Open jring-o opened 3 years ago
barton2526
commented
3 years ago We could vote on it or not.
It is my view (and probably many others) that a proposal of this kind of expenditure requires a vote, as previously mandated by the poll proposal document.
KeithMyers
commented
3 years ago Looks reasonable to me. Should go to a vote I think.
jamescowens
commented
3 years ago @barton2526 is correct. It absolutely has to be put up for a vote.
Phieyl
commented
3 years ago If you do decide to issue this for vote may I nominate that @startail#3359 and @Delta#9258 Get added for developer compensation for their work on Gricoinstats.eu and the Gridcoin Wallet Bot on Discord?
Nethlek
commented
3 years ago I already objected to this on Discord, but I'm going to do it here to. My main complaint is the complete lack of transparency for each individual figure, especially non-dev contributions. I asked roboticmind about the 5k you want to award him and he told me he has no idea how you arrived at that figure and that he never stated how long he worked on the wiki to the best of his memory.
Furthermore I challenge the 5k you want to award yourself, which I'm going to assume is because of the Fireside (feel free to correct me if that assumption is inaccurate). There was never any spending approved for this and to bill the foundation after the fact strikes me as an underhanded tactic. I am of the conviction that if you want to get paid for something like that, you have to get it approved before you can bill for your time, not retroactively. That would create a precedent that I for one would want to avoid. Regardless of the nature of this figure, I would still challenge you to produce an itemized invoice to justify it independent from my objection.
Additionally I would challenge you on receiving any funds in lieu of the fact that you already received a substantial amount to develop gridcoin.world a considerable time ago and the website is still half broken. I would challenge you to produce an itemized invoice for those funds and justify why the website is still not working properly before you can even be considered for receiving any further funding.
I also agree with Barton and Jim that a proposal of this nature absolutely requires a vote.
Edit: I was misinformed about the website. It turns out no money has been forwarded yet. Apologies
Vortac2
commented
3 years ago Allocating the majority of Foundation funds in a single vote is completely unprecedented and will probably surprise the investors (to put it mildly). We should approach this more carefully. During the last spike (when the price was around 10 cents) it was a lengthy process to obtain even 100k GRC from the Foundation for some basic advertising, let alone millions.
IMO, the proposal should be first split into three votes (as outlined in the original post): current dev work, past dev work, non-dev work. The payout window should be extended to 24 months (or even longer). To provide some additional supervision, the proposal can be revalidated by another vote in 12 months. Such a 'step by step' approach will hopefully instill more trust and won't look like a sudden decision coming out of blue.
nate-simpson
commented
3 years ago Pasting from Slack with minor edits:
Not at all against compensating developers, but I am firmly against doing it at "market rates." We should be doing it in GRC in rates we set with an eye to hopeful future values, not dumping 45% of the foundation and a couple of percentage points of the entire supply potentially back onto the market (not that anyone necessarily would, but it is a possibility) at once. What those rates should be, don't know.
Regardless, I hardly see how this restores credibility or moves forward. The proposed $30 rate is a joke to a real developer anyway and the inability to liquidate these amounts of GRC without crashing the price even more means that this compensates nobody and incentivizes nobody. It feels like more of the same thing this community has always done -- throw foundation/dev funds around somewhat arbitrarily with no real plan and hope it leads somewhere.
(To be clear, Jim / Cy / ravon / others I'm not thinking of have restored credibility to the dev side of the coin and are the only reason this thing isn't totally dead already, and I'm not against rewarding them for it, but this both under- and over-rewards at the same time.)
Nethlek
commented
3 years ago It was brought to my attention that I was wrong. I was informed that the funds for gridcoin.world had already been paid out but that turned out to have been inaccurate. I apologize for this but the rest of my objections stand.
