Open dvyukov opened 7 years ago
FTR, a bunch of recent double-fetch bugs in Linux kernel:
commit f16b613ca8b3e4960cdc5575e9b8e1dbdd7d54d5
Author: Wenwen Wang
Date: Fri May 18 14:55:35 2018 -0500
crypto: chtls - fix a missing-check bug
In do_chtls_setsockopt(), the tls crypto info is first copied from the
poiner 'optval' in userspace and saved to 'tmp_crypto_info'. Then the
'version' of the crypto info is checked. If the version is not as expected,
i.e., TLS_1_2_VERSION, error code -ENOTSUPP is returned to indicate that
the provided crypto info is not supported yet. Then, the 'cipher_type'
field of the 'tmp_crypto_info' is also checked to see if it is
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128. If it is, the whole struct of
tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 is copied from the pointer 'optval' and then
the function chtls_setkey() is invoked to set the key.
Given that the 'optval' pointer resides in userspace, a malicious userspace
process can race to change the data pointed by 'optval' between the two
copies. For example, a user can provide a crypto info with TLS_1_2_VERSION
and TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128. After the first copy, the user can modify the
'version' and the 'cipher_type' fields to any versions and/or cipher types
that are not allowed. This way, the user can bypass the checks, inject
bad data to the kernel, cause chtls_setkey() to set a wrong key or other
issues.
This patch reuses the data copied in the first try so as to ensure these
checks will not be bypassed.
commit 6009d1fe6ba3bb2dab55921da60465329cc1cd89
Author: Wenwen Wang
Date: Mon May 21 01:58:07 2018 -0500
isdn: eicon: fix a missing-check bug
In divasmain.c, the function divas_write() firstly invokes the function
diva_xdi_open_adapter() to open the adapter that matches with the adapter
number provided by the user, and then invokes the function diva_xdi_write()
to perform the write operation using the matched adapter. The two functions
diva_xdi_open_adapter() and diva_xdi_write() are located in diva.c.
In diva_xdi_open_adapter(), the user command is copied to the object 'msg'
from the userspace pointer 'src' through the function pointer 'cp_fn',
which eventually calls copy_from_user() to do the copy. Then, the adapter
number 'msg.adapter' is used to find out a matched adapter from the
'adapter_queue'. A matched adapter will be returned if it is found.
Otherwise, NULL is returned to indicate the failure of the verification on
the adapter number.
As mentioned above, if a matched adapter is returned, the function
diva_xdi_write() is invoked to perform the write operation. In this
function, the user command is copied once again from the userspace pointer
'src', which is the same as the 'src' pointer in diva_xdi_open_adapter() as
both of them are from the 'buf' pointer in divas_write(). Similarly, the
copy is achieved through the function pointer 'cp_fn', which finally calls
copy_from_user(). After the successful copy, the corresponding command
processing handler of the matched adapter is invoked to perform the write
operation.
It is obvious that there are two copies here from userspace, one is in
diva_xdi_open_adapter(), and one is in diva_xdi_write(). Plus, both of
these two copies share the same source userspace pointer, i.e., the 'buf'
pointer in divas_write(). Given that a malicious userspace process can race
to change the content pointed by the 'buf' pointer, this can pose potential
security issues. For example, in the first copy, the user provides a valid
adapter number to pass the verification process and a valid adapter can be
found. Then the user can modify the adapter number to an invalid number.
This way, the user can bypass the verification process of the adapter
number and inject inconsistent data.
This patch reuses the data copied in
diva_xdi_open_adapter() and passes it to diva_xdi_write(). This way, the
above issues can be avoided.
commit bd23a7269834dc7c1f93e83535d16ebc44b75eba
Author: Wenwen Wang
Date: Tue May 8 08:50:28 2018 -0500
virt: vbox: Only copy_from_user the request-header once
In vbg_misc_device_ioctl(), the header of the ioctl argument is copied from
the userspace pointer 'arg' and saved to the kernel object 'hdr'. Then the
'version', 'size_in', and 'size_out' fields of 'hdr' are verified.
Before this commit, after the checks a buffer for the entire request would
be allocated and then all data including the verified header would be
copied from the userspace 'arg' pointer again.
