x/vulndb: potential Go vuln in github.com/tendermint/tendermint: GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p

[GoVulnBot]

In GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p, there is a vulnerability in the following Go packages or modules:

Unit	Fixed	Vulnerable Ranges
github.com/tendermint/tendermint	0.34.9	>= 0.34.0, < 0.34.9

See doc/triage.md for instructions on how to triage this report.

package: github.com/tendermint/tendermint
versions:
  - introduced: v0.34.0
    fixed: v0.34.9
description: "_The root cause of this security vulnerability is in the Tendermint
    specification, and this advisory is a duplicate of https://github.com/tendermint/spec/security/advisories/GHSA-jqfc-687g-59pw._\n\n\n###
    Impact\nTendermint light clients running versions 0.34.0 to 0.34.8 are unable
    to detect and punish a new kind of attack. We’re calling this a “forward lunatic
    attack,” or FLA. The severity of this vulnerability is _moderate_. \n\nNote that
    an FLA cannot be successfully executed unless there are already ⅓+ Byzantine validators,
    and therefore outside of Tendermint’s security model; however, it is important
    to be able to detect and punish these kinds of attacks in order to incentivize
    correct behavior.\n\nIn an FLA, an attacking validator (with ⅓+ voting power)
    signs commit messages for arbitrary application state associated with a block
    height that hasn’t been seen yet, hence the name “forward lunatic attacks.” A
    malicious validator effectively executes a [lunatic attack](https://docs.tendermint.com/master/spec/light-client/accountability/#the-misbehavior-of-faulty-validators),
    but signs messages for a target block that is higher than the current block. This
    can be dangerous: Typically, misbehavior evidence is only created when there are
    conflicting blocks at the same height, but by targeting a block height that is
    far “ahead” of the current chain height, it’s possible that the chain will not
    produce a (conflicting) block at the target height in time to create evidence.
    \n\nPrior to Tendermint v0.34.9, the light client could accept a bad header from
    its primary witness, and would not be able to form evidence of this deception,
    even if all the secondary witnesses were correct. Because the light client is
    responsible for verifying cross-chain state for IBC, a successful FLA could result
    in loss of funds. However, it is important to note that FLAs are only possible
    outside the Tendermint security model. \n\nAll FLAs, attempted and successful,
    leave traces of provable misbehavior on-chain. A faulty header contains signatures
    from the faulty validator, and even in unpatched versions of Tendermint Core,
    networks could use social consensus (off-chain action) to recover the network.
    The patches introduced in Tendermint Core v0.34.9 handle all evidence automatically
    and on-chain. \n\nNote that this fix also allows for successful automatic reporting
    of FLAs, even after a chain halt. By adding a time to FetchBlock, light clients
    effectively have a backup way to determine if a halted chain should have continued,
    and it will be able to submit evidence as soon as the chain resumes. \n\n### Patches\nThis
    problem has been patched in Tendermint Core v0.34.9. \n\n### Workarounds\nThere
    are no workarounds. All users are recommended to upgrade to Tendermint Core v0.34.9
    at their earliest possible convenience. \n\n### Credits\n\nThank you to @MaximilianDiez
    for originally surfacing this issue, and to @cmwaters, @josef-widder, and @milosevic
    for creating fixes at both the implementation and specification level.\n\n###
    For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n*
    Open an issue in [tendermint/tendermint](https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint)\n*
    Email us at [security@tendermint.com](mailto:security@tendermint.com)"
published: 2021-12-20T18:17:41Z
last_modified: 2021-12-20T18:17:41Z
ghsas:
  - GHSA-f3w5-v9xx-rp8p

[neild]

Vulnerability in tool.

[gopherbot]

Change https://go.dev/cl/592767 mentions this issue: data/reports: unexclude 50 reports