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Triggered downstream pipeline to see what breaks https://gitlab.cee.redhat.com/rhidp/rhdh/-/pipelines/8477481
This PR contains the following updates:
==2.1.0
->==2.2.2
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2024-37891
When using urllib3's proxy support with
ProxyManager
, theProxy-Authorization
header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected.However, when sending HTTP requests without using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the
Proxy-Authorization
header even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat theProxy-Authorization
HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects.Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the
Proxy-Authorization
header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident.Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the
Proxy-Authorization
header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.Affected usages
We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:
Proxy-Authorization
header without using urllib3's built-in proxy support.Remediation
Proxy-Authorization
header with urllib3'sProxyManager
.redirects=False
when sending requests.Proxy-Authorization
header.urllib3's Proxy-Authorization request header isn't stripped during cross-origin redirects
CVE-2024-37891 / GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf
More information
#### Details When using urllib3's proxy support with `ProxyManager`, the `Proxy-Authorization` header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected. However, when sending HTTP requests *without* using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the `Proxy-Authorization` header even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat the `Proxy-Authorization` HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects. Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the `Proxy-Authorization` header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident. Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the `Proxy-Authorization` header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach. ##### Affected usages We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited: * Setting the `Proxy-Authorization` header without using urllib3's built-in proxy support. * Not disabling HTTP redirects. * Either not using an HTTPS origin server or for the proxy or target origin to redirect to a malicious origin. ##### Remediation * Using the `Proxy-Authorization` header with urllib3's `ProxyManager`. * Disabling HTTP redirects using `redirects=False` when sending requests. * Not using the `Proxy-Authorization` header. #### Severity - CVSS Score: 4.4 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N` #### References - [https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf](https://togithub.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf) - [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37891](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37891) - [https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/40b6d1605814dd1db0a46e202d6e56f2e4c9a468](https://togithub.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/40b6d1605814dd1db0a46e202d6e56f2e4c9a468) - [https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/accff72ecc2f6cf5a76d9570198a93ac7c90270e](https://togithub.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/accff72ecc2f6cf5a76d9570198a93ac7c90270e) - [https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3](https://togithub.com/urllib3/urllib3) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://togithub.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://togithub.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).Release Notes
urllib3/urllib3 (urllib3)
### [`v2.2.2`](https://togithub.com/urllib3/urllib3/blob/HEAD/CHANGES.rst#222-2024-06-17) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/urllib3/urllib3/compare/2.2.1...2.2.2) \================== - Added the `Proxy-Authorization` header to the list of headers to strip from requests when redirecting to a different host. As before, different headers can be set via `Retry.remove_headers_on_redirect`. - Allowed passing negative integers as `amt` to read methods of `http.client.HTTPResponse` as an alternative to `None`. (`#3122Configuration
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