RoboticMind
commented
3 years ago I agree with Vortac that it would be a very good idea to split this up into different proposals for a vote. I also think that there would need to be some more specific information about what exactly these programs would entail. For instance I don't know if I know what the bounty program entails. Is it a program for placing a bounty for specific development issues? Can it reach out to any non-code development? I understand that this is for starting a discussion, but I think this is important to know to get one rolling
As for the Paying Non-dev Contributors for Past Work section, I think it that it would need to give information about what the payments are for and how the what the rates came from. I assume for me the reason I'm included is for the gridcoin.us work and the wiki work, but there's a lot of people who aren't really following Gridcoin that closely that might not know that. Similar for other story for the people listed there
In general I think there needs to be some more information about each piece. It's a little tricky to discuss without more information. I like some of the ideas here, so I think some clarification in the discussion or edits to the original post would be a good way to get this moving forward
stevel20286
commented
3 years ago What if the developers and contributors were paid in GRC and the GRC was held in “escrow” until the gridcoin price reached a certain level. Currently the amount of GRC is equal to about $160k which is not enough to adequately reward anyone fairly for their efforts, yet if the GRC value was to increase to 10c/GRC that would mean that the funds available to pay for development are $1.6m. Values here are just used as an example. I think that the developers have gone long enough without pay so I think it’s fair to assume that none of them are on the bones of their ass and need cash now, so if some sort of bond was issued now for a percentage of the GRC held in the foundation I think that solves the issue of them being paid. I see no point in blowing all of the foundations funds when they are worth practically nothing. it make much much sense to issue a promise of payment now that can be redeemed once the GRC value is suitable. this happens all the time on the stock market with performance rights
Nethlek
commented
3 years ago And what if it never reaches 10 cents? I strongly disagree that we should hold their compensation hostage and I would be surprised if such a measure was even legal to begin with. I'm not a lawyer so what do I know but this does not sound above board in the slightest. Hard pass on that suggestion.
jring-o
commented
3 years ago The Foundation problem has been openly discussed for a while now. Here's an attempt to catch everyone up.
Gridcoin was the first implementation of blockchain<->cryptocurrency that opened my eyes to the potential of the technology. I feel like that might be the case for many people here. It would be a shame to lose it.
To be absolutely clear: The continuation of Gridcoin is at stake here.
The main point of this proposal is to use or otherwise allocate the foundation funds for near-mid term use. The next step would be to determine a method for funding future development. Despite the brilliant concept and massive potential of Gridcoin, if these two things are not done I (and probably others) would struggle to see a future for Gridcoin and would have to reconsider the time I spend contributing to the project.
If this were my proposal alone, I would suggest 50% of funds go to Cy and Jim. They know how to distribute funds and to whom. And since they saved the codebase, this is their coin. 25% would go to directly incentivize adoption by growing the number of staking participants. 25% would go to the formation of a non-profit.
Instead what is proposed is 50% to Cy and Jim. A small percentage to non-dev contributors. And the creation of structures that can be absorbed into a non-profit should the time ever come.
The two polls
The funding rate for Dev work was agreed at $30/hr some years ago. Most everyone is aware of the deficiencies of the system in place, including the laughable rate and liquidity problems, but it's the best we had at the time. Other ideas are welcome.
Ultimately a USD:GRC translation is ridiculous due to these deficiencies and the realities of the technology itself. The point of GRC is to hold stake and participate in the network, not to translate it to USD; As with all PoSblockchain<->cryptocurrency pairs, GRC represents two things:
1 BTC = 1 BTC. 1 DOGE = 1 DOGE. 1 GRC = 1 GRC.
We just need to build a thing worth building -- a thing that can justify its own existence.
Building something for speculation on where the thing might bring the USD translation of a GRC, and any proposal based on speculation is unethical, dangerous, and irresponsible. If anything, we should assume that the USD translation of a GRC will be 0. I would argue, then, that we should drop the USD translations altogether and assign direct value to a GRC. I expect that I am an outlier on this extreme, but let's at the very least maintain current market translation and leave speculation out of anything we propose or build.
For non-dev payment I chose numbers based on the above concepts. The USD number listed is to help people relate to the translated value.
The point here is that GRC is a representation of stake in the network. It is required to interact with the blockchain and to use whatever tools we develop on top of the chain. For now, because of our PoS system, voting, and ERR distribution mechanisms, those with more GRC can be said to run the network. The developers of Fern and other contributors in the document should run the network. This is their coin. The do not currently run the network. If we give them the foundation, they will. Considering their past behavior as evidence, they will likely use the funds to attempt to create a network effect, to fund developments, and to jump-start other initiatives. They are very unlikely to sell their GRC for this reason and because they understand the liquidity problem.
