Open hats-bug-reporter[bot] opened 5 months ago
It wouldn't be high since such large value increases would be unrealistic per Orchestrator, however I see the point and value really is extracted.
@0xmahdirostami
A colleague said it very well: "This would be a potential loss of funds that were not intended to be there in the first place" The possible direkt transfer of funds are not inteded for the Rebasing Funding manager. If a project was to send tokens they would do it via the deposit function. This is a good find, but as the funds of users are not at risk here we decided to go with a medium finding
Github username: @0x3b33 Twitter username: @0x3b33 Submission hash (on-chain): 0xa97510eedf2caa18cca5455d3d7b08bc891c5e470687ef5c1f2069f60f6da1ed Severity: high
Description: Description\ FM_Rebasing_v1 is vulnerable to JIT (just in time liquidity). Users can front-run an increase in bit value and deposit large amounts of assets. The same can be said for withdrawals, where users will avoid a value decrease.
Attack Scenario\ A user can track deposit TX (not normal ones, but ones that increase the bits value) front-run them by making a large deposit, and then back-run them with a withdrawal. This allows them to extract a portion of the rewards with no risk.
Example:
Bob profited 50% of the rewards that should have been sent to active depositors. In real scenarios, the profits might not be that large, however, some parts of the value increase will still be MEV'd.
Recommendation\ Implement a withdrawal window to disincentivize whales from sandwiching value increases.