Reward calculation is incorrect

[hats-bug-reporter[bot]]

Github username: @8ahoz Submission hash (on-chain): 0x9c755d2f8bba921b6311df35afcfcd314adf98a3eebec6aa273d59a2a7c718c7 Severity: medium severity

Description:

Reward calculation is incorrect

configureRewards() in DistributionManager.sol can be called by EMISSION_MANAGER to create a new incentivizedAsset with reward config. This function first checks _incentivizedAssets mapping and if the incentivized asset does not exist there it pushes the asset to the _allIncentivizedAssets array. Then it does a similar thing for reward asset, however this time check happens in incentivizedAsset.rewardData which means the function checks if the rewardData exists for that specific incentivizedAsset and if that specific reward address is not set for that specific incentivized asset index, the reward token gets pushed to the _allRewards array which is global for all incentivized assets.

The issue described above will cause the same reward data to be pushed to the array more than once if it is used as a reward to multiple incentivized assets. By checking IncentivesController:claimReward() we can understand the protocol plans to use the same reward token for multiple assets which means the double accounting of reward tokens in _allRewards is inevitable.

IncentivesController:getPendingRewards() iterates through all assets for a user, and for each asset it iterates over each reward in _allRewards array. As explained above, rewards will be saved in this array more than once which will cause reward to be accounted multiple times for the same asset and same reward. Causing returned reward amount to be multiplied by the times the reward token is used in the protocol.

A similar issue exists for IncentivesController:claimAllRewards() Here again, the same reward is accounted multiple times but thanks to the following line, subsequent accountings will return only 0 extra reward to the claimer, preventing a critical vulnerability but still causing all claimers to overpay for gas for each time the reward token is used. https://github.com/VMEX-finance/vmex/blob/68e969e252d7fb501e308c230dbba0967965c9f3/packages/contracts/contracts/protocol/incentives/IncentivesController.sol#L217

PoC:

• EMISSION_MANAGER calls configureReward for assetA with reward tokenX
• EMISSION_MANAGER calls configureReward for assetB with reward tokenX
• EMISSION_MANAGER calls configureReward for assetC with reward tokenX
• Since tokenX is pushed to the _allRewards 3 times, getPendingRewards() returns 3x rewards for every user
• claimAllRewards() also calculates rewards for each asset 3 times, making it more costly

Recommendation:

configureRewards() should not push the same reward token to _allRewards more than once. Keep a mapping for already added reward tokens, and only push to array if the token is not in the mapping.

[skyao2002]

Thanks for the submission. This is definitely a valid concern and we appreciate the catch. The getPendingRewards function will return inaccurate information. The claimAllRewards is slightly gas inefficient, making users pay slightly more.

We believe this issue does not quite meet the requirements for a medium severity issue:

• Gas griefing attacks
• Attacks that make essential functionality of the contracts temporarily unusable or inaccessible
• Short-term freezing of user funds

We will move this issue to a low severity issue. Thanks again for your submission.