile
?
thanks
I really like how we implemented this in frost
: https://github.com/mozilla/frost/blob/master/aws/client.py#L17-L32
You can pass in a profile using --aws-profiles
(though for sops
it would be --aws-profile
) and it gets passed to the session creation, otherwise we just do the default AWS auth flow.
I'd also consider expanding this to removing support for setting AWS roles in the config. Most tools that interact with AWS via the command line require you to authenticate to AWS outside of the context of the tool and it makes sense to me that sops functions the same way. It seems like most of the issues are around people being confused it doesn't work that way (i.e. https://github.com/mozilla/sops/issues/555).
Why do you prefer using a flag vs an environment variable? It’s kind of the same thing with different syntax, no?
Using a flag would let us simplify the code a bit...
On Thu, 20 Feb 2020 at 23:21, Paul Nguyen notifications@github.com wrote:
It's really useful to pass the profile using --aws-profile. I can understand reducing confusion but is it possible to just deprecate storing the aws profile in the encrypted file and keep --aws-profile?
thanks
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I'd also consider expanding this to removing support for setting AWS roles in the config.
Original support for that came from a requirement to invoke KMS from various accounts transparently, by having Sops assume roles in those accounts. I believe this feature is still in use in our own teams.
I agree with @jvehent, we use sops in the company I work for and being able to use multiple accounts transparently on the same shell is very important to us. Changing environment variables before running a sops command is pretty dirty, especially in automation scripts.
I agree with @jvehent, we use sops in the company I work for and being able to use multiple accounts transparently on the same shell is very important to us. Changing environment variables before running a sops command is pretty dirty, especially in automation scripts.
I assume you mean the removal of the feature from the config file.
I personally find it very hard to care about the difference in spelling between:
AWS_PROFILE=foo sops foo.yaml
and
sops --aws-profile=foo foo.yaml
But if there's some specific reason you care about this, I'd love to hear about it.
I'd also consider expanding this to removing support for setting AWS roles in the config.
Original support for that came from a requirement to invoke KMS from various accounts transparently, by having Sops assume roles in those accounts. I believe this feature is still in use in our own teams.
Hm, I wonder if it is? I don't think the .sops.yaml
config file is used at all when decrypting or editing. My understanding is that it'll only be used when creating new files. IIRC, I had to change profiles manually back then, but maybe things have changed. I think if you use MFA, SOPS's profile switching is not going to work anyway, because we don't support token input.
I agree with ajvb. When I decrypt a file encrypted by other member of our team, I have to manually delete profile entry in the file every time.
One vote to deprecate - it's standard practice in our pipelines and locally to set up the AWS env for each CI/CD step. We've used SOPS for a while now and never touched (maybe never even knew about) embedding the aws_profile in the encrypted file.
I'd add that, although the AWS CLI could just pick one of AWS_PROFILE
or --profile
, it supports both and I've used both. It also seems like SOPS follows this pattern for most other flags/env vars, so I'm not sure why this one should be different.
Not having the --aws-profile makes things more difficult for beginners - how do you communicate that the AWS_PROFILE env and AWS_SDK_LOAD_CONFIG=1 are needed? Not having the profile in the encrypted file makes sense.
I initially had expected the aws profile to be settable in the .sops.yaml file -- since you specify the kms id there.
Not specifying the role makes in the .sops.yaml makes sense, I created a policy that allowed access to the sops key. I then assigned the policy to the user. This means, you don't directly have to specify permissions in the key policy.
If you keep the role - then the aws user specified by the AWS_PROFILE must have sts:AssumeRole to be able to use it -- I find this more complicated.
I found the docs to be difficult to use, and had to dig before I got things to work with AWS keys.
Prerequisite -- aws-cli installed, aws configure has run, aws s3 ls --profile myprofile works
You will want to create a new KMS key in the AWS console, assign a policy when creating it to allow admins to use manage and use it.