We should consider that the proposed recipients of the funds are all long-term contributors who have outstanding reputations in the community. They also regularly distribute their own GRC holdings in order to boost community engagement, morale, and to do what the whales should have been doing all these years: attempt to create a network effect. As already stated, it is very unlikely they will sell any but a small amount of their stake in the network.
I personally think that Cy and Jim could receive all the funds as they know how to manage funds and are ridiculously reasonable.
I think adding Startail and Delta is a great idea.
I'd propose they get 500,000 GRC each.
I'm fine with not paying myself. I'm not fine with everyone else in this doc not getting paid.
I support the treasury model. I would support a reasonable fork and reset if it has developer support. I would never support a donation-based model.
The future development program would be a program run by Jim. He would use the funds to pay developers for their work. Think codebase maintenance, testnet, and specific non-major developments.
Bounties would be made for specific tasks, any tasks. The people in charge would decide if the requirements were met upon completion. The payments would be made if everything is done well.
ZigzagoonBalloon
commented
3 years ago Just adding my comment from Discord as it hasn't been touched on. Non-dev work is very vague, it would be nice to have a greater explanation of what work is actually being rewarded for those out of the loop (including me for some of them).
In terms of The Fireside, while I do enjoy listening to it most of the time, I personally wouldn't consider it a professional podcast due to its very casual nature. Compare it to The BOINC Radio podcast, which has a clear and well-defined structure and no people talking over each other or going off on abstract tangents. It's a stretch to ask money for it if that is what you're asking it for.
Also just chucking in my support to decoupling from USD. I think all future proposals should only use USD values as a guide at most (current Dogecoin situation shows us how wild the prices can be, 1 Elon tweet could probably take us to $1). 1 GRC = 1GRC and as long as BOINC exists Gridcoin will have a value separate to its market value.
jring-o
commented
3 years ago Audio discussion on the subject with primary input from myself, Jim, and Chocolate.
skcin
commented
3 years ago Hey, first of all thanks to @jamescowens and @cyrossignol for their great work. To be clear, if you want to go through with this and want to get payed those coins I will support it. You really did a great job.
I do not want to make any suggestions on how many coins Jim and Cy (or anyone else) should get because it is very hard to argue against them deserving the payments. I just wanted to comment on a few topics and present an idea how the funds could be used more sustainable in the future.
After listening to @jring-o podcast and giving this some thought I identified 4 key questions:
I agree with Jringo that Gridcoin is experimental and should not be considered as an investment for money you can't afford to lose. However alot of the problems related to this discussion are tied to the value of GRC. (denominated in USD or any other unit of account) Not only the foundation funds but also the marketcapitalization and on exchange liquidity govern the amount of payments the Gridcoin network can sustainably distribute without completely crashing the price. By answering the above questions I want to try to explain my rough idea of how the management of funds could be handled in the future.
• abandon the fixed 30$/hr rate • release 20% of the funds total value per year (this ensures that the funds are not drained quickly) • distribute these yearly released funds based on the contribution of eligible people (more work done → bigger share of the payout)
This will make the payment ($/hr) flexible but will ensure the treasury is not drained. It would be more like a donation based on work done than an actual payment (with a pre negotiated rate). To avoid overpayment at times of high GRC prices or low contribution the 30$/hr rate could be introduced as a cap.
And finally the foundation funds should not be held in GRC exclusively. We would be way better off if we held 50% of the funds in BTC, ETH or USD. With the latest developments in Ethereum it might even be possible to hold a basket of coins in a single multisig ethereum address. To reach the desired allocation, the GRC could be sold off in OTC (over the counter) transactions (maybe in chuncks of 1% a month) at market price to not impact the exchange rate too much. OTC trades would also eliminate the risks involved with exchanges.
This could also open up the possibility of an incentive program for active participants. It could work similar to employee stock options. The Gridcoin network could offer active participants the option to buy GRC at a discount (maybe 10% below current market rate) if it needs to sell GRC.
