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Microsoft Office 2007 MSO.dll Arbitrary Free #417

Closed GoogleCodeExporter closed 9 years ago

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago 
The following crash was observed in Microsoft Office 2007 with Microsoft Office 
File Validation Add-In disabled and Application Verifier enabled for testing 
and reproduction. This bug did not reproduce in Office 2010 running on Windows 
7 x86. The attached PoC file will reproduce when Word is closed. However, there 
were other crashing files (not attached) faulting on the same EIP that did not 
require Word to be be closed to trigger the crash. This particular PoC did not 
minimize cleanly and has 666 deltas from the original non-fuzzed file.

Attached files:
Fuzzed non-minimized PoC: 2435406723_crash.doc
Original non-fuzzed file: 2435406723_orig.doc

DLL Versions:
mso.dll: 12.0.6721.5000
wwlib.dll: 12.0.6720.5000

Observed Crash:
eax=0012bd13 ebx=000008ac ecx=00000003 edx=334b9dbc esi=00019910 edi=00000000
eip=329dc5b6 esp=0012bd04 ebp=0012bd08 iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00010246

mso!Ordinal649:
329dc5a3 55              push    ebp
329dc5a4 8bec            mov     ebp,esp
329dc5a6 56              push    esi
329dc5a7 8b7508          mov     esi,dword ptr [ebp+8]
329dc5aa 85f6            test    esi,esi
329dc5ac 742b            je      mso!Ordinal649+0x36 (329dc5d9)
329dc5ae 8d4d0b          lea     ecx,[ebp+0Bh]
329dc5b1 e8aad2feff      call    mso!Ordinal6797+0xa8 (329c9860)
=> 329dc5b6 ff36            push    dword ptr [esi]      
ds:0023:00019910=????????
329dc5b8 e8d5cbfeff      call    mso!MsoFreePv (329c9192)

0:000> kb 8
ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to Child              
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0012bd08 31252d68 00019910 0db269c0 0012bd54 mso!Ordinal649+0x13
0012bd18 31339e69 0db26f94 0db269c0 035784cc wwlib!FMain+0xe7b1
0012bd54 31338a56 00000000 00000080 035784cc wwlib!FMain+0xf58b2
0012bda4 313385a6 0db269c0 00000800 00000000 wwlib!FMain+0xf449f
0012bdc4 31337401 00000000 00000800 9d186de9 wwlib!FMain+0xf3fef
0012be2c 3133720b 00000000 0db269c0 00000000 wwlib!FMain+0xf2e4a
0012ceac 3134d981 00d20192 00000000 00000001 wwlib!FMain+0xf2c54
0012cf40 7739b6e3 00d20192 00000010 00000000 wwlib!FMain+0x1093ca

The value in esi is coming from [arg0+5d4] in the calling function. This value 
was set in a different code path. If we find where arg0 was originally 
allocated and set a memory write hardware breakpoint on that location we can 
find several writes to this location. The value 00019910 is set from the 
following code:

eax=00019910 ebx=00000038 ecx=00000000 edx=00000003 esi=0da3e9c0 edi=0da3ef98
eip=3128d559 esp=0012cacc ebp=0012caf8 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000202

0:000> kb L8
ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to Child              
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0012caf8 3128d49e 00000000 0000000a aae8528c wwlib!FMain+0x48fa2
0012cc44 31497035 0da3e9c0 0001a1ab 00000000 wwlib!FMain+0x48ee7
0012cd38 3149812e 0da3e9c0 0001a1ab 0012d050 wwlib!DllGetLCID+0x2275f
0012d4a8 31497d09 0da3e9c0 0001a1ab 3211f0e4 wwlib!DllGetLCID+0x23858
0012d830 31498500 3211e7e0 80000001 0001a1ab wwlib!DllGetLCID+0x23433
0012dcac 6bdd1fb9 3211e7e0 0012dd4c 0012dd08 wwlib!DllGetLCID+0x23c2a
0012dd70 6bddfb4b 021aeec4 0012df80 0012ddac MSPTLS!LssbFIsSublineEmpty+0x2501
0012dd80 6bddff92 00000000 0012dfa4 0012df7c MSPTLS!LssbFIsSublineEmpty+0x10093

3128d54a 2bc8            sub     ecx,eax
3128d54c 8dbc86ac050000  lea     edi,[esi+eax*4+5ACh]
3128d553 8b45f4          mov     eax,dword ptr [ebp-0Ch]
3128d556 41              inc     ecx
=> 3128d557 f3ab            rep stos dword ptr es:[edi]
3128d559 837deeff        cmp     dword ptr [ebp-12h],0FFFFFFFFh 
ss:0023:0012cae6=00019427

To exploit this bug an attacker must spray memory until virtual address 
0x00019000 is reserved and committed into the running process. Then, at offset 
0x910 in that page the attacker must place any address he or she wishes to 
free. This will lead to an exploitable arbitrary free vulnerability.

Original issue reported on code.google.com by scvi...@google.com on 1 Jun 2015 at 6:37

Attachments:

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago 
This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. If 90 days elapse without 
a broadly available patch, then the bug report will automatically become 
visible to the public.

Original comment by scvi...@google.com on 1 Jun 2015 at 6:40

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago

Original comment by scvi...@google.com on 1 Jun 2015 at 6:41

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago

Original comment by scvi...@google.com on 1 Jun 2015 at 8:22

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago

Original comment by scvi...@google.com on 19 Aug 2015 at 12:45

GoogleCodeExporter commented 9 years ago

Original comment by scvi...@google.com on 26 Aug 2015 at 6:25