migrate plain-text secrets to keystore

[Byron]

Remove plain-text secrets from various configuration files and put them into the keystore instead.

This is a similar move as the one done by the gh command-line tool recently, which now also stores its secrets (like the GitHub authentication token) in the keystore.

Tasks

• [x] migrate user-related tokens
  • [x] assure different build types (i.e. nightly, dev, production) are reasonably isolated
  • [x] assure tests are isolated
  • [x] assure Sensitive fields won't be serialized (but they need to be deserialized for migration)
  • [x] assure frontend still sees secrets
  • [x] for safety, delete the user if the access token isn't in the secrets store anymore
• [x] setting the password to an empty string should delete it from the keychain
  • (even though empty string is fine for MacOS at least, but that might not be the case everywhere)
• [x] upgrade secrets storage to avoid keyring popups on MacOS
  • [x] https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/pull/1427
  • [x] use gix from main with explicit rev
• [x] migrate AI related tokens
  • [x] assure that these settings are truly global, with secrets spanning all application kinds
• [x] validate on Windows (access_token only)
• [x] validate on Ubunutu
• [x] validate on MacOS (access_token and github token)

Platform Notes

• On MacOS - Dev Mode

  • it asks for access to the secret each time the binary changes. gh doesn't have this problem, as it appears to use the Git credential helpers (which are stable, binary-wise).
  • With the recent updates to gitoxide it finds git executables more thoroughly, enabling credentials to be used. I think the custom keychain should be the level-2 store, with git-credentials being the one tried first.

• On MacOS - Nightly Build

  • No popup was observed, not even after a restart.
  • a github login worked fine as well (and apparently, empty passwords are allowed)
  • auto-deletion of GItHub credentials works as well
  • This is how secrets look like now, so each entry is easily identifiable.

• On Windows

  • login doesn't work, it says there was an error in the browser (edge). probably something about the backend that it uses there.
  • using a dev-user.json from MacOS on Windows does work though, and it successfully creates and deletes secrets in whatever secret-store Windows has the Credential Manager. I.e. it can remove the secret from the plain file, access it from the secret store, and delete it from the secret store once the user is signed out.

• On Ubuntu 22.04

  • The login doesn't work, similarly to Windows. It's probably the same, with :https://auth.gitbutler.com/login/callback?error=redirect_uri_mismatch&error_description=The+redirect_uri+MUST+match+the+registered+callback+URL+for+this+application.&error_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.github.com%2Fapps%2Fmanaging-oauth-apps%2Ftroubleshooting-authorization-request-errors%2F%23redirect-uri-mismatch&state=IqB-c-28IA0egwI-dqs39UEY_7ZpZ0Zn
  • passwords manager access works without popup, tried read, write and deletion via GitButler.
  • There is no popups, despite rebuilds and thus changed binaries.

Notes for the Reviewer

• ❗️The secrets implementation on MacOS is different between dev and nightly/production builds. For proper testing, one must also build the nightly locally.
  • On other platforms, it's fine to use the dev-build for testing - they all use the system keychain.
  • On MacOS, dev build, a git-credential based keystore implementation needed to prevent nagging popups.
• ❗️Windows and Linux testing was done with an older version that stored passwords under different names, but since the keychain implementation didn't change I'd assume it works like before. However, I only logged in, so never created multiple secrets. That might be something to test as well, easiest by setting the OpenAI and Antrophic API keys.
• Frontend
  • The frontend still receives a struct just like before, with secrets being mere strings. For this PR I avoided changes there, but it would certainly be advisable to develop some strategy on how to handle secrets in the frontend. Right now it's easy to spill them, or to send them to remote locations (i.e. log them). In Rust, that's impossible now.
  • There is some duplication and the most naive implementation that makes this work you can imagine. My recommendation (and hope) is that the cleanup can be done by someone who has a proper dev setup for this and… is more experience in the ways of the frontend :).
  • I could have imagined to use a real implementation of the respective service and mock the invoke call instead. But since this wasn't done and I wanted to keep my frontend time short, I just implemented it directly without creating a SecretService with respective mock-tests using that. However, this is probably what should be created at some point once more secrets are used.

[Byron]

I declare it ready for review despite the Frontend-based CI failures. @mtsgrd offered help in turning the naive current implementation into something maintainable much faster and better than I could do it. Thus, I will stop force-pushing here and will at most push fixes on top if @krlvi finds issues during testing.

[gitguardian[bot]]

⚠️ GitGuardian has uncovered 1 secret following the scan of your pull request.

Please consider investigating the findings and remediating the incidents. Failure to do so may lead to compromising the associated services or software components.

🔎 Detected hardcoded secret in your pull request

| GitGuardian id | GitGuardian status | Secret | Commit | Filename | | | -------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------ | ---------------- | --------------- | -------------------- | | [-](https://dashboard.gitguardian.com/workspace/495881/incidents/secrets) | | Generic High Entropy Secret | b0ababbabf1164b8e83b923c3d124b2780d743cf | app/src/lib/ai/service.test.ts | [View secret](https://github.com/gitbutlerapp/gitbutler/commit/b0ababbabf1164b8e83b923c3d124b2780d743cf#diff-806b07fa44fb9bbaf589ff8acacfb1e2f53a8091b7ae716b7e0100e0c72a4a5aL186) |

🛠 Guidelines to remediate hardcoded secrets

1. Understand the implications of revoking this secret by investigating where it is used in your code. 2. Replace and store your secret safely. [Learn here](https://blog.gitguardian.com/secrets-api-management?utm_source=product&utm_medium=GitHub_checks&utm_campaign=check_run_comment) the best practices. 3. Revoke and [rotate this secret](https://docs.gitguardian.com/secrets-detection/secrets-detection-engine/detectors/generics/generic_high_entropy_secret#revoke-the-secret?utm_source=product&utm_medium=GitHub_checks&utm_campaign=check_run_comment). 4. If possible, [rewrite git history](https://blog.gitguardian.com/rewriting-git-history-cheatsheet?utm_source=product&utm_medium=GitHub_checks&utm_campaign=check_run_comment). Rewriting git history is not a trivial act. You might completely break other contributing developers' workflow and you risk accidentally deleting legitimate data. To avoid such incidents in the future consider - following these [best practices](https://blog.gitguardian.com/secrets-api-management/?utm_source=product&utm_medium=GitHub_checks&utm_campaign=check_run_comment) for managing and storing secrets including API keys and other credentials - install [secret detection on pre-commit](https://docs.gitguardian.com/ggshield-docs/integrations/git-hooks/pre-commit?utm_source=product&utm_medium=GitHub_checks&utm_campaign=check_run_comment) to catch secret before it leaves your machine and ease remediation.

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^{🦉 GitGuardian detects secrets in your source code to help developers and security teams secure the modern development process. You are seeing this because you or someone else with access to this repository has authorized GitGuardian to scan your pull request.}

[mtsgrd]

@Byron thanks, I've pushed a commit splitting out a separate service for the secrets. Could you have a look and make sure things still work as expected?