If the non GRC part of the funds would significantly exceed 50% of the total, we would use that to buy GRC OTC.
The fact that only a fixed percentage of the holdings is payed out each year removes the immediate fear of draining the funds too quickly. This should somewhat remove the problem of billing less than actually contributed. The payment would most probably be less than with the fixed rate but it removes the concerns and discussions currently holding back the payments. And if the price of GRC would go up in value the payment in USD terms would go up as well. The fact that 50% of the funds would be held in non GRC assets could ensure development incentives in times of low GRC prices. It would also put upward pressure on the GRC price, because some GRC are sold OTC and not on the market.
I think for now it is the best way to let trusted community members (Jim and Jringo) manage the distribution of the funds. Until someone comes up with a better solution, this is the only way the distribution can be handled in a timely manner. In the long run it would of course be great to have either a trustless system or a legal entity handling this. But I don't think this will happen anytime soon.
Personally I think it would be great if this could work donation based. If the GRC released from the foundation funds are restricted, it would not be necessary to receive a constant flow of donations. However there is a good chance that the donations are not sufficient over a longer time period. I am not against a protocol level development fee, I even initially proposed it together with the CBR https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@skcin/gridcoin-reward-mechanism-and-how-to-improve-it. But I am against changing the tokenomics of GRC if not absolutely necessary. So, if it is necessary to give part of the block rewards to the foundation budget I would at least argue to keep the inflation as it is.
These are my thoughts on the topic. I hope this important issue can be resolved so that Gridcoin can continue to thrive.
jring-o
commented
3 years ago Audio discussion #2
barton2526
commented
3 years ago Any updates on this?
skcin
commented
3 years ago Hey, if there is any interest in multi asset reserves I could provide a python script handling the rebalancing calculations. You put in the assets you hold and it pulls the current prices from coinmarketcap and calculate the rebalancing actions necessary to reach the target allocation.
A workflow could look like this:
• once a year run the script to determin the yearly budget • the multisig key holders release the GRC accordingly • monthly or quarterly run the script to check if any reallocation is necessary • multisig keyholders would have to perform the OTC transactions
Let me know if you want me to release it.
jring-o
commented
3 years ago Here is the next draft.
I think it is important to keep in mind that there are two parts to this proposal.
Once past work has been paid for and funds are allocated to the two programs, more detailed budgets can be established within those programs. At the same time a treasury system can be developed to supplement funding into the future.
Changes
The biggest change is in the funding rate for Fern development. Working off of Jim's idea from the audio discussions I have translated $30/hr into %coinsupply/hr. There are several benefits to this model:
Other changes:
Foundation Purse: 30,000,000 GRC - bc3NA8e8E3EoTL1qhRmeprbjWcmuoZ26A2 Circulating Supply: 440,000,000 GRC
Rate: 0.000681% circulating supply/hr Rate: 2,996.4 GRC/hr
Jim: 1,500 hrs | 4,494,600 GRC Cy: 3,000 hrs | 8,989,200 GRC Total: 4,500 hrs | 13,483,800 GRC
Remaining: 16,516,200 GRC
Because we cannot calculate hours for this work, we must simply allocate funds. Future payment would would be based on the 30$/hr protocol until a replacement is approved by the network.
Total: 2,000,000 GRC
Barton - Testnet Coordination: 1,000,000 GRC Ravon - Work prior to Fern: 500,000 GRC iFoggz - Work prior to Fern: 500,000 GRC
Remaining in Purse: 14,516,200
Because we cannot calculate hours for this work, we must simply allocate funds. Future payment will be based on a protocol approved by the network.
2,350,000 GRC
Jringo: $5,000 -- 500,000 GRC Roboticmind: $5,000 -- 500,000 GRC Startail: $5,000 - 500,000 GRC Delta: $5,000 - 500,000 GRC Gridcoin2Moon: $2,500 -- 250,000 GRC Shmoogle: $1,000 -- 100,000 GRC
Remaining in Purse: 12,516,200
6,258,100 GRC
Remaining in Purse: 6,258,100 GRC
6,258,100 GRC
Remaining in Purse: 0 GRC
Payments are made in equal payments over 18 months, subject to the retention of the developer or contributor in their role. (I.e. if Cycy or Jim or anyone were to go dark in those 18 months, the payments would stop.)
