ios-xr / gisobuild

Golden ISO build tool for ios-xr
Other
28 stars 14 forks source link

CVE-2007-4559 Patch #28

Closed TrellixVulnTeam closed 1 year ago

TrellixVulnTeam commented 1 year ago

Patching CVE-2007-4559

Hi, we are security researchers from the Advanced Research Center at Trellix. We have began a campaign to patch a widespread bug named CVE-2007-4559. CVE-2007-4559 is a 15 year old bug in the Python tarfile package. By using extract() or extractall() on a tarfile object without sanitizing input, a maliciously crafted .tar file could perform a directory path traversal attack. We found at least one unsantized extractall() in your codebase and are providing a patch for you via pull request. The patch essentially checks to see if all tarfile members will be extracted safely and throws an exception otherwise. We encourage you to use this patch or your own solution to secure against CVE-2007-4559. Further technical information about the vulnerability can be found in this blog.

If you have further questions you may contact us through this projects lead researcher Kasimir Schulz.

NeilKetley commented 1 year ago

Patching CVE-2007-4559

Hi, we are security researchers from the Advanced Research Center at Trellix. We have began a campaign to patch a widespread bug named CVE-2007-4559. CVE-2007-4559 is a 15 year old bug in the Python tarfile package. By using extract() or extractall() on a tarfile object without sanitizing input, a maliciously crafted .tar file could perform a directory path traversal attack. We found at least one unsantized extractall() in your codebase and are providing a patch for you via pull request. The patch essentially checks to see if all tarfile members will be extracted safely and throws an exception otherwise. We encourage you to use this patch or your own solution to secure against CVE-2007-4559. Further technical information about the vulnerability can be found in this blog.

If you have further questions you may contact us through this projects lead researcher Kasimir Schulz.

Thank you for flagging this up. Having taken a look into the issue and proposed fix I have a few thoughts to share. The potential issue, in this circumstance, is unlikely to be a concern as it is mitigated by security steps that must be followed, for other reasons, regarding the tarballs being used. Despite that we will take steps to address the vulnerability.

The proposed fix has some gaps. It does not deal with file names with absolute paths (i.e. starting with '/') nor with elements within the tarball that are symlinks to locations "outside" the tarball extract location. So we have come up with our own set of changes which we will be releasing in due course.