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ggicci / caddy-jwt

🆔 Caddy Module JWT Authentication
MIT License
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chore(deps): bump github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2 from 2.0.12 to 2.0.16 #65

Closed dependabot[bot] closed 10 months ago

dependabot[bot] commented 10 months ago

Bumps github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2 from 2.0.12 to 2.0.16.

Release notes

Sourced from github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2's releases.

v2.0.16

v2.0.16 31 Oct 2023
[Security]
  * [jws] ECDSA signature verification requires us to check if the signature
    is of the desired length of bytes, but this check that used to exist before
    had been removed in [#65](https://github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/issues/65), resulting in certain malformed signatures to pass
    verification.

One of the ways this could happen if R is a 31 byte integer and S is 32 byte integer,
both containing the correct signature values, but R is not zero-padded.

   Correct = R: [ 0 , ... ] (32 bytes) S: [ ... ] (32 bytes)
   Wrong   = R: [ ... ] (31 bytes)     S: [ ... ] (32 bytes)

In order for this check to pass, you would still need to have all 63 bytes
populated with the correct signature. The only modification a bad actor
may be able to do is to add one more byte at the end, in which case the
first 32 bytes (including what would have been S's first byte) is used for R,
and S would contain the rest. But this will only result in the verification to
fail. Therefore this in itself should not pose any security risk, albeit
allowing some illegally formated messages to be verified.



    

  • [jwk] jwk.Key objects now have a Validate() method to validate the data
stored in the keys. However, this still does not necessarily mean that the key's
are valid for use in cryptographic operations. If Validate() is successful,
it only means that the keys are in the right format, including the presence
of required fields and that certain fields have proper length, etc.
    • 



[New Features]


    

  • 

    [jws] Added jws.WithValidateKey() to force calling key.Validate() before
signing or verification.
    

    • 

  • 

    [jws] jws.Sign() now returns a special type of error that can hold the
individual errors from the signers. The stringification is still the same
as before to preserve backwards compatibility.
    

    • 

  • 

    [jwk] Added jwk.IsKeyValidationError that checks if an error is an error
from key.Validate().
    

    • 



[Bug Fixes]


    

  • [jwt] jwt.ParseInsecure() was running verification if you provided a key
via jwt.WithKey() or jwt.WithKeySet() (#1007)

v2.0.15

v2.0.15 19 20 Oct 2023
[Bug fixes]
  * [jws] jws.Sign() now properly check for valid algorithm / key type pair when
</tr></table>

... (truncated)

Changelog

Sourced from github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2's changelog.

v2.0.16 31 Oct 2023 [Security]

  • [jws] ECDSA signature verification requires us to check if the signature is of the desired length of bytes, but this check that used to exist before had been removed in #65, resulting in certain malformed signatures to pass verification.

    One of the ways this could happen if R is a 31 byte integer and S is 32 byte integer, both containing the correct signature values, but R is not zero-padded.

    Correct = R: [ 0 , ... ] (32 bytes) S: [ ... ] (32 bytes) Wrong = R: [ ... ] (31 bytes) S: [ ... ] (32 bytes)

    In order for this check to pass, you would still need to have all 63 bytes populated with the correct signature. The only modification a bad actor may be able to do is to add one more byte at the end, in which case the first 32 bytes (including what would have been S's first byte) is used for R, and S would contain the rest. But this will only result in the verification to fail. Therefore this in itself should not pose any security risk, albeit allowing some illegally formated messages to be verified.

  • [jwk] jwk.Key objects now have a Validate() method to validate the data stored in the keys. However, this still does not necessarily mean that the key's are valid for use in cryptographic operations. If Validate() is successful, it only means that the keys are in the right format, including the presence of required fields and that certain fields have proper length, etc.

[New Features]

  • [jws] Added jws.WithValidateKey() to force calling key.Validate() before signing or verification.

  • [jws] jws.Sign() now returns a special type of error that can hold the individual errors from the signers. The stringification is still the same as before to preserve backwards compatibility.

  • [jwk] Added jwk.IsKeyValidationError that checks if an error is an error from key.Validate().

[Bug Fixes]

  • [jwt] jwt.ParseInsecure() was running verification if you provided a key via jwt.WithKey() or jwt.WithKeySet() (#1007)

v2.0.15 19 20 Oct 2023 [Bug fixes]

  • [jws] jws.Sign() now properly check for valid algorithm / key type pair when the key implements crypto.Signer. This was caused by the fact that when jws.WithKey() accepted keys that implemented crypto.Signer, there really is no way to robustly check what algorithm the crypto.Signer implements.

    The code has now been modified to check for KNOWN key types, i.e. those

... (truncated)

Commits


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codecov-commenter commented 10 months ago

Codecov Report

All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests :white_check_mark:

Comparison is base (0ee1dc3) 96.26% compared to head (04f334d) 96.26%.

Additional details and impacted files ```diff @@ Coverage Diff @@ ## main #65 +/- ## ======================================= Coverage 96.26% 96.26% ======================================= Files 2 2 Lines 321 321 ======================================= Hits 309 309 Misses 10 10 Partials 2 2 ``` | [Flag](https://app.codecov.io/gh/ggicci/caddy-jwt/pull/65/flags?src=pr&el=flags&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=github&utm_content=comment&utm_campaign=pr+comments&utm_term=Ggicci) | Coverage Δ | | |---|---|---| | [unittests](https://app.codecov.io/gh/ggicci/caddy-jwt/pull/65/flags?src=pr&el=flag&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=github&utm_content=comment&utm_campaign=pr+comments&utm_term=Ggicci) | `96.26% <ø> (ø)` | | Flags with carried forward coverage won't be shown. [Click here](https://docs.codecov.io/docs/carryforward-flags?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=github&utm_content=comment&utm_campaign=pr+comments&utm_term=Ggicci#carryforward-flags-in-the-pull-request-comment) to find out more.

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dependabot[bot] commented 10 months ago

Superseded by #66.