Closed renovate[bot] closed 1 month ago
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In order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the go get
command, which resulted in the following additional change(s):
go
directive was updated for compatibility reasonsDetails:
Package | Change |
---|---|
go |
1.20 -> 1.22.5 |
go.opentelemetry.io/otel |
v1.21.0 -> v1.28.0 |
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric |
v1.21.0 -> v1.28.0 |
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace |
v1.21.0 -> v1.28.0 |
github.com/go-logr/logr |
v1.3.0 -> v1.4.2 |
This PR contains the following updates:
v24.0.6+incompatible
->v25.0.6+incompatible
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
GHSA-jq35-85cj-fj4p
Intel's RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) feature, introduced by the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture, provides software insights into hardware energy consumption. To facilitate this, Intel introduced the powercap framework in Linux kernel 3.13, which reads values via relevant MSRs (model specific registers) and provides unprivileged userspace access via
sysfs
. As RAPL is an interface to access a hardware feature, it is only available when running on bare metal with the module compiled into the kernel.By 2019, it was realized that in some cases unprivileged access to RAPL readings could be exploited as a power-based side-channel against security features including AES-NI (potentially inside a SGX enclave) and KASLR (kernel address space layout randomization). Also known as the PLATYPUS attack, Intel assigned CVE-2020-8694 and CVE-2020-8695, and AMD assigned CVE-2020-12912.
Several mitigations were applied; Intel reduced the sampling resolution via a microcode update, and the Linux kernel prevents access by non-root users since 5.10. However, this kernel-based mitigation does not apply to many container-based scenarios:
sysfs
is mounted inside containers read-only; however only read access is needed to carry out this attack on an unpatched CPUWhile this is not a direct vulnerability in container runtimes, defense in depth and safe defaults are valuable and preferred, especially as this poses a risk to multi-tenant container environments running directly on affected hardware. This is provided by masking
/sys/devices/virtual/powercap
in the default mount configuration, and adding an additional set of rules to deny it in the default AppArmor profile.While
sysfs
is not the only way to read from the RAPL subsystem, other ways of accessing it require additional capabilities such asCAP_SYS_RAWIO
which is not available to containers by default, orperf
paranoia level less than 1, which is a non-default kernel tunable.References
CVE-2024-24557
The classic builder cache system is prone to cache poisoning if the image is built
FROM scratch
. Also, changes to some instructions (most important beingHEALTHCHECK
andONBUILD
) would not cause a cache miss.An attacker with the knowledge of the Dockerfile someone is using could poison their cache by making them pull a specially crafted image that would be considered as a valid cache candidate for some build steps.
For example, an attacker could create an image that is considered as a valid cache candidate for:
when in fact the malicious image used as a cache would be an image built from a different Dockerfile.
In the second case, the attacker could for example substitute a different
HEALTCHECK
command.Impact
23.0+ users are only affected if they explicitly opted out of Buildkit (
DOCKER_BUILDKIT=0
environment variable) or are using the/build
API endpoint (which uses the classic builder by default).All users on versions older than 23.0 could be impacted. An example could be a CI with a shared cache, or just a regular Docker user pulling a malicious image due to misspelling/typosquatting.
Image build API endpoint (
/build
) andImageBuild
function fromgithub.com/docker/docker/client
is also affected as it the uses classic builder by default.Patches
Patches are included in Moby releases:
Workarounds
--no-cache
or use Buildkit if possible (DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1
, it's default on 23.0+ assuming that the buildx plugin is installed).Version = types.BuilderBuildKit
orNoCache = true
inImageBuildOptions
forImageBuild
call.CVE-2024-41110
A security vulnerability has been detected in certain versions of Docker Engine, which could allow an attacker to bypass authorization plugins (AuthZ) under specific circumstances. The base likelihood of this being exploited is low. This advisory outlines the issue, identifies the affected versions, and provides remediation steps for impacted users.
Impact
Using a specially-crafted API request, an Engine API client could make the daemon forward the request or response to an authorization plugin without the body. In certain circumstances, the authorization plugin may allow a request which it would have otherwise denied if the body had been forwarded to it.
A security issue was discovered In 2018, where an attacker could bypass AuthZ plugins using a specially crafted API request. This could lead to unauthorized actions, including privilege escalation. Although this issue was fixed in Docker Engine v18.09.1 in January 2019, the fix was not carried forward to later major versions, resulting in a regression. Anyone who depends on authorization plugins that introspect the request and/or response body to make access control decisions is potentially impacted.
Docker EE v19.03.x and all versions of Mirantis Container Runtime are not vulnerable.
Vulnerability details
Patches
Remediation steps
References
Release Notes
docker/docker (github.com/docker/docker)
### [`v25.0.6+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.5...v25.0.6) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.5...v25.0.6) ### [`v25.0.5+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.4...v25.0.5) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.4...v25.0.5) ### [`v25.0.4+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.3...v25.0.4) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.3...v25.0.4) ### [`v25.0.3+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.2...v25.0.3) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.2...v25.0.3) ### [`v25.0.2+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.1...v25.0.2) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.1...v25.0.2) ### [`v25.0.1+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.0...v25.0.1) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v25.0.0...v25.0.1) ### [`v25.0.0+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.9...v25.0.0) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.9...v25.0.0) ### [`v24.0.9+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.8...v24.0.9) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.8...v24.0.9) ### [`v24.0.8+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.7...v24.0.8) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.7...v24.0.8) ### [`v24.0.7+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.6...v24.0.7) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v24.0.6...v24.0.7)Configuration
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