Given that the 'arg' pointer resides in userspace, a malicious userspace
process can race to change the data pointed to by 'arg' between the two
copies. By doing so, the user can bypass the verifications on the ioctl
argument.
This commit fixes this by using the already checked copy of the header
to fill the header part of the allocated buffer and only copying the
remainder of the data from userspace.
commit 3f12888dfae2a48741c4caa9214885b3aaf350f9
Author: Wenwen Wang
Date: Sat May 5 13:38:03 2018 -0500
ALSA: control: fix a redundant-copy issue
In snd_ctl_elem_add_compat(), the fields of the struct 'data' need to be
copied from the corresponding fields of the struct 'data32' in userspace.
This is achieved by invoking copy_from_user() and get_user() functions. The
problem here is that the 'type' field is copied twice. One is by
copy_from_user() and one is by get_user(). Given that the 'type' field is
not used between the two copies, the second copy is *completely* redundant
and should be removed for better performance and cleanup. Also, these two
copies can cause inconsistent data: as the struct 'data32' resides in
userspace and a malicious userspace process can race to change the 'type'
field between the two copies to cause inconsistent data. Depending on how
the data is used in the future, such an inconsistency may cause potential
security risks.
For above reasons, we should take out the second copy.
commit dc487321b1e6ab27f545fd8826ce3f76b01b63c2
Author: Wenwen Wang
Date: Mon Apr 30 17:56:10 2018 -0500
staging: lustre: llite: fix potential missing-check bug when copying lumv
In ll_dir_ioctl(), the object lumv3 is firstly copied from the user space
using Its address, i.e., lumv1 = &lumv3. If the lmm_magic field of lumv3 is
LOV_USER_MAGIC_V3, lumv3 will be modified by the second copy from the user
space. The second copy is necessary, because the two versions (i.e.,
lov_user_md_v1 and lov_user_md_v3) have different data formats and lengths.
However, given that the user data resides in the user space, a malicious
user-space process can race to change the data between the two copies. By
doing so, the attacker can provide a data with an inconsistent version,
e.g., v1 version + v3 data. This can lead to logical errors in the
following execution in ll_dir_setstripe(), which performs different actions
according to the version specified by the field lmm_magic.
This patch rechecks the version field lmm_magic in the second copy. If the
version is not as expected, i.e., LOV_USER_MAGIC_V3, an error code will be
returned: -EINVAL.
commit d656fe49e33df48ee6bc19e871f5862f49895c9e
Author: Wenwen Wang
Date: Mon Apr 30 12:31:13 2018 -0500
ethtool: fix a potential missing-check bug
In ethtool_get_rxnfc(), the object "info" is firstly copied from
user-space. If the FLOW_RSS flag is set in the member field flow_type of
"info" (and cmd is ETHTOOL_GRXFH), info needs to be copied again from
user-space because FLOW_RSS is newer and has new definition, as mentioned
in the comment. However, given that the user data resides in user-space, a
malicious user can race to change the data after the first copy. By doing
so, the user can inject inconsistent data. For example, in the second
copy, the FLOW_RSS flag could be cleared in the field flow_type of "info".
In the following execution, "info" will be used in the function
ops->get_rxnfc(). Such inconsistent data can potentially lead to unexpected
information leakage since ops->get_rxnfc() will prepare various types of
data according to flow_type, and the prepared data will be eventually
copied to user-space. This inconsistent data may also cause undefined
behaviors based on how ops->get_rxnfc() is implemented.
This patch simply re-verifies the flow_type field of "info" after the
second copy. If the value is not as expected, an error code will be
returned.
FTR a TOCTOU vulnerability in FreeBSD: https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-20:23.sendmsg.asc
Here is the corresponding kernel change: https://github.com/Merna177/linux/pull/1
Double-fetch (aka TOCTOU) is a class of bugs where kernel code executes
copy_from_user
twice for the same user region and expects that contents do not change. See: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-wang.pdf https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/42189.pdf The first work has identified 5 double-fetch bugs in Linux kernel.We may consider to provoke them more actively somehow by changing the data in another thread. And/or detect potential TOCTOU cases. E.g. instrument copy_from_user and memorize copied regions in task context and report when a syscall fetches the same range more than once.