A program run by Jim that would define software priorities, maintain the Gridcoin codebase via patches and updates, allocate resources, welcome and educate new developers.
A program run by Jim, Cy, and Jringo that would initiate bounties that advance the Gridcoin network, develop the codebase, engage the community, and reach out to external parties.
iFoggz
commented
3 years ago Well finally got around to reading this lengthy topic.
I remember back in the day during the rob-fork-athon was about when I stepped into the Gridcoin development arena. A challenge I've not regretted at all from facing on head first. I started to provide fixes to problems and finding those needles in a hay stack. I put in hundreds of hours sifting and troubleshooting during those dark times. Finally once that nightmare was over I felt a great accomplishment to be able to contribute to a thriving network. This attracted me to continue on forward and build the community and network.
I remember when developer compensation was a heated topic but was one I supported. It was nice to see the developers getting some love and appreciation from the network. I believe compensating developers is a good way to keep good long term developers. I also believe keeping the foundation alive is important as well.
Continuing forward I took part in numerous tasks to help strengthen the network and I still plan to do so now and in the future.
I believe in the proposal to be fair as Gridcoin has taken many overhauls to get it to where it is today. I as well as other developers have put in hundreds of hours that were not billed for.
I am proud of the work of the community that has made Gridcoin to where it is today. The scraper was a huge milestone in my opinion and I'm glad part of my original code ideas was implemented in it as well. I had started to develop a scraper for the stats originally but had to take a leave due to family reasons and it felt good to know some of what I worked on could be included and that jim and cycy could make the dream a reality. It was a huge undertaking that had to be done and I stand behind them both. The process took a lot of time and I believe compensation should be in order.
I understand the anxiety in the community about such a large amount of funds being transferred and that is completely understandable.
I support this proposal not because I'm getting recognition for my past work before fern but because I believe in every one of the people who have put the time and energy into Gridcoin to get our coin to where it is today from the ruins it was in when Rob was around.
We continue to thrive and grow and I look forward to Gridcoins bright future. Keep up the great work.
jring-o
commented
3 years ago The poll has been made
Time to restore credibility to the developer compensation program and allocate funds for the future.
I'll leave my opinions for the comments. Here are the proposed numbers. Much of this proposal comes from Jim.
We could vote on it or not.
Starting Point
Foundation Purse: 30,400,000 GRC - bc3NA8e8E3EoTL1qhRmeprbjWcmuoZ26A2 USD:GRC - $0.01
Use of Funds
Paying Core Devs for Fern, Gladys, and other recent bug fixes:
Rate: $30/hr
Jim: 1,500 hrs Cy: 3,000 hrs Total: 4,500
Jim: $45,000 Cy: $90,000 Total: $135,000
Jim: 4,500,000 GRC Cy: 9,000,000 GRC Total: 13,500,000 GRC
Remaining in Purse: 16,900,000
Paying Other Devs For Past Work
Barton - Testnet Coordination: $10,000 -- 1,000,000 GRC Ravon - Work prior to Fern: $5,000 -- 500,000 GRC iFoggz - Work prior to Fern: $5,000 -- 500,000 GRC
Remaining in Purse: 14,900,000
Paying Non-dev Contributors for Past Work
Jringo: $5,000 -- 500,000 GRC Roboticmind: $5,000 -- 500,000 GRC Gridcoin2Moon: $2,500 -- 250,000 GRC Shmoogle: $1,000 -- 100,000 GRC
Remaining in Purse: 13,550,000
Allocation to Future Development Program
6,775,000 GRC
Remaining in Purse: 6,775,000 GRC
Allocation to Bounty Program
6,775,000 GRC
Remaining in Purse: 0 GRC
Payment Process
Payments are made in equal payments over 12 months, subject to the retention of the developer or contributor in their role. (I.e. if Cycy or Jim or anyone were to go dark in those 12 months, the payments would stop.)
Future Development Program
Run by Jim with input from other developers.
Bounty Program
Run by Jim, Cy, and Jringo with input from other contributors.