Para poder contrastar un poco con lo propuesto por Sandra, tendría que ver que es lo que tiene Peirce acerca de la inferencia.
Textos sobre Peirce la inferencia y el razonamiento
[ ] Atkins, Richard Kenneth, 'Validity', Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers (New York, 2023; online edn, Oxford Academic, 20 July 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197689066.003.0004, accessed 3 July 2024
Introducción y capítulo 1 y 4
[ ] Michael, Frederick & Michael, Emily (1979). Peirce on the nature of logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (1):84-88.
[ ] Levi, Isaac. "Inference and Logic According to Peirce" In The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy of C.S. Peirce edited by Jacqueline Brunning and Paul Forster, 34-56. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442682276-005
[ ] Poggiani, Francesco. “What Makes a Reasoning Sound? C. S. Peirce’s Normative Foundation of Logic.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48, no. 1 (2012): 31–50. https://doi.org/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.48.1.31.
[ ] O’Neill, L. J. “Aspects of Peirce’s Theory of Inference.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 34, no. 2 (1998): 436–49. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320702.
[ ] AULETTA, GENNARO. “A Critical Examination of Peirce’s Theory of Natural Inferences.” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 73, no. 3/4 (2017): 1053–94. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26291328.
Originally posted by @ivanvgav in #8