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Id": "key-consolepolicy-3",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "Enable IAM User Permissions",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": "arn:aws:iam:::root"
},
"Action": "kms:*",
"Resource": "*"
},
{
"Sid": "Allow access for Key Administrators",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": [
"arn:aws:iam::[AWS_ACCOUNT]:user/joe",
]
},
"Action": [
"kms:Create*",
"kms:Describe*",
"kms:Enable*",
"kms:List*",
"kms:Put*",
"kms:Update*",
"kms:Revoke*",
"kms:Disable*",
"kms:Get*",
"kms:Delete*",
"kms:TagResource",
"kms:UntagResource",
"kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion",
"kms:CancelKeyDeletion"
],
"Resource": "*"
},
{
"Sid": "Allow use of the key",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": [
"arn:aws:iam::[AWS_ACCOUNT]:user/devops",
]
},
"Action": [
"kms:Encrypt",
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:ReEncrypt*",
"kms:GenerateDataKey*",
"kms:DescribeKey"
],
"Resource": "*"
},
{
"Sid": "Allow attachment of persistent resources",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"AWS": [
"arn:aws:iam::[AWS_ACCOUNT]:user/devops",
]
},
"Action": [
"kms:CreateGrant",
"kms:ListGrants",
"kms:RevokeGrant"
],
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": {
"Bool": {
"kms:GrantIsForAWSResource": "true"
}
}
}
]
}
You need to create an IAM policy, and name it. (you may want to restrict the action a bit more)
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Id": "kms-key-policy-sops",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "kms:*",
"Resource": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-2:[AWS_ACCOUNT]:key/[ID]"
}
]
}
Assign the policy to one or more users (not the ones you gave access to in the key policy -- they already have access)
Switch to a git repo that you want to store secrets in, go to the root folder of repo
Create a new file called .sops.yaml
(root of repo) with content
creation_rules:
- path-regex: '*/**/*'
kms: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-2:[AWS_ACCOUNT]:key/[ID]'
Install the sops tool with brew, apt, yum, apk etc.
Export env variables to determine the AWS_PROFILE used. If you are not sure what AWS account the profile (in ~/.aws/credentials the thing in square brackets) is, run aws sts get-caller-identity. This must match the user you assigned the policy to in step 3
export AWS_PROFILE=myprofile
export AWS_SDK_LOAD_CONFIG=1
# instead of doing this you can also invoke sops with
# AWS_PROFILE=myprofile sops ..., but that can be more typing.
You're done.
sops test.yaml # should open vim, change something and exit
cat test.yaml. # should show encrypted
sops -d test.yaml # should show original unencrypted
It would also be good to have a terraform example to create the key / policy etc, like https://github.com/minamijoyo/terraform-kms-example, so that this can be done in code rather than with the AWS console.
This is also an issue with the role that is used to encrypt the secret is being persisted into the encrypted metadata and attempted to always be used in decryption.
SOPS config
creation_rules:
- kms: 'arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789:key/123456+arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/encrypt-role'
The encryption works fine, but it fails to decrypt because the role is persisted to the enc.yaml metadata file and in the where I am running the decrypt step does not have access to the original role used for encryption (it does have access to the KMS key using a separate role).
Example SOPS encrypted metadata with role hardcoded.
super_secret:
token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:asdasdasdasdasdas/wM=,iv:asdasdasdasdasdasd=,tag:asdasdasdasdasdasd==,type:str]
sops:
kms:
- arn: arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789:key/123456
role: arn:aws:iam::123456789:role/encrypt-role
created_at: '2020-07-14T18:28:18Z'
enc: stuff
aws_profile: ""
gcp_kms: []
azure_kv: []
lastmodified: '2020-07-14T18:28:19Z'
mac: mac-stuff
pgp: []
unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
version: 3.5.0
I'd like to voice my opinion on this: please do not deprecate this feature. The "confusion" of needing to have the same profiles as other users is not the responsibility, nor is it relevant, to the SOPS tool. It's a problem to be solved with policy and convention within a team. Removing this feature would force anyone using this tool to follow one very narrow convention.
If you are getting SOPS files with profiles in the file's config, then that's a breakdown of team collaboration, not a break in this tool. If someone is planning on sharing a file with someone (and those people don't use the same profile names), then they should not be using the --profile
option... They should be setting their profile via ENV vars (which won't add it to the config) when creating the file to be shared.
