...botched deployments not not only harm the domain in question, but also have a deterrent effect on adoption by others.
in the first section, I just want to point of that based on my practical experience, most DANE breakage (which might hamper DANE validation adoption) stemmed from recipient domains with broken DNSSEC (not even running DANE), rather than broken DANE. That being said, I believe that the said paragraph is accurate, and will become increasingly important as DANE usage increases, and DNSSEC development become more mature.
Regarding the paragraph
in the first section, I just want to point of that based on my practical experience, most DANE breakage (which might hamper DANE validation adoption) stemmed from recipient domains with broken DNSSEC (not even running DANE), rather than broken DANE. That being said, I believe that the said paragraph is accurate, and will become increasingly important as DANE usage increases, and DNSSEC development become more mature.