Open ann0see opened 1 year ago
Is this code change intended to thwart the connection floods we've seen? I believe those floods aren't possible when a server's firewall blocks UDP packets from random sources. Would this code change benefit servers that block random UDP packets?
Is this code change intended to thwart the connection floods we've seen?
There's no code yet, but yes, it should make the software a bit stricter.
I believe those floods aren't possible when a server's firewall blocks UDP packets from random sources.
The problem is: how would you conclude that some source is "random"? Having a firewall surely helps. My server even uses a blacklist - but that's a protection on a lower level and mainly protects other services.
It would be good to see if we can even reproduce the observed behaviour on modern servers. Maybe bIsIdentified is enough
A source is random when it doesn't rely on the directory server to open a connection prior to use. I believe this prevents random connections outside the directory protocol from reaching a server. So my servers should be immune to this particular attack. I could open UDP and make a server susceptible to that type of attack. Of course, private servers (more accurately called unlisted servers) must open UDP to anyone.
Ok. But as you said that doesn't hold true for unlisted servers or direct connections. So that's only a small "solution" if you even want to call it that.
Thanks for watching out for users in all scenarios. I do limit my scope to developing the directory-based public network.
Even though #2935 is already old, I think we should still consider hardening the "connection" process. @dtinth proposed a "waiting room" approach, which we kind of already have (we already have something like this: https://github.com/jamulussoftware/jamulus/blob/2505a3154aa69459d5bcb3ae0ff8d189fdb0cb83/src/channel.cpp#L39).
Originally posted by @dtinth in https://github.com/jamulussoftware/jamulus/discussions/2935#discussioncomment-4191832