I'd like to, as an example, explain my team's use-case for SOPS. We "enforce" specifically-named AWS profiles for anyone working on our codebase. This makes our particular AWS account/IAM design much easier to maintain and implement. So, for our team, we expect and require any humans or machines decrypting the SOPS files to have those profiles present in their config. If the ability to store the profile in any given SOPS file's config is removed, our team would have to use a shim/wrapper around sops
to set the correct profile with env vars for a given SOPS file. This would be a step backwards for us. I'm sure there are other users that have similar use-cases or find storing the profile in config is useful or required.
In summary: deprecating this feature would move the burden of enforcing team standards from the teams to this tool.
@zhimsel thanks a lot for your feedback, it's good to hear from someone from the other side of the argument :)
I agree with what you say, pretty much. If you don't want to store the profile in the SOPS file, why do you even need to tell SOPS about it? I haven't used AWS in a while, but IIRC it's pretty easy to change profiles. Having heard this viewpoint, my stance is that we should document this better, and show users this is probably not what they want to do, but leave --profile
be.
I personally find it very hard to care about the difference in spelling between:
AWS_PROFILE=foo sops foo.yaml
and
sops --aws-profile=foo foo.yaml
But if there's some specific reason you care about this, I'd love to hear about it.
Just to add, being forced to use environment variables instead of the --aws-profile
flag would be a bit of a pain for people using SOPS from e.g. Powershell, because Powershell doesn't support inline definition of environment variables that apply to only a single command. Mind, that's more Powershell's problem than SOPS's, but, it's one reason someone might prefer the flag.
Having aws_profile
in the encrypted file has this issue:
In chronological order:
.sops.yaml
It's so annoying.. SOPS should work with ANY credentials it finds on the path, and for w/e reason always fails if aws_profile
is present, even if you have IRSA or anything else.
- Decryption on cluster by FluxCD starts working on removing "aws_profile" key from encrypted file.
Is there any good workaround for this or dirty hacks? I would also vote to do this in native way - the same way is on my side, I encrypt locally with profile and pass it to argoCD (which doesn't know anything about my local profile)
There is nothing wrong with having profile in the encrypted file. This matches the practice in many other tools, eg. terraform/terragrunt. The problem is with how you use the aws config profiles.
A practice that we found very useful is to name aws profile by access scope instead of the actual role name, and redefine it in different environments. For instance:
For developers:
[profile serviceA]
credential_process = aws configure export-credentials --profile=devops
[profile devops]
sso_start_url = ...
For CI/CD service:
[profile serviceA]
credential_source = Environment
By doing this, the sops yaml will always use aws_profile: serviceA
, and getting different credentials on different environments.
SOPS does not follow default credentials chain in that case. Which means it works exactly the opposite of many industry standard tools like aws cli or terraform.
terraform.
This is actually the standard aws sdk behavior, and has nothing to do with individual tool. If you specify profile for the session, it will skip the default cred provider chain entirely.
terraform.
This is actually the standard aws sdk behavior, and has nothing to do with individual tool. If you specify profile for the session, it will skip the default cred provider chain entirely.
We talk here about storing authentication configuration in the sops encrypted file. I might run terraform
with AWS_PROFILE
exported, but that does not mean it will store the profile in the provider
config..
Running sops
with the --aws-profile
flag will do exactly that - persist the config in the sops encrypted file - it should not do that.. .sops.yaml
should store the configuration for authentication method, not the encrypted file...
Another example - encrypting a file with kms key using aws --profile
will result in the key information being in the encrypted file, but it will exclude the method used to authenticate to aws api...
There seems to have been a number of issues surrounding our use of AWS profiles:
Storing the AWS Profile in the encrypted file breaks expectations because it cannot be decrypted on systems where that profile doesn't exist. This is very different from how folks are used to interacting with AWS.
I'd propose that we deprecate storing the aws profile within the key and instead require users to pass
--aws-profile
every time they want to use an AWS profile.