gunagyaArmorcode / test8

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attRedirectInURL #29

Open armorcodegithubqa[bot] opened 2 years ago

armorcodegithubqa[bot] commented 2 years ago

Threat Class :URL Redirector Abuse Reason :The test result seems to indicate a vulnerability because the response contains a redirection to demo.testfire.net, showing that the application allows redirection to external sites, a weakness which can be exploited for phishing attacks. Technical Description :Phishing is a social engineering technique where an attacker masquerades as a legitimate entity with which the victim might do business in order to prompt the user to reveal some confidential information (frequently authentication credentials) that can later be used by an attacker. Phishing is essentially a form of information gathering or "fishing" for information. An http parameter was found to hold a URL value and cause the web application to redirect the request to the specified URL. By modifying the URL value to a malicious site, an attacker may successfully launch a phishing scam and steal user credentials. The fact that the server name in the modified link is identical to the original site helps the attacker by giving his phishing attempts a more reliable appearance. Risk :It is possible to persuade a naive user to supply sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, social security number etc.

Mitigation: There are several mitigation techniques: [1] Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur, or provides constructs that make it easier to avoid. Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket. [2] Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies. For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters. Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the: [-] HTML body [-] Element attributes (such as src="XYZ") [-] URIs [-] JavaScript sections [-] Cascading Style Sheets and style property Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body. Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed. [3] Strategy: Identify and Reduce Attack Surface Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls. [4] Strategy: Output Encoding For every web page that is generated, use and specify a character encoding such as ISO-8859-1 or UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, the web browser may choose a different encoding by guessing which encoding is actually being used by the web page. This can cause the web browser to treat certain sequences as special, opening up the client to subtle XSS attacks. See CWE-116 for more mitigations related to encoding/escaping. [5] Strategy: Identify and Reduce Attack Surface To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XMLHTTPRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set. [6] Strategy: Input Validation Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy: a whitelist of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. Do not rely exclusively on a blacklist of malicious or malformed inputs. However, blacklists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if you are expecting colors such as "red" or "blue." When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent whitelists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon ("<3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities. Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address. Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.

https://qa.armorcode.ai/#/findings/5403360

armorcodegithubqa[bot] commented 2 years ago

test

by Gunagya Chordia via ArmorCode Platform

gunagyaArmorcode commented 2 years ago

test

armorcodegithubqa[bot] commented 2 years ago

okta

by Varsha Madathil via ArmorCode Platform