mnot
commented
10 years ago julian.reschke@gmx.de changed description from:
Jari Arkko
Comment (2013-12-19)
Kathleen Moriarty made a Gen-ART review which raised comments which I believe would be useful to consider (but we've not seen a reply yet).
Minor issues:
In section 2.1, in third to last paragraph, why is ought used here instead of a keyword? This is a point that could help with interoperability, so I think a keyword is important. Unless there is another error message, one should be provided when the role access requirements are not met. Users would expect this functionality.
Nits/editorial comments:
Section 3.2.1 - please fix the run-on sentence, the first one as it is difficult to read. Suggestion: From: If a server receives a request for an access-protected object, and an acceptable Authorization header is not sent, the server responds with a "401 Unauthorized" status code, and a WWW-Authenticate header as per the framework defined above, which for the digest scheme is utilized as follows: To: If a server receives a request for an access-protected object and an acceptable Authorization header is not sent. The server responds with a "401 Unauthorized" status code and a WWW-Authenticate header as per the framework defined above. For the digest scheme, this is utilized as follows:
Section 4.1, second to last paragraph. Please consider rewording the content in parenthesis, it is difficult to read and probably found just be a separate sentence rather than included with the prior sentence in parenthesis. "If a request is authenticated and a realm specified, the same credentials are presumed to be valid for all other requests within this realm (assuming that the authentication scheme itself does not require otherwise, such as credentials that vary according to a challenge value or using synchronized clocks)."
Section 4.2, second paragraph, consider breaking the following sentence into two: From: However, if a recipient proxy needs to obtain its own credentials by requesting them from a further outbound client, it will generate its own 407 response, which might have the appearance of forwarding the Proxy-Authenticate header field if both proxies use the same challenge set. To: However, if a recipient proxy needs to obtain its own credentials by requesting them from a further outbound client, it will generate its own 407 response. This might have the appearance of forwarding the Proxy-Authenticate header field if both proxies use the same challenge set.
Section 4.4, the last paragraph could be read more clearly with the following change: From: This header field contains two challenges; one for the "Newauth" scheme with a realm value of "apps", and two additional parameters "type" and "title", and another one for the "Basic" scheme with a realm value of "simple". To: This header field contains two challenges; one for the "Newauth"scheme with a realm value of "apps" and two additional parameters "type" and "title", and the second for the "Basic" scheme with a realm value of "simple".
Section 6: Security Considerations Could you add in text to inform developers that content should not be accessed before authentication occurs when required? I know this sounds obvious, but I recently ran into this issue. On a Mac, I am able to see that the application server/database information is actually loaded before I authenticate (sure there is a SQL injection happening here too) and the screen is slightly greyed out. On a PC, it appears to block access, but this is a display thing rather than requiring the authentication to actually work prior to serving content. Perhaps something like the following:
When a web service is configured to use authentication, content from the application server requiring authentication MUST not be accessed until the authentication has completed successfully.
Richard Barnes
Comment (2013-12-18)
COMMENT 1: In Section 3.1, suggest clarifying:
OLD: "The origin server MUST send a WWW-Authenticate ... target resource."
NEW: "The origin server MUST send a WWW-Authenticate ... target resource. (If the server is unwilling to grant access for any credentials, it should instead use the 403 (Forbidden) status code.)"
Sean Turner
Comment (2013-12-19)
*) I'll not repeats the OWS discuss point from p1. If it gets changed there I assume it will get changed here. If not then this can be ignored.
0) Abstract: Maybe would add stateless in front of protocol in the description.
1) So I guess the reason we're not saying TLS is an MTI with basic/digest is that that's getting done in an httpauth draft? It really wouldn't hurt to duplicate that while we're getting the other one done (I know you don't want a reference to that draft).
Stephen Farrell
Comment (2013-12-18)
2.2: shouldn't there be some mention of how realms map to web-origins here? I don't necessarily mean in a normative manner, but to explain.
4.2: I didn't find the description of chains of proxies very clear. An example would help I think. Although it looks like chains of proxies all doing 407 are not very well defined - is that fair?
Please check the secdir review. 1 I agree with the comment that this really should have some mention of using TLS to protect basic/digest, even if that ought also be elsewhere.
1 http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg03491.html
to:
Jari Arkko
Comment (2013-12-19)
Kathleen Moriarty made a Gen-ART review which raised comments which I believe would be useful to consider (but we've not seen a reply yet).
'' this is a copy of 522 ''
Richard Barnes
Comment (2013-12-18)
COMMENT 1: In Section 3.1, suggest clarifying:
OLD: "The origin server MUST send a WWW-Authenticate ... target resource."
NEW: "The origin server MUST send a WWW-Authenticate ... target resource. (If the server is unwilling to grant access for any credentials, it should instead use the 403 (Forbidden) status code.)"
Sean Turner
Comment (2013-12-19)
*) I'll not repeats the OWS discuss point from p1. If it gets changed there I assume it will get changed here. If not then this can be ignored.
0) Abstract: Maybe would add stateless in front of protocol in the description.
1) So I guess the reason we're not saying TLS is an MTI with basic/digest is that that's getting done in an httpauth draft? It really wouldn't hurt to duplicate that while we're getting the other one done (I know you don't want a reference to that draft).
Stephen Farrell
Comment (2013-12-18)
2.2: shouldn't there be some mention of how realms map to web-origins here? I don't necessarily mean in a normative manner, but to explain.
4.2: I didn't find the description of chains of proxies very clear. An example would help I think. Although it looks like chains of proxies all doing 407 are not very well defined - is that fair?
Please check the secdir review. 1 I agree with the comment that this really should have some mention of using TLS to protect basic/digest, even if that ought also be elsewhere.
1 http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg03491.html
Jari Arkko
Comment (2013-12-19)
Kathleen Moriarty made a Gen-ART review which raised comments which I believe would be useful to consider (but we've not seen a reply yet).
'' this is a copy of #522''
Richard Barnes
Comment (2013-12-18)
COMMENT 1: In Section 3.1, suggest clarifying:
OLD: "The origin server MUST send a WWW-Authenticate ... target resource."
NEW: "The origin server MUST send a WWW-Authenticate ... target resource. (If the server is unwilling to grant access for any credentials, it should instead use the 403 (Forbidden) status code.)" -- ''we already say that in 2.1: A server receiving credentials that are valid, but not adequate to gain access, ought to respond with the 403 (Forbidden) status code (Section 6.5.3 of [Part2]).''
Sean Turner
Comment (2013-12-19)
*) I'll not repeats the OWS discuss point from p1. If it gets changed there I assume it will get changed here. If not then this can be ignored. -- ''see #537''
0) Abstract: Maybe would add stateless in front of protocol in the description. -- ''see #538''
1) So I guess the reason we're not saying TLS is an MTI with basic/digest is that that's getting done in an httpauth draft? It really wouldn't hurt to duplicate that while we're getting the other one done (I know you don't want a reference to that draft). -- ''see #539''
Stephen Farrell
Comment (2013-12-18)
2.2: shouldn't there be some mention of how realms map to web-origins here? I don't necessarily mean in a normative manner, but to explain. -- ''They do not map to web origins directly; we discussed whether to ref the Origin spec but decided not to; see #322''
4.2: I didn't find the description of chains of proxies very clear. An example would help I think. Although it looks like chains of proxies all doing 407 are not very well defined - is that fair? -- ''fixed in 2558''
Please check the secdir review. (http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg03491.html) I agree with the comment that this really should have some mention of using TLS to protect basic/digest, even if that ought also be elsewhere. -- ''see #539''
Reported by julian.reschke@gmx.de, migrated from https://trac.ietf.org/trac/httpbis